Judgments

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CONF-2-17

2017 FC 1047

IN THE MATTER of an Application by [***] for Warrants Pursuant to Sections 12 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23

and

IN THE MATTER of Islamist Terrorism and [***]

Indexed as: X (Re)

Federal Court, Crampton C.J.—Ottawa, March 17, May 4 and September 27, 2017.

Editor’s Note: Portions redacted by the Court are indicated by [***].

Security Intelligence — Reference seeking to determine whether information obtained by Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) from mobile devices of subject of investigation (subject) unlawful — CSIS capturing International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers with cellular-site simulator (CSS) — CSIS using CSS technology to attribute cellular device to subject whose identity already known, to “geo-locate” subject’s cellular device — Attorney General submitting, inter alia, use of CSS not contravening Radiocommunication Act, s. 9(1)(b), Criminal Code, s. 184, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8 — Whether CSIS’s use of CSS without warrant to obtain identifying characteristics of subject’s mobile devices unlawful — CSIS’s use of CSS technology not contravening Radiocommunication Act — Wording of Authority to Use Radio held by CSIS in accordance with Radiocommunication Act, s. 5(1)(a)(v) sufficiently broad to cover use of CSS equipment by CSIS — CSIS also not contravening Criminal Code — Obtaining IMSI, IMEI identifiers through use of CSS equipment not capturing any content of communications made by targeted mobile devices — Criminal Code mischief provisions also not violated — As to Charter, s. 8, while capture of IMSI, IMEI constituting “search”, such capture only minimally intrusive and is authorized by law — Nothing in language of Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Act), s. 21, or elsewhere supporting view that CSIS required to obtain warrant when engaging in minimally intrusive “search” — Act, s. 12 providing CSIS with authority to investigate suspicious activities without warrant — View that CSIS requiring warrant every time that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy engaged reading out requirement that search be “unreasonable” before it may be found contrary to Charter, s. 8 — Parliament implicitly allowing CSIS to use CSS when passing s. 12 — S. 12 reasonable law — “Reasonable grounds to suspect” standard sufficient to justify warrantless search — National security objectives sufficient to tip balance in favour of state interest when searches minimally intrusive — S. 12 neither overbroad nor vague — Scope of information CSIS may collect, retain limited to that which is “strictly necessary” — S. 12 not lacking in precision — Clearly articulating scope of activities to be investigated by CSIS — Judicial pre-authorization under Act, s. 21 necessary for more than minimally intrusive activities — Judgment: CSIS’s warrantless use of CSS technology to capture identifying characteristics of subject’s mobile devices not unlawful.

Constitutional Law — Charter of Rights — Unreasonable Search or Seizure — Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) capturing, without warrant, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers from mobile devices of subject of investigation (subject) with cellular-site simulator (CSS) — Attorney General submitting, inter alia, use of CSS not contravening Charter, s. 8 — Whether subject’s Charter, s. 8 rights violated — Specifically, whether CSIS conducting “search or seizure”, whether search or seizure “reasonable” — Individuals having reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of IMSI, IMEI identifiers — Capture of IMSI, IMEI identifiers therefore constituting “search” — However, such capture only minimally intrusive — CSIS not requiring warrant whenever wishing to gather information through use of new technology — Supreme Court making it clear there is no free-standing prohibition on use of electronic or other technologies without a warrant — Rather, question whether technology intruding on reasonable sphere of privacy of individual — Here, nothing about CSS technology per se justifying conclusion that its use objectively unreasonable — Minimally invasive search not necessarily contravening s. 8 — CSS technology reliable, not giving rise to consequences associated with “false positive” — CSIS’s CSS operations not unreasonable.

Radiocommunications — Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) capturing International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers from mobile devices of subject of investigation with cellular-site simulator (CSS) — CSIS holding Authority to Use Radio (Authority) in accordance with Radiocommunication Act, s. 5(1)(a)(v) — Wording of Authority sufficiently broad to cover use of CSS equipment by CSIS.

Criminal Justice — Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) capturing, without warrant, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers from subject of investigation with cellular-site simulator (CSS) — CSIS use of CSS without judicial authorization not contravening Criminal Code, s. 184 as no content of communications made by targeted mobile devices captured — Criminal Code mischief provisions also not violated.

This was a reference seeking to determine whether the activity in which the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) engaged to obtain information from the mobile devices of a known subject of investigation (subject) was unlawful.

The activity in question was conducted without a warrant and involved CSIS’s use of a cellular-site simulator (CSS) to capture the identifying characteristics of the mobile devices, which consisted of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers that were emitted by the mobile devices when they attempted to communicate with the cellular network of the telecommunications service providers (TSP). The IMSI number identified the country in which the subject’s cellular account is located, the network code of his TSP, and the unique subscriber identifying number given to the subject by the TSP. The IMEI identified the make, model and unique serial number of his mobile devices. CSIS currently only uses CSS technology for two purposes: (1) to attribute a cellular device to a subject of investigation whose identity is already known, and (2) to “geo-locate” a subject of investigation’s cellular device.

The Attorney General submitted, inter alia, that CSIS’s use of CSS technology solely to capture IMSI and IMEI identifiers does not contravene the Radiocommunication Act, the Criminal Code or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). Specifically, the Attorney General maintained that CSIS’s use of a CSS complies with the Radiocommunication Act because CSIS holds an Authority to Use Radio (Authority) in accordance with subparagraph 5(1)(a)(v) of the Radiocommunication Act and that, by virtue of that Authority and section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (the Act), CSIS’s use of CSS technology does not contravene paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Radiocommunication Act. CSIS also maintained that its use of a CSS without prior judicial authorization does not contravene section 184 of the Criminal Code because its CSS equipment does not intercept any private communications.

The main issue was whether CSIS’s use of a CSS without a warrant, and solely to obtain the identifying characteristics of the subject’s mobile devices, was unlawful.

Held, CSIS’s warrantless use of CSS technology to capture the identifying characteristics of the subject’s mobile devices was not unlawful.

CSIS’s use of CSS technology does not contravene the Radiocommunication Act. On its face, the wording of the Authority is sufficiently broad to cover the use of CSS equipment by CSIS. Specifically, the use of such equipment would clearly fall within the scope of the words “in respect of any and all types of specially designed radio apparatus used for the purposes specified in paragraph 2”, as they appear in paragraph 1 of the Authority. Those words appear to have contemplated that the Authority would be used in respect of radio apparatus that was not yet in existence in 1992, when the Authority was issued. Those words have the effect of allowing the Authority to be used in respect of such radio apparatus.

Obtaining IMSI and IMEI identifiers through the use of CSS equipment does not capture any content of communications made by the mobile devices that are targeted by that equipment. Accordingly, CSIS’s use of CSS technology to attribute IMSI and IMEI identifiers to a subject of investigation does not contravene Part VI of the Criminal Code. CSIS’s use of a CSS without a warrant also does not contravene the mischief provisions in section 430 of the Criminal Code. Section 12 of the Act and the Authority provide a lawful exemption from conviction under section 429 of the Criminal Code.

There were two distinct issues to be assessed in determining whether there was a violation of section 8 of the Charter, namely (i) whether there was a “search or seizure”, and (ii), if so, whether that search or seizure was “unreasonable”. A consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and taking a purposive approach to section 8 of the Charter, suggests that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the IMSI and IMEI identifiers. This is because of the nature of the information that those numbers permit CSIS to obtain or infer. The use of CSS technology therefore constitutes a “search”. It can be assumed that individuals in general likely have a subjective expectation that any information concerning their mobile devices that may be communicated to the cell towers operated by their TSPs will not be surreptitiously captured by agents of the state, such as CSIS. In addition, the average person likely would not consider his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers to have been “abandoned” when they are disclosed to cell towers by their mobile devices. There is no implied waiver of a person’s privacy rights in his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers vis-à-vis the general public, when their mobile device offers that information to the cellular environment.

CSS technology is minimally intrusive. Neither the mobile device nor its contents are accessed in any way. Although CSIS may be able to begin putting together an initial profile of the subject of investigation and communications patterns, it is difficult to see how the inferences that it may be able to draw regarding the individual’s personal activities would be particularly strong or invasive.

CSIS does not require a warrant whenever it wishes to gather information through the use of new technology. The Supreme Court made it clear that there is no “free-standing prohibition on [the use of] electronic or other technologies without a warrant.” Rather, the question is whether the technology intrudes on the reasonable sphere of privacy of an individual. The answer to this question requires an assessment of the “totality of the relevant circumstances”. In this particular case, there was nothing about CSS technology per se that would justify a conclusion that its use is objectively unreasonable. Individuals’ subjective expectations of privacy in relation to the IMSI and IMEI information on their mobile devices are objectively reasonable.

In conclusion, regarding whether the capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers constitutes a “search”, although intrusions on individuals’ anonymity interests do not always engage section 8 of the Charter, the capture of IMSI and IMEI information does reach this threshold, because of the profiles of individuals that CSIS can begin to build upon acquiring that information. It is those very profiles that may ultimately assist CSIS to obtain a warrant to acquire subscriber information and engage in even more intrusive activities. However, until CSIS is able to obtain that subscriber data and exercise other warranted powers, its capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers is only minimally intrusive.

CSIS’s use of a CSS to intercept and attribute the IMSI and IMEI numbers of a mobile device is authorized by law. There is nothing in the language of section 21, or elsewhere in the Act, that would support the view that CSIS is required to obtain a warrant anytime that it engages in a minimally intrusive “search” within the meaning of the Charter. The language of section 12 of the Act provides CSIS with all the authority it requires to investigate activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, without a warrant, unless one is required at common law. The view that CSIS requires a warrant every time that a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is engaged would conflate the two elements in section 8 of the Charter into a single element, by effectively reading out the requirement that a search be “unreasonable” before it may be found to be contrary to section 8. Parliament implicitly allowed CSIS to use a CSS to intercept and attribute the IMSI and IMEI numbers of a mobile device to a subject of investigation, based on “reasonable grounds to suspect”, when it passed section 12 of the Act.

The nature and purpose of section 12 support the view that it is a reasonable law. The “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard set forth in section 12 of the Act is sufficient to justify a warrantless search by CSIS. The national security objectives permeating section 12 will generally be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the state interest, when searches conducted by CSIS are minimally intrusive. Section 12 is neither overbroad nor vague, because it imposes objective standards and strict limits on the collection of information by CSIS. The scope of information that may be collected by CSIS is explicitly limited to that which “is strictly necessary”. This limitation also implicitly applies to the retention of information collected by CSIS. In the presence of these clearly ascertainable and understandable limitations, it cannot be said that section 12 “so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate”. On the contrary, section 12, read together with the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” set forth in section 2 of the Act, clearly articulates the scope of activities that may be investigated by CSIS. By including the provisions of section 21 pertaining to warrants in the Act, Parliament implicitly contemplated that CSIS would not conduct collection activities under section 12 that are more than minimally intrusive, without first obtaining judicial pre-authorization under section 21.

The case law relied upon by the amici does not support the proposition that a minimally invasive search necessarily contravenes section 8 of the Charter in the absence of prior judicial authorization or after-the-fact judicial control. The Supreme Court of Canada trilogy of “sniffer dog” cases, i.e. R. v. A.M., R. v. Kang-Brown and R. v. Chehil can be distinguished from CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI numbers from an individual’s wireless electronic devices. This is because CSS technology is highly reliable and therefore does not give rise to the potentially severe consequences associated with a “false positive”. The roles and responsibilities of the Minister, the Security Intelligence Review Committee and CSIS’s Director assist in ensuring that section 12 is a reasonable law for the purposes of assessing whether the minimally invasive searches that it authorizes are reasonable. The manner in which CSIS currently conducts its CSS operations is not unreasonable.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], s. 8.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23, ss. 2 “threats to the security of Canada”, 6, 12, 16, 20(2),(3),(4), 21, 21.1(1),(3),(4), 22, 27, 34(1), 38(1).

Code of Conduct Regulation, Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f).

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, ss. 183 “ intercept”, private communication”, 184, 429, 430, 487.01, 492.2.

Electric Utilities Act, S.A. 2003, c. E-5.1.

Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21, s. 51(2)(a).

Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2, ss. 2 “harmful interference”, 5(1)(a), 9(1)(b).

CASES CITED

FOLLOWED:

X (Re), 2016 FC 1105, [2017] 2 F.C.R. 396.

APPLIED:

R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211; R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212; Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 161; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (also distinguished on another ground); R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, (1993), 145 A.R. 104 (also distinguished on another ground); R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579; Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, (1984), 55 A.R. 291; R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220 (also distinguished on another ground); R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (also distinguished on another ground).

DISTINGUISHED:

R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (also considered on another ground); R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (also applied on another ground); R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, (1993), 145 A.R. 104 (also applied on another ground); Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 (also considered on another ground); R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220 (also applied on another ground); R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (also applied on another ground).

CONSIDERED:

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re), 2008 FC 300, [2008] 3 F.C.R. 477; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014 SCC 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33; Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Brewster, 2016 ONSC 4133 (CanLII); R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (also distinguished on another ground); R. v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757; R. v. Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554; Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 (also distinguished on another ground); Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1096, 457 F.T.R. 1; Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 602; Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157, 387 C.R.R. (2d) 1; Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, (1992), 114 N.S.R. (2d) 91.

REFERRED TO:

R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 568; R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, (1996), 131 D.L.R. (4th) 654; R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, (1994), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 297; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161; R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531; Wakeling v. United States of America, 2014 SCC 72, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 549; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 508; ); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, (1994), 115 D.L.R. (4th) 702; R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 673; R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652, (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, (1998), 166 D.L.R. (4th) 261; R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, [1993] 8 W.W.R. 257; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59.

AUTHORS CITED

Canada. Parliament. Senate. Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada (November 1983) (Chair: P. M. Pitfield).

“RCMP, CSIS launch investigations into phone spying on Parliament Hill after CBC story”, CBC News (April 4, 2017), online: ˂www.cbc.ca˃.

“Spies’ use of cellphone surveillance technology suspended in January, pending review”, CBC News (May 3, 2017), online: ˂www.cbc.ca˃.

Tamir Israel and Christopher Parsons, Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada, Ottawa: Telecom Transparency Project & Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic, 2016.

Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia. “International mobile subscriber identity”, online: ˂https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity˃.

REFERENCE seeking to determine whether the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s warrantless use of CSS technology to capture the indentifying characteristics from the mobile devices of a known subject of investigation was unlawful. Judgment: Such use was not unlawful.

APPEARANCES

Jennifer Poirier, Stéphanie Dion and Ilana Bleichert for Department of Justice, National Security Litigation and Advisory Group.

Gordon Cameron and Owen M. Rees as amici curiae.

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

Deputy Attorney General of Canada for Department of Justice, National Security Litigation and Advisory Group.

The following are the public reasons for judgment and judgment rendered in English by

Crampton C.J.:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	Paragraph
I.     Introduction	1
II.     Background	10
III.    This Proceeding	21
IV.   Preliminary Issue Regarding the Openness of the Hearing on the Legal Arguments	35
V.   CSS Technology	51
VI.   CSIS’s Policy Regarding the Collection and Retention of Electronic Identifiers	75
VII.  Assessment of Legal Submissions	80
A.    The Radiocommunication Act	82
B.    The Criminal Code	96
C.   Section 8 of the Charter	107
(1)  Legal Principles	107
(a)  What Constitutes a Search or Seizure?	110
(b)  What Constitutes an Unreasonable Search or Seizure?	125
(2)  Application of the Legal Principles to the Facts of this Application	137
(a)  Did CSIS’s Use of CSS Technology Constitute a “Search”?	137
(i)    The Subject Matter of the Intrusive Activity	141
(ii)   Individuals’ Interest in the Subject Matter	147
(iii)  Do Individuals Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Subject Matter?	148
(iv)  If So, Are Such Expectations Objectively Reasonable?	149
The Nature of the Privacy Interest at Stake	149
The Circumstances in which IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Are Obtained	152
The Manner and Place of the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers	153
Whether the IMSI/IMEI Identifiers have been Abandoned or Disclosed to One or More Third Parties	158
The Extent to which the Search Technique is Intrusive in Relation to the Identified Privacy Interest	161
The Relevant Statutory and Contractual Framework	164
Is the Use of CSS Technology Objectively Unreasonable?	182
Conclusion Regarding the Objective Reasonableness of Individuals’ Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Relation to the IMSI and IMEI Identifiers of their Mobile Devices	185
(v)   Conclusion Regarding Whether the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Constitutes a “Search”	187
(b)  Is CSIS’s Interception of IMSI and IMEI Numbers Unreasonable?	190
(i)    Was the “Search” Authorized by Law?	192
(ii)   Is Section 12 of the Act a Reasonable Law?	202
The Nature and Purpose of Section 12	203
The Degree of Intrusiveness Authorized by Section 12	218
The Extent to Which the Act Provides for Judicial Supervision	220
The Presence of Other “Checks and Balances” or Accountability Measures	230
Conclusion Regarding the Reasonableness of Section 12	236
(iii)  Was the Manner in Which the Search was Carried Out Unreasonable?	237
(iv)  Conclusion Regarding the Reasonableness of CSIS’s Use of CSS Technology	244
VIII. Conclusion	247
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III

I.          Introduction

[1]        In a free and democratic society, it can be expected that citizens will not want the identifying characteristics of their mobile telephones to be surreptitiously obtained by anyone, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), for the purpose of assisting to build a profile about them.

[2]        However, unless it is unlawful for CSIS to engage in such activity, it is free to do so within the parameters established by its enabling legislation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44] (the Charter). The question to be decided in this case is whether the activity in which CSIS engaged to obtain such information from the mobile devices of a known subject of investigation, [***] was in fact unlawful. That activity was conducted without a warrant and involved CSIS’s use of a cellular-site simulator (CSS) to capture the identifying characteristics of his mobile devices.

[3]        Those identifying characteristics consisted of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers that were emitted by [***] mobile devices when they attempted to communicate with the cellular network of his telecommunications service providers (TSP). The IMSI number identified the country in which [***] cellular account is located, the network code of his TSP, and the unique subscriber identifying number given to him by the TSP. The IMEI identified the make, model and unique serial number of his mobile devices.

[4]        In my view, CSIS’s use of a CSS without a warrant, and solely to obtain the identifying characteristics of [***] mobile devices, was not unlawful. This is in part because of a number of measures that were taken to ensure that the activity was minimally intrusive. So long as similar measures are followed by CSIS in the future, its CSS operations would also be lawful. In other words, they would not contravene the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2, the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, or the Charter.

[5]        Generally speaking, the measures adopted by CSIS in carrying out CSS operations should strictly limit its intrusion on the privacy rights of the subjects of its investigations. In addition, these measures should ensure that CSIS does not capture the contents of any communications or any of the contents stored on, or available through, anyone’s mobile device(s). They should also ensure that the incidentally captured information pertaining to the mobile devices of third parties is quickly destroyed and is not subject to any analysis whatsoever, once it has been confirmed that those devices are not the mobile device(s) used by the subject of investigation [***] Furthermore, CSS technology should not be used to geo-locate anyone without a warrant.

[6]        CSIS’s use of a CSS against [***] constituted a “search” within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. This is because [***] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information that CSIS was in a position to begin to gather about him, or about which it was able to make informed inferences, upon gaining access to the IMSI and IMEI numbers of his mobile devices. In brief, those numbers assisted CSIS to begin building a profile on [***] including by potentially helping CSIS to determine his [***[contacts]***] and communication patterns” with the aid of information already available to CSIS. To the extent that this enabled CSIS to begin to gain an understanding of, or to make reasoned inferences about, certain aspects of [***] core biographic personal information, it engaged his rights under section 8 of the Charter.

[7]        Nevertheless, the search was not “unreasonable”, because it was narrowly targeted, highly accurate and minimally intrusive. The CSS operations conducted by CSIS were even more minimally intrusive with respect to the information that was incidentally captured from the wireless devices of third parties, because that information was quickly destroyed and was not subject to any analysis whatsoever, after it was determined that the information did not pertain to [***] wireless devices.

[8]        More generally, the evidence in this proceeding establishes that the CSS technology used by CSIS does not permit it to identify the individual whose mobile devices are targeted by the CSS operation, or to gain access to billing or other intrusive information. Indeed, the identity of targets of CSIS’s CSS operations, as well as their location and other information, typically is already known at the time such operations are conducted. Where CSIS requires detailed billing or subscriber information from a TSP, it will require a warrant. This is because of the more highly intrusive nature of such information, which can include a listing of all calls made during a billing period, the duration of those calls, and the locations of the parties to those calls.

[9]        Agents of the state who are responsible for the safety and security of the general public may engage in minimally intrusive activities without violating section 8 of the Charter so long as those activities are authorized by law, the law is reasonable, and the activity is carried out in a reasonable fashion. Such minimally intrusive activities can include the physical surveillance of people in public, and even the monitoring of the level of heat emanating from their homes. In this case, CSIS’s use of CSS technology was authorized by section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23 (Act), section 12 is a reasonable law, and CSIS’s search was conducted in a reasonable manner.

II.          Background

[10]      This is the first proceeding in which CSIS has explicitly sought the Court’s views regarding its use of CSS technology to obtain information or intelligence in the course of an investigation, without a warrant.

[11]      CSIS has used CSS technology for that purpose for several years. However, prior to February 10, 2016, the Court was unaware of this fact. On that date, CSIS provided the Court with a copy of the classified report of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), entitled, SIRC Review 2014-03—Review of CSIS’s use of Metadata. Among other things, that report referred to two case studies. The first was entitled The Use of Metadata by the Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC) and ultimately led to a decision by my colleague, Justice Simon Noël, concerning CSIS’s program of collection and retention of such information (X (Re), 2016 FC 1105, [2017] 2 F.C.R. 396 (X (Re)). The second case study was entitled The Service’s Collection of International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Data, and provided a brief overview of the history of CSIS’s use of CSS technology. In brief, after getting introduced to the technology [***] CSIS gradually increased its use of the technology to the point that it has now been used across the country, [***]

[12]      According to SIRC’s report and the evidence provided in this proceeding, CSIS currently only uses CSS technology for two purposes, which are described in greater detail in Part V of these reasons below. The first such purpose is to attribute a cellular device to a subject of investigation whose identity is often already known. This was the case with [***] Such attribution is done by obtaining, through CSS technology, the IMSI associated with a subject of investigation’s SIM [subscriber identity module] card, as well as the IMEI that is associated with a specific mobile device. Based on the information available to SIRC at the time it prepared its report, SIRC concluded that this activity alone does not require a warrant from this Court. However, SIRC added that any change to the uses of the information captured by the use of CSS technology would require further legal consideration.

[13]      The second use that CSIS makes of CSS technology is to “geo-locate” a subject of investigation’s cellular device. SIRC observed, and CSIS has since conceded, that this use of CSS technology must be sanctioned by a warrant issued by this Court.

[14]      Before receiving SIRC’s report in February 2016, Justice Mosley inquired about CSIS’s use of the “Stingray” technology in the context of an ex parte hearing that took place on [***] and that concerned proposed changes to the template language of certain of this Court’s warrants. However, CSIS’s legal counsel was not in a position to provide a response to his general inquiry at that time.

[15]      Shortly after having had an opportunity to review SIRC’s above-mentioned report, Justice Mosley again inquired about the use of CSS technology. The affiant in that hearing [***] testified that the technology had been used in the investigation that led to that application for warrants, and explained how the technology had been used. The affiant undertook to confirm that data from the mobile devices of third parties which is collected at the time of a CSS operation is destroyed by CSIS. That confirmation ultimately was provided on [***] and again by a senior employee of CSIS, [***] during the evidentiary hearing in this application.

[16]      A similar inquiry was made by Justice Mosley, and a similar response was provided by another affiant, during the hearing of another application [***]

[17]      At a subsequent case management meeting that I co-presided with Justice Noël on [***] Justice Noël inquired about the “Stingray” technology, how it operates, and whether it was being used under this Court’s warrants.^[i] In response to Justice Noël’s request, the Deputy Director Operations (DDO) of CSIS, Mr. Jeff Yaworski, undertook to obtain the relevant details and to provide them to the Court. It was only as a result of information subsequently provided by CSIS that the Court began to gain a more fulsome appreciation of the nature and extent of CSIS’s use of CSS technology.

[18]      On [***] counsel to CSIS confirmed in a letter to the Court that there were no other instances, apart from those mentioned above, in which references were made to CSS or similar technology, in exchanges between the Court and CSIS or its counsel. At the end of that letter, the Court was informed that [***] This was the first time that the Court had been informed that CSIS was using CSS or similar technology pursuant to its warrants.

[19]      [***]

[***]

[***]

[20]      On [***] Justice Noël directed CSIS and the Attorney General “to provide information and evidence regarding the nature, scope, usage and minimization of the investigative technique called Stingray.” Justice Noël’s direction added that “[t]he Court requires the information and evidence in order to fully and clearly understand the investigative technique; and, to assess whether [***] or any other warrant provides lawful authority for the technique”. Ultimately, CSIS decided to provide that information and evidence in the context of this proceeding.

III.         This Proceeding

[21]      In this proceeding, CSIS sought a number of warrants from the Court pursuant to sections 12 and 21 of the Act to permit it to continue to investigate the activities of [***] in connection with Islamist terrorism. As explained below, I granted those warrants with two amendments, for the period commencing on [***] and ending on [***]

[22]      [***]

[23]      The IMSI and IMEI numbers that were obtained from [***] wireless devices in [***] assisted CSIS to execute interception powers that this Court authorized in [***] by ensuring that those powers were exercised against the wireless devices described in this Court’s warrants.

[24]      In support of its application for warrants in this proceeding, CSIS relied on two affidavits, provided by [***] affidavit) and [***] affidavit). In addition, CSIS and the amici submitted a number of documents, including responses to undertakings given to me during the proceeding, that were marked as exhibits.

[25]      [***]

[26]      With two exceptions, the operative language of the warrants granted in this proceeding was identical to the language of the warrants that had previously been granted by Justice [***] in respect of [***] and that had been scheduled to expire on [***] The first exception was that I included language which prohibits the use of CSS [***] in paragraph [***] warrant. That prohibition has been included in several other warrants since the Court learned that CSIS had been relying on paragraph [***] in using CSS [***] against targets of the Court’s warrants. In including that prohibition, I made it clear to CSIS and the Attorney General that this amendment to the warrant should not be taken as any pronouncement by the Court with respect to the legality of the CSS technology, whether or not used pursuant to a warrant, as these remained “live” issues in this application [***]

[27]      The second amendment that I made to the warrant powers sought in this proceeding was to delete the requested authorization to obtain [***] That amendment was made after I determined that the evidence adduced by CSIS did not establish reasonable grounds to believe that [***]

[28]      On [***] at the end of the evidentiary hearing in this proceeding, I granted the warrants sought by CSIS, with the two amendments described above. I did so after satisfying myself that, among other things, CSIS had established that there were reasonable grounds to believe that [***] activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada, as defined in paragraph 2(c) of the Act, and that CSIS required the warrants to investigate that threat.

[29]      In making my decision to grant those warrants, I relied on the evidence provided by [***] which included considerable information obtained in the course of CSIS’s investigation of Islamist terrorism as well as more specific information concerning [***] That information was obtained through various methods of investigation, including physical surveillance and warranted intercepts involving [***] Additional information was also collected from human sources, interviews, open information, government agencies in Canada and foreign agencies that are investigating Islamist terrorism. I did not rely on the very limited information that was obtained by CSIS using CSS technology against [***] without a warrant. That information was obtained through the use of the technology during a two-day period, and simply consisted of the attribution of three devices to [***] namely, [***] According to one of the affiants in this proceeding, that information has now been destroyed. For greater certainty, I also did not rely on any information that was derived from the IMSI and IMEI numbers obtained through CSIS’s use of CSS technology, including communications over any of those devices that were subsequently intercepted by CSIS.

[30]      In issuing the most recent warrants against [***] I made it clear that I would remain seized of this application in order to (i) take notice of the amendments to this Court’s warrant templates that are ultimately made as a result of the decision that Justice Simon Noël issued on October 4, 2016, in X (Re), above, (ii) make corresponding amendments to the warrants that I have provisionally issued in this proceeding, and (iii) make any further amendments to those warrants that I consider appropriate, after having had an opportunity to consider the legal submissions made in this proceeding.

[31]      As an aside, and for completeness, it is relevant to note that the Attorney General confirmed in a letter dated [***] that the only instances in which the language of [***] was relied on were [***] geo-location CSS operations. The Attorney General added that CSIS did not rely on any warrants issued by this Court to conduct any of its other past CSS operations, because it does not consider that it requires a warrant to capture IMSI and IMEI numbers for the purposes of attributing a device to a subject of investigation.

[32]      This proceeding was organized as an en banc hearing because it involves the first application to the Court in which CSIS has (i) explicitly stated that it had resorted to CSS technology in the course of investigating the activities of its subject of investigation, (ii) made submissions on the lawfulness of its use of the technique in that investigation, and (iii) provided evidence regarding its use of that technology. I considered it appropriate to convene the other designated judges of the Court to join me on the bench, so that they would have the benefit of the evidence provided by [***] including on cross-examination by the amici. I also considered it to be important that they have the benefit of responses provided by [***] to questions that any of them, or I, might pose. This should assist each of the designated judges of the Court in future applications involving CSS technology, and may reduce the need for similar evidence in such applications.

[33]      Notwithstanding the presence of other designated judges of this Court in this proceeding, I assured CSIS and representatives of the Attorney General at the outset of the hearing that was held on [***] that my judicial independence would not thereby be compromised in any way. I, and I alone, have decided the issues that have been raised in this application.

[34]      Given the importance of the legal issues raised in this application, the Court retained Mr. Gordon Cameron and Mr. Owen Rees to act as amici curiae.

IV.   Preliminary Issue Regarding the Openness of the Hearing on the Legal Arguments

[35]      During the evidentiary hearing on [***] I learned that there is more information in the public domain regarding CSS technology and its use by law enforcement agencies than I had previously appreciated. With that in mind, and having regard to the recent significant increase in public interest concerning the oversight of CSIS’s activities by the Court, I invited the Attorney General’s views as to whether it was necessary for the hearing of legal arguments concerning the CSS technology to be held in camera.

[36]      Counsel to the Attorney General undertook to seek instructions and get back to the Court on this matter. However, she observed that CSIS likely would be reluctant to participate in a public hearing on this issue, given that its use of CSS technology had never been publicly acknowledged.

[37]      Subsequently, in a letter dated [***] the Attorney General took the position that a public hearing of the legal submissions in this hearing would not be suitable. In brief, the Attorney General submitted that such a public hearing would be contrary to section 27 of the Act and could cause serious injury to Canada’s national security interests. Among other things, the Attorney General maintained that a public hearing would adversely impact [***] Instead of a public hearing, the Attorney General proposed that a public decision be issued, subject to appropriate redactions.

[38]      Section 27 of the Act states:

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23

Hearing of applications

27 An application under section 21, 21.1 or 23 for a warrant, an application under section 22 or 22.1 for the renewal of a warrant or an application for an order under section 22.3 shall be held in private in accordance with regulations made under section 28. [Emphasis added.]

[39]      In support of its position that a public hearing of the legal arguments in this proceeding would be contrary to the explicit terms of section 27, the Attorney General relied on the following passage from Justice Noël’s decision in Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re), 2008 FC 300, [2008] 3 F.C.R. 477, at paragraph 34:

Section 27 provides that applications for warrant “shall be heard in private” (“huis clos” in French). “Private” is defined as “[c]onfidential; secret” in Brian A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St-Paul: Thomson West, 2004), s.v. “private”. In Hubert Reid, Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien: avec lexique anglais-français, (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1994), s.v. “huis clos”, the expression “huis clos” is described as being “une exception au principe de la publicité des débats, qui consiste à interdire au public l’accès à la salle d’audience.” Again, the main aims of the privacy of applications for a warrant are to preserve the secrecy of sensitive information in general and to ensure the execution of warrant [sic]. The interested person(s) (targets) must not be present or aware of the warrant application; otherwise its purpose would become academic. The public should not have access to the information because it is related to national security and because of the effectiveness of the CSIS depends on the secrecy of its methods and operations. Finally, third party information is often transmitted under the caveat that it would not be released. If warrants were debated in public, sensitive information would likely be released advertently or inadvertently. It would prevent CSIS from being informed about threats to Canada’s security, would render useless the investigation, would be dangerous to human sources involved and could endanger Canada’s relationship with allied countries.

[40]      However, the Attorney General failed to note that Justice Noël proceeded to observe, at paragraph 46 of his decision, that “issues that are ‘collateral’ to a warrant application, such as jurisdictional issues, could be heard in open courts in some circumstances.” In this regard, Justice Noël emphasized that “each case turns on its facts keeping in mind the clear wording of section 27 of the [Act] and the necessary balance between national security and fundamental rights” (paragraph 47). Ultimately, Justice Noël concluded that the issues of law and of fact in the particular case that was before him were so intertwined that the jurisdiction issue that had been raised could not be dealt with in public.

[41]      In the present proceeding, it was not initially apparent to me that the factual and legal issues were similarly intertwined. However, it subsequently transpired that the factual evidence adduced was critical to the findings I ultimately made in respect of the issue of whether CSIS’s use of CSS technology constituted a search, as well as the issue of whether that search was “unreasonable”, within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter.

[42]      The Attorney General’s stated reasons for opposing a public hearing were significantly undermined by two important developments that occurred between the time of the evidentiary hearing and the hearing of the parties’ legal submissions. The first of those developments was that the Minister was reported to have publicly confirmed the use of CSS technology by CSIS and the RCMP, but only “within the four corners of the law” (“RCMP, CSIS launch investigations into phone spying on Parliament Hill after CBC story”, CBC News (April 4, 2017) online: ˂www.cbc.ca˃.) The Attorney General confirmed this fact in a letter to the Court dated April 5, 2017, yet continued to maintain that “the hearing [of the legal] submissions concerning the Service’s use of CSS must continue to be held in camera in order to comply with section 27 of the [Act] and to avoid serious injury to national security interests”.

[43]      The second important intervening development consisted of a CBC news article, published the day before the hearing of the legal submissions in this proceeding, in which CSIS was reported to have “confirmed [that] it has used the cellphone identification and tracking technology in recent years, both with and without a warrant” (“Spies’ use of cellphone surveillance technology suspended in January, pending review”, CBC News (May 3, 2017) online: ˂www.cbc.ca˃.)

[44]      In light of that reported confirmation by CSIS of its use of CSS technology, the amici sent a short letter to the Court suggesting that the circumstances were such that the hearing of the legal submissions in this proceeding should be made open to the public. While recognizing the requirement in section 27 that warrant applications be heard in private, they observed that certain statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014 SCC 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33 (Harkat), “would support a decision by the Court to make the legal argument on the Service’s use of cell site simulators open to the public.” At paragraph 25 of that decision, the Supreme Court observed that the issues in that case did “not turn on confidential information and could have been debated fully in public without any serious risk of disclosure, supplemented where necessary by brief closed written submissions and by the closed record.” The Court proceeded to add, at paragraph 26, that the content of the closed part of the hearing in that case did not assist the Court in deciding the issues before it, and “served only to foster an appearance of opacity of these proceedings, which runs contrary to the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability.” The amici did not address the differences between the case that was before the Supreme Court and the application that is before this Court in the current proceeding.

[45]      In response to the amici’s suggestion, the Attorney General sent a short letter to the Court later that day in which she agreed to discuss the possibility of holding a public hearing. However, the Attorney General noted that an adjournment might be required in order to identify which elements could be heard in a public hearing and which would require consideration in camera. The Attorney General also “urge[d] consideration of section 27 of the [Act]”.

[46]      At the outset of the hearing of the legal arguments in this application the following morning, the amici once again suggested that the Court adjourn the hearing to permit them to work with the Attorney General to devise a means to have at least part of the oral legal submissions made in a public forum.

[47]      However, given the last-minute nature of the amici’s suggestion, and in the absence of additional submissions from the amici and the Attorney General as to how a public hearing could occur given the express language of section 27, I decided to proceed with the hearing, as previously scheduled.

[48]      In reaching that decision, I was cognizant of the decision in Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 [Ruby], at paragraphs 57–58, where the Supreme Court of Canada observed that it was not open to the parties, even on consent, to bypass the mandatory in camera requirement set forth in paragraph 51(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21. The Court added that, constitutional issues aside, it was also not open to a judge to conduct an open hearing, even if only in respect of legal issues, in direct contradiction of the statute, regardless of the proposal put forth by the parties. (For constitutional reasons, the Court then proceeded to “read down” certain provisions of the Privacy Act to apply only to certain types of ex parte submissions, thereby permitting a court to conduct other parts of a hearing in public (Ruby, above, at paragraphs 58–60).)

[49]      I also considered the practical difficulty that would have been associated with reconvening an appropriate number of the Court’s designated judges any time prior to October or November of this year. In addition, I was sensitive to the fact that the Attorney General’s legal submissions had already been filed with the Court when I initially expressed an interest in the possibility of having an open hearing of all or part of the oral legal submissions in this proceeding. I was also mindful of the fact that it would have been unprecedented to have such an open hearing in respect of an application for warrants under section 21 of the Act. Assuming that section 27 does not preclude the holding of a public hearing in some circumstances, I considered that it would be preferable for such a hearing to be held in a proceeding that had been better planned for that purpose. Finally, at the time I was not entirely convinced that the factual and legal issues were intimately linked. As I have already noted, it subsequently became apparent that they were indeed so linked.

[50]      In the meantime, I considered it appropriate to considerably reduce the opacity that otherwise would be associated with this proceeding by issuing public redacted versions of both this decision and the written versions of the parties’ arguments. In my view, those measures, taken together, will represent an important additional step by this Court to foster greater openness with respect to the ex parte proceedings that are brought before it under the Act. Stated differently, these measures will increase the principles of transparency and accountability to which the Supreme Court referred in Harkat, above, at paragraph 26.

V.        CSS Technology

[51]      Information regarding the manner in which the CSS technology functions was provided to the Court by [***] both through the [***] affidavit and orally during the evidentiary hearing on [***]

[52]      [***] is employed by CSIS as a [***] He did not testify on what was done specifically in the case of [***] but rather spoke of the CSS technique generally. Among other things, he described himself as a subject-matter expert with respect to the CSS technology. [***] His evidence was provided for the purpose of assisting the Court to determine whether information obtained without a warrant that specifically sanctioned the use of a CSS, had been obtained lawfully and may be relied upon in an application by CSIS for warrants under section 21 of the Act.

[53]      [***] explained that CSS is an umbrella term that encompasses both generic terms that are sometimes used, such as “IMSI grabber” or “IMSI catcher, as well as manufacturer or vendor-based names such as Stingray, [***]

[54]      [***] confirmed that CSIS utilizes CSS technology solely for the two purposes that were previously identified by SIRC, and discussed at paragraph 12 above, namely, (i) to attribute a cellular device to a known subject of investigation and, (ii) once attributed, to geo-locate a subject of investigation’s cellular device at some later date, when the subject’s precise whereabouts are no longer known by CSIS.

[55]      [***] noted that, when CSIS uses a CSS for the first purpose, it already knows the location of the individual, but not the IMSI or IMEI of the individual’s mobile device(s). In addition, the identity of the subject of investigation is also typically known. In describing this use of the CSS technology, [***] stated: “Our goal is to identify cellular devices and attribute them to subjects of investigation. This would be a clear investigative requirement in order to be able to determine [***[contacts]***] and communication patterns [***]

[56]      In contrast to the facts that are known by CSIS at the time it conducts a CSS operation for the purpose described above, when CSIS uses a CSS to geo-locate an individual, it knows one or more of that person’s IMSI or IMEI identifiers, but not the individual’s location. [***] specified that CSIS does not seek to geo-locate individuals through the use of CSS operations without a warrant.

[57]      According to [***] TSPs are able to identify mobile devices that are allowed access to their services through two unique pieces of information that are provided by such devices, namely, the IMSI and the IMEI. [***] described those identifiers in his affidavit as follows:

13. An IMSI is a 15 digit string that uniquely associates to a TSP a subscriber account. It is comprised of three parts; a 3 digit Mobile Country Code (MCC) identifying the country of the IMSI subscriber; a 2 or 3 digit Mobile Network Code (MNC) identifying the home network of the IMSI subscriber; and the remaining digits ascribed to a Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN) which is associated by the service provider to uniquely identify a user’s account within a provider’s system.

14. An IMEI is a 15 digit string that uniquely identifies a cellular device, the actual hardware, to a TSP […] The first 8 digits of an IMEI is comprised of a Type Allocation code (TAC) which identifies the make and model of the equipment. The following 7 digits are the serial number which uniquely identifies the device.

[58]      By way of example, [***] gave the following IMSI number 302720123456789. In this sequence, the digits “302” represent the MCC (country code of the subscriber); the digits “720” represent the MNC (network code of the subscriber’s TSP); and the remaining digits represent the MSIN (unique subscriber identifying number). This information is stored on the SIM cards of mobile devices.

[59]      By way of further example, [***] gave the following IMEI number: 353778081234560. In this sequence, the numbers “35377808” represent the TAC (device make and model), while the numbers “1234560” represent the unique device serial number. The Court understands that this information is stored on the device itself, rather than on its SIM card.

[60]      [***[technical information]***]

[61]      [***[technical information]***]

[62]      To facilitate the provision of telecommunications services by TSPs, each TSP is licensed to operate and broadcast on frequencies that are different from those licensed to other TSPs. [***[technical information]***]

[63]      [***[technical information]***]

[64]      By mimicking a TSP’s cell tower, CSS devices induce cellular devices to interact with them as if they were a bona fide cell tower. In essence, a CSS is a “false” tower that requests devices to authenticate themselves to something that is posing as a TSP’s tower.

[65]      [***[technical information]***]

[66]      To then identify the IMSI and IMEI identifiers that correspond to the device used by the subject of the CSS operation, [***[technical information]***]

[67]      [***[technical information]***]

[68]      [***[technical information]***]

[69]      [***[technical information]***]

[70]      [***[technical information]***]

[71]      [***[technical information]***]

[72]      [***] CSIS operates its CSS equipment in a manner that does not degrade or otherwise affect in any perceptible way the quality of service experienced by the user of a mobile device that is in the vicinity of a CSS. [***[technical information]***]

[73]      [***] further assured the Court that, with one exception, the CSS technology used by CSIS does not have any capacity to capture either the content of any communications made by users of mobile devices, or the information stored on their mobile devices. [***]^[ii] [***]

[74]      Finally, [***] stressed that the IMEI and IMSI identifiers that are captured by CSS equipment is not encrypted, but rather is “in the open”.

VI.        CSIS’s Policy Regarding the Collection and Retention of Electronic Identifiers

[75]      On [***] CSIS DDO issued a Directive relating to the collection and retention of electronic identifiers. According to [***] that Directive was issued as a result of Justice Noël’s decision in X (Re), above, where he decided, among other things, that the words “strictly necessary” in section 12 of the Act apply to both the collection and the retention of information by CSIS.

[76]      For the purposes of the Directive, electronic identifiers include IMSI and IMEI numbers, [***]

[77]      Pursuant to the Directive, a moratorium was imposed on the use of technical means for the purpose of collecting electronic identifiers. [***]

[78]      According to [***] all of those electronic identifiers previously obtained by CSIS pursuant to CSS operations, including those for which an operational report has been written, have now been destroyed in accordance with the Directive. [***]

[79]      By way of further background, the Attorney General explained during the evidentiary hearing in this application that, given Justice Noël’s decision in X (Re), above, and given CSIS’s view that the retention of IMSI and IMEI identifiers cannot be said to be “strictly necessary” once an operational report of the collection exercise has been finalized, those identifiers are generally deleted at that time. [***] testified that the operational reports are usually prepared “within [***] days”. However, he added that, once CSS operations have been resumed following the issuance of these judgment and reasons, CSIS is considering requesting up to [***] months within which to determine whether IMSI and IMEI identifiers that it has collected can be attributed to a subject of investigation. That is the period of time within which Justice Noël determined, in X (Re), above, at paragraph 253, that “information that is evidently not threat-related and that does not involve the target” must be destroyed. [***]

VII.       Assessment of Legal Submissions

[80]      The Attorney General submits that CSIS’s use of CSS technology solely to capture IMSI and IMEI identifiers does not contravene either the Radiocommunication Act, the Criminal Code, or the Charter. I agree, subject to the reasons set forth below.

[81]      The Attorney General’s submissions in respect of each of those laws will be addressed separately below.

A.        The Radiocommunication Act

[82]      The Radiocommunication Act governs the use of radio apparatus and radio-sensitive equipment to ensure the orderly development and efficient operation of radiocommunications in Canada. To this end, paragraph 5(1)(a) of that legislation allows the Minister of Industry (now the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development) to issue licences and certificates to govern radio apparatus, including “any other authorization relating to radiocommunication that the Minister considers appropriate.”

[83]      Among other things, paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Radiocommunication Act prohibits anyone from interfering with or obstructing any radiocommunication “without lawful excuse.”

[84]      The Attorney General concedes that a CSS device is a “radio apparatus” within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act. However, she maintains that CSIS’s use of a CSS complies with that legislation because CSIS holds an Authority to Use Radio (Authority), which was issued on September 1, 1992. She further maintains that, by virtue of that Authority and section 12 of the Act, CSIS’s use of CSS technology does not contravene paragraph 9(1)(b) of the Radiocommunication Act.

[85]      For the present purposes, the provisions in the Authority which are most relevant are the following:

1)  In accordance with subparagraph 5(1)(a)(v) of the Radiocommunication Act, this constitutes authorization for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in respect of any and all types of specially designed radio apparatus used for the purpose specified in paragraph 2, for which a radio licence, under subparagraph 5(1)(a)(i) of the Radiocommunication Act, is not appropriate.

2)  This authorization applies to radio apparatus specified in paragraph 1 only when it is being tested, used for training, or used for operations, solely in relation to investigations under sections 12 and 16 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23.

…

7)  All radio apparatus covered by this authorization shall not cause harmful interference to other authorized or licensed radio apparatus.

…

9)  This authorization is valid unless withdrawn by the Department of Communications or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) indicates in writing that it is no longer required. [Emphasis added.]

[86]      The full text of the Authority is set forth in Appendix I to these judgment and reasons.

[87]      The amici note that CSIS was not “exposed to” CSS technology [***] They maintain that it cannot reasonably have been in the Minister’s contemplation in 1992, at the dawn of cellular technology, that the Authority would be interpreted to authorize the use of CSS equipment for the purpose of obtaining IMSI and IMEI identifiers. They add that, had CSIS sought authorization from the present Minister, the Minister would likely have circumscribed its use of CSS technology, as he did in the authorization that was provided to the RCMP on March 13, 2017. The full text of that authorization is set forth in Appendix II to these judgment and reasons.

[88]      The foregoing may all very well be true. However, it fails to come to grips with the fact that, on its face, the wording of the Authority is sufficiently broad to cover the use of CSS equipment by CSIS.

[89]      Specifically, the use of such equipment would clearly fall within the scope of the words “in respect of any and all types of specially designed radio apparatus used for the purposes specified in paragraph 2”, as they appear in paragraph 1 of the Authority. I am inclined to agree with CSIS that those words appear to have contemplated that the Authority would be used in respect of radio apparatus that was not yet in existence in 1992, when the Authority was issued.

[90]      In any event, those words have the effect of allowing the Authority to be used in respect of such radio apparatus. Until the Minister withdraws the Authority, as provided for in paragraph 9, the Authority will remain sufficient authorization, for the purposes of the Radiocommunication Act, for CSIS to use CSS equipment. The evidence adduced in this proceeding is that the Minister has not taken any such action.

[91]      I pause to observe that the Attorney General noted that, prior to obtaining the above-mentioned authorization in March of this year, the RCMP had been relying upon a different authorization pertaining to “jammers”, to conduct its CSS operations.

[92]      The amici added that the use of a CSS to obtain IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with cellular devices clearly does cause some interference with those devices and has the potential to cause harmful interference, within the meaning of paragraph 7 of the Authority. In this regard, they note that “harmful interference” is defined in section 2 of the Radiocommunication Act to mean:

Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2

Definitions

2 …

harmful interference … an adverse effect of electromagnetic energy from any emission, radiation or induction that

(a)     endangers the use or functioning of a safety-related radiocommunication system, or

(b) significantly degrades or obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts, the use or functioning of radio apparatus or radio-sensitive equipment.

[93]      The amici further note that the potential to cause harmful interference, including interfering with emergency calls to 911, formed part of the record before Justice Code of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v. Brewster, 2016 ONSC 4133 (CanLII), at paragraphs 34, 38, 51–52. However, the passages from that decision that were cited by the amici simply described (i) measures that the RCMP adopt, in operating its CSS equipment, to minimize the potential to cause unreasonable interference with mobile telephones, (ii) the capacity of that equipment to interrupt calls for up to two minutes (when configured in a rarely used mode), and (iii) arguments regarding alleged deficiencies in the RCMP’s warrant, which Justice Code did not accept. Moreover, it bears underscoring that Justice Code’s observations were made based on the specific evidence that was adduced in that case.

[94]      The evidence in this case is that the equipment used by CSIS [***[maintains contact with a mobile device for a few seconds]***] In my view, [***] do not constitute significant degradations or obstructions, and do not constitute repeated interruptions, as contemplated by the above-quoted language from section 2 of the Radiocommunications Act.

[95]      Given the foregoing, I am satisfied that CSIS’s use of CSS technology does not contravene the Radiocommunication Act.

B.        The Criminal Code

[96]      Part VI [ss. 183 to 196.1] of the Criminal Code provides a scheme that governs the interception of private communications. Among other things, section 184 of the Criminal Code prohibits the wilful interception of private communications by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, where done without consent or prior judicial authorization.

[97]      CSIS maintains that its use of a CSS without prior judicial authorization does not contravene section 184 of the Criminal Code because its CSS equipment does not intercept any private communications. [***]

[98]      Pursuant to section 183 of the Criminal Code, private communication is defined to mean:

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46

Definitions

183 …

private communication … any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it.

[99]      Pursuant to section 183 of the Criminal Code, the word intercept “includes [to] listen to, record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof.” It is common ground between CSIS and the amici that obtaining IMSI and IMEI identifiers through the use of CSS equipment does not do any of these things, or otherwise capture any content of communications made by the mobile devices that are targeted by that equipment.

[100]   Accordingly, the amici agree that in the absence of any interception of the content of communications, CSIS’s use of CSS technology to attribute IMSI and IMEI identifiers to a subject of investigation does not contravene Part VI of the Criminal Code.

[101]   However, the amici maintained that CSIS’s use of a CSS without a warrant contravenes the mischief provisions in section 430 of the Criminal Code, and that neither section 12 of the Act nor the Authority discussed at paragraphs 84–90 above provide a lawful exemption from section 430. I disagree.

[102]   Subsection 430(1) states:

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46

Mischief

430 (1) Every one commits mischief who wilfully

(a) destroys or damages property;

(b) renders property dangerous, useless, inoperative or ineffective;

(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or operation of property; or

(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use, enjoyment or operation of property.

[103]   Pursuant to section 429 of the Criminal Code, “[n]o person shall be convicted of an offence under sections 430 to 446 where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.”

[104]   For the reasons set forth in Part VII.A. immediately above, I do not accept the amici’s position that the Authority does not provide such legal justification.

[105]   For the reasons that are provided in Part VII.C.(2)(b)(ii) below, I do not accept the amici’s position with respect to section 12.

[106]   I will simply add in passing that, in their oral submissions, the amici conceded that if I find that section 12 provides sufficient authorization for the capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers through the use of CSS technology, that would be sufficient to bring that activity within the scope of the defence afforded by section 429 of the Criminal Code.

C.        Section 8 of the Charter

(1)   Legal Principles

[107]   Section 8 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”

[108]   It follows that there are two distinct issues to be assessed in determining whether there has been a violation of section 8, namely (i) whether there has been a “search or seizure”, and (ii), if so, whether that search or seizure was “unreasonable”, (R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (Gomboc), at paragraph 20).

[109]   In approaching these issues, courts must adopt “a purposive approach that emphasizes the protection of privacy as a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and autonomy as well as to the maintenance of a thriving democratic society” (R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212 (Spencer), at paragraph 15).

(a)  What Constitutes a Search or Seizure?

[110]   A “seizure” has been defined as “the taking of a thing from a person by a public official without that person’s consent” as well as the compelled production of information, for example, pursuant to a regulatory statute (Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (Thomson Newspapers), at page 505; R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (McKinlay), at page 642).

[111]   By contrast, a “search” occurs when an individual who is the object of intrusive state activity has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the alleged search. If so, then the activity in question constitutes a “search” and section 8 is engaged (Spencer, above, at paragraph 16; Gomboc, above, at paragraph 20).

[112]   In assessing whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the subject matter of an alleged search, the totality of the circumstances to be assessed include various factors directly related to the individual’s expectation of privacy, both subjectively and objectively viewed. These include:

i.     the subject matter of the alleged search;

ii.    the individual’s interest in the subject matter;

iii.   the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and

iv.    whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances.

(Spencer, above, at paragraph 18.)

[113]   With respect to the first of the four factors listed above, an assessment must be made of both the subject matter of the alleged search or seizure, as well as any inferences that can reasonably be made from that subject matter regarding private activities or other private information of the individual (Spencer, above, at paragraphs 26–31). Put differently, when the subject matter of an alleged search is information, a court must consider the significance of the information obtained as a result of the search (R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (A.M.), at paragraph 38).

[114]   The protection afforded by section 8 of the Charter does not extend to all matters that the individual may wish to keep out of the hands of agents of the state (R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (Tessling), at paragraph 26). Rather, that protection is limited to a “biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state [including] information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual” (R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (Plant), at page 293 (emphasis added); Spencer, above, at paragraph 27).

[115]   In evaluating the second of the above-listed factors (the individual’s interest in the subject matter of the alleged search), the focus is upon the extent to which that interest may be said to be direct (Tessling, above, at paragraph 32; Spencer, above, at paragraph 19; R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (Patrick), at paragraph 27).

[116]   With respect to the third of those factors (the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter), this may be established by direct evidence demonstrating such an expectation, or by inference from the circumstances (Spencer, above, at paragraph 19; Tessling, above, at paragraph 38). For example, a subjective expectation of privacy can be presumed in respect of activities that take place in a person’s home (Patrick, above, at paragraph 37; Gomboc, above, at paragraph 25). However, section 8 of the Charter “does not cloak the home in an impenetrable veil of privacy”, and where there is no direct search of the home itself, “the informational privacy interest should be the focal point of the analysis” (Gomboc, above, at paragraphs 46, 49). In this latter regard, the fact that the home may have been involved “should be subsidiary to what the investigative technique was capable of revealing about the home and what information was actually disclosed” (Gomboc, above, at paragraph 50).

[117]   Turning to the fourth of the factors (whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable), the degree of privacy a citizen can reasonably expect may vary significantly depending upon the activity that brings him or her into contact with the state (Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 506–507).

[118]   The considerations to be assessed in evaluating this factor include:

i.     the nature of the privacy interest at stake;

ii.    the circumstances in which the search occurred;

iii.   the place in which it occurred;

iv.    whether the information has already been abandoned or disclosed to third parties;

v.     the purpose of the intrusion;

vi.    the extent to which the search technique that was used was intrusive in relation to the identified privacy interest;

vii.   the relevant statutory and contractual framework, if any; and

viii.  whether the use of the search or surveillance technology that was used was itself     objectively unreasonable.

(Spencer, above, at paragraph 20; Tessling, above, at paragraph 32; Patrick, above, at paragraph 38.)

[119]   The Supreme Court has also held the view in the past that the nature of the state’s interest in conducting a particular type of intrusive activity can also be considered in determining whether that activity constitutes a “search” (R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8 (Evans), at paragraph 40; R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20 (Colarusso), at page 53). However, it has since stated that it is more logical to consider this factor when considering whether a search was unreasonable (Tessling, above, at paragraph 64, discussing the seriousness of the offence).

[120]   Insofar as the nature of the privacy interest at stake is concerned, privacy interests can be primarily territorial, personal or informational in nature. These are not strict or mutually exclusive categories (Spencer, above, at paragraph 35; Tessling, above, at paragraph 20). The analysis of these categories “turns on the privacy of the area or the thing being searched and the impact of the search on its target, not on the legal or illegal nature of the items sought” (Spencer, above, at paragraph 36).

[121]   Territorial privacy includes an individual’s privacy in an area or place, such as his or her home, hotel room or place of work. Personal privacy connotes a person’s bodily integrity, and in particular the right not to have his or her body touched, explored or sampled to disclose objects or information an individual may wish to conceal. Informational privacy includes privacy in information that an individual may want to keep secret or to be kept in confidence, information over which an individual may wish to maintain control, and information that has been provided to others on an anonymous basis or that is related to activities in which the individual has engaged on an anonymous basis (Spencer, above, at paragraphs 38–44).

[122]   The factors to be considered in determining the parameters of the protection afforded by section 8 with respect to informational privacy include the nature of the information in question, the place where the information was obtained, the manner in which it was obtained and the seriousness of the state interest in question (Plant, above, at page 293). Additional factors that must be considered include:

i.     whether the subject matter of the search was in public view;

ii.    whether the subject matter had been abandoned;

iii.   whether the use of surveillance technology was itself objectively unreasonable; and

iv.    whether any intimate details of the individual’s lifestyle, or core biographical information of the individual, were obtained.

(Tessling, above, at paragraph 32.)

[123]   With respect to the relevant statutory framework referred to at paragraph 118 above, the objective reasonableness of a person’s privacy expectation will vary according to the nature of that framework, for example, whether it is criminal, administrative, regulatory or national security legislation. In brief, the objective privacy expectations will be much greater in a criminal context than they often will be in an administrative or regulatory context (Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 505–508; Colarusso, above, at pages 37–38 and 40; R. v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 (Jarvis), at paragraph 62). Stated differently, intrusion by the state that may constitute a search or a seizure in a criminal context may not constitute either of these things in a non-criminal context (McKinlay, above, at pages 641–642 and 647–648; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, at pages 226–227).

[124]   Finally, where there is a relevant contractual framework, it will be appropriate to consider the nature of the relationship between the parties to the framework, whether the person in receipt of the information in question was contractually bound to keep the information confidential, and whether the relationship between that person and the individual whose privacy interests are at issue is one of confidence (Plant, above, at pages 294–295).

(b)  What Constitutes an Unreasonable Search or Seizure?

[125]   Section 8 of the Charter does not afford protection against all searches, only against unreasonable ones.

[126]   Broadly speaking, a determination of whether a search is unreasonable requires assessing “whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals” (Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Hunter), at pages 159–160). In conducting such assessments, a court is often called upon to weigh the privacy interests of one or more individuals against the interests of public safety, including the right to life, liberty and security of persons who may be in danger of serious harm (R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Tse), at paragraph 21).

[127]   In brief, “[w]here the constitutional line of ‘reasonableness’ will be drawn [is] a function of both the importance of the state objective and the degree of impact on the individual’s privacy interest” (R. v. Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Rodgers), at paragraph 27; A.M., above, at paragraphs 36–37).

[128]   It follows that, “if a person has but a minimal expectation with respect to informational privacy, this may tip the balance in the favour of the state interest” (Jarvis, above, at paragraph 71).

[129]   In any event, the state’s intrusion on an individual’s privacy rights will only be upheld where it does not extend beyond what is necessary to achieve the state’s legitimate objective (Thomson Newspapers, above, at page 495).

[130]   Given that the underlying purpose of section 8 is to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy, prior authorization of any such intrusions is presumptively required before they occur. Put differently, a search will be presumed to be unreasonable if it has not been pre-authorized by an entirely neutral and impartial arbiter who is capable of acting judicially in balancing the interests of the state against those of the individual (Spencer, above, at paragraph 68; Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 (Goodwin), at paragraph 56; Hunter, above, at pages 160–162).

[131]   In addition, the neutral arbiter must be satisfied that the person seeking the authorization has reasonable grounds, established under oath, to believe that the relevant statutory or other conditions to be met before the search power may be exercised have indeed been met (Hunter, above, at pages 166–168). In some contexts, including the national security context, this “reasonable grounds to believe” standard may be flexible (Hunter, above, at page 168; Rodgers, above, at paragraph 35; R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220 (Chehil), at paragraph 23). For example, a high degree of accuracy may justify the imposition of a lower evidentiary standard―such as reasonable suspicion―to trigger the availability of the search power (Goodwin, above, at paragraph 67). This is particularly so where the intrusion is minimal and narrowly targeted (A.M., above, at paragraphs 13 and 42; R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (Kang-Brown), at paragraphs 25, 60, 210 and 213; and Chehil, above, at paragraph 28). In such circumstances, the person who conducted the search after having satisfied the reasonable suspicion test may not require pre-authorization by a neutral arbiter at all (Kang-Brown, above; Mahjoub (Re), 2013 FC 1096, 457 F.T.R. 1 (Mahjoub), at paragraph 35).

[132]   Where pre-authorization is presumptively required, it will fall to the person who conducted a warrantless search to justify why it was not feasible to obtain such pre-authorization (Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 59).

[133]   Alternatively, that person may overcome the presumption of unlawfulness that applies to warrantless searches by demonstrating that the search was authorized by law, that the law in question is reasonable, and that the manner in which the search was carried out was reasonable (Goodwin, above, at paragraph 48; Wakeling v. United States of America, 2014 SCC 72, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 549 (Wakeling), at paragraph 41; Rodgers, above, at paragraph 25; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at page 278).

[134]   In assessing whether a law which authorizes a warrantless search is reasonable, factors to be assessed include its nature and purpose, the degree of intrusiveness that it authorizes, the mechanism of intrusion authorized, the extent to which it provides for judicial supervision, and any other accountability measures or “checks and balances” that it contains to constrain the extent of the state’s intrusion on an individual’s privacy interests (Goodwin, above, at paragraphs 57 and 71–72; Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 596–597; Wakeling, above, at paragraph 77). Depending upon the circumstances and the legislative scheme, the availability of after-the-fact oversight may assist to overcome the presumptive unlawfulness of a warrantless search (Goodwin, above, at paragraph 71).

[135]   With respect to the manner in which a search is carried out, factors to be assessed include the reliability or accuracy of the search mechanism, and the extent to which it may intrude on the privacy of innocent individuals. In this latter regard, “‘[a] method of searching that captures an inordinate number of innocent individuals cannot be reasonable’” (Goodwin, above, at paragraph 67, quoting Chehil, above, at paragraph 51).

[136]   In any event, a court must assess what the search mechanism or technology is currently capable of doing, as opposed to what it may be capable of doing in the future (A.M., above, at paragraphs 39–40; Gomboc, above, at paragraph 40; Tessling, above, at paragraph 29).

(2)   Application of the Legal Principles to the Facts of this Application

(a)  Did CSIS’s Use of CSS Technology Constitute a “Search”?

[137]   In this case, CSIS used its CSS technology solely to intercept the IMSI and IMEI numbers from [***] mobile devices, so that it could then identify those specific devices and attribute them to him. CSIS did not use CSS technology to geo-locate [***] Indeed, the Attorney General concedes that a warrant would be required to use CSS technology in that manner. Accordingly, the following assessment will be confined to assessing the use of CSS technology to capture the IMSI and IMEI numbers pertaining to [***] wireless devices, and thereby enable CSIS to identify those devices and attribute them to him.

[138]   According to [***] the individual or individuals who are the subject of a CSS operation ordinarily are known [***] Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that CSIS will ordinarily already know certain things about such individuals at the time the CSS operation is conducted. Those things include their location [***] even though their [***] may not yet be known.

[139]   In passing, I will pause to recall that, with one exception, the CSS equipment currently operated by CSIS is not capable of intercepting the content of any communications. [***] The evidence on the record is that CSIS has a policy of not capturing such content. In my view, any such activity would require a warrant.

[140]   The Attorney General submits that CSIS’s use of CSS technology to obtain the IMSI and IMEI identifiers pertaining to an individual’s mobile device does not engage section 8 of the Charter because individuals generally do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of those identifiers. I disagree. In my view, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, which are addressed below, and taking a purposive approach to section 8 of the Charter, suggests that individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of those numbers. This is because of the nature of the information that those numbers permit CSIS to obtain or infer. Therefore, the use of CSS technology constitutes a “search” and the first of the two elements in section 8 is met.

(i)    The Subject Matter of the Intrusive Activity

[141]   The Attorney General maintains that the IMSI and IMEI identifiers obtained through the use of CSS technology are “just mundane numbers” that simply reveal the country code of the subscriber, the identity of the subscriber’s TSP, the subscriber’s unique identifying number, the mobile device’s make and model, and the device’s serial number. The Attorney General adds that this information reveals nothing about an individual’s biographical core or private life, and does not tend to reveal any intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual. For example, in this application, the CSS operation revealed [***]

[142]   In support of its position that this information does not engage section 8 of the Charter, the Attorney General places significant reliance on Tessling, Gomboc and Plant, above, where the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the capture of information pertaining to the amount of heat emanating from a home, the amount of electricity flowing into a home, and records pertaining to the amount of electricity consumed in a home, respectively, did not engage section 8.

[143]   However, a senior employee of CSIS, [***] stated in an affidavit that “[o]ver time, the IMSI and IMEI numbers of a specific subject of investigation may reveal patterns” (emphasis added). [***]

[144]   Although [***] did not mention it, another example of information that could well be revealed through the capture of a subject of investigation’s IMSI or IMEI numbers could be that individual’s pattern [***] This may well have been what [***] was referring to when he testified that IMSI and IMEI information is required “in order to be able to determine [***[contacts]***] and communication patterns and a bunch of other additional elements in regards to undergoing national security investigations.” [***] the capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers can be distinguished from what was at issue in Tessling, Gomboc and Plant, above.

[145]   In addition, in a report that was entered as Exhibit 16 in this proceeding, it was noted that “IMSI/IMEI identifiers can also be used to identify digital activities such as web browsing … without any need to ever match a compiled profile to an individual’s specific name or address” (Tamir Israel and Christopher Parsons, Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada, (Ottawa: Telecom Transparency Project & Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic, 2016 (Gone Opaque), at page 15).

[146]   It is also significant that [***] further noted that, “[l]ike any other type of intelligence the Service collects, an IMSI or IMEI obtained through a CSS device may be shared with foreign agencies where the Service considers it to be appropriate”. He added: “Prior to sharing this information, the Service will assess and examine options to mitigate any potential risks of mistreatment of those persons whose identities are disclosed to the foreign agencies”. In this regard, he stated that he was aware of [***] instances where the IMSI and/or IMEI numbers collected by CSIS through the use of CSS technology were shared with foreign agencies. I will address the potential significance of such sharing of information with foreign authorities at paragraph 168 below.

(ii)   Individuals’ Interest in the Subject Matter

[147]   [***] clearly has a direct interest in the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with the mobile devices that were captured by CSIS’s CSS operation. The same would be true for other subjects of a CSIS investigation, who may be targets of a CSS operation, regardless of whether their identities may be known. The Attorney General did not suggest otherwise.

(iii)  Do Individuals Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Subject Matter?

[148]   No evidence was tendered in this proceeding with respect to the subjective expectations of [***] or others in respect of the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with their mobile devices. However, this question does not pose a “high hurdle” (Patrick, above, at paragraph 37). I agree with the amici that it can be assumed that individuals in general likely have a subjective expectation that any information concerning their mobile devices that may be communicated to the cell towers operated by their TSPs will not be surreptitiously captured by agents of the state, such as CSIS, or indeed by others through the use of “false” cell towers. That said, most individuals likely are not aware that any information that has the potential to reveal personal information about them is “offered” by their mobile devices to cell towers, and may be intercepted by agents of the state.

(iv)  If So, Are Such Expectations Objectively Reasonable?

The Nature of the Privacy Interest at Stake

[149]   The principal privacy interests implicated by CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI identifiers are the interests of individuals in their personal information pertaining to their mobile electronic devices and their use of those devices. Those interests are engaged upon CSIS’s initial “grab” of their IMSI and IMEI numbers, and then when CSIS subsequently uses those numbers to build a profile of the individual’s [***[contacts]***] and communication patterns”.

[150]   To the extent that such technology can reveal information about whom subjects of investigation are communicating with when they are at different locations, [***] the use of that technology also implicates an element of territorial privacy.In the particular circumstances of this case, territorial privacy is very much secondary to informational privacy (Spencer, above, at paragraph 37; Gomboc, above, at paragraph 49). This is because CSIS generally knows the location of its subject of investigation at the time it conducts a CSS operation to capture the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with the wireless device(s) carried by that individual.

[151]   Within the broad umbrella of informational privacy, the interests that are implicated by CSIS’s capture and subsequent analysis of IMSI and IMEI numbers are the confidentiality of those numbers, the subject of investigation’s control over who has access to those numbers, and that individual’s interest in preserving the anonymity of (i) his links with the people with whom he or she may be communicating, and (ii) the location(s) at which such communications may be taking place [***] (Spencer, above, at paragraphs 42–49).

The Circumstances in which IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Are Obtained

[152]   According to [***] CSIS deploys CSS technology to obtain IMSI and IMEI identifiers for the purposes of attributing a mobile device to a specific subject of an investigation being conducted pursuant to section 12 [of the Act] [***] As previously mentioned, at the time CSS operations are conducted, such individuals typically are targets of CSIS, such that various things are already known about them, including their location, [***] the personal identities of subjects of investigation are typically already known at the time CSIS conducts its CSS operations.

The Manner and Place of the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers

[153]   [***]

[154]   [***]

[155]   Regardless of where the subject of investigation may be located, CSIS’s capture of the IMSI/IMEI numbers of that individual’s mobile device(s) through the use of CSS technology does not reveal anything more about that individual’s mobile device or activities within that venue [***]

[156]   As explained at paragraphs 70–73 and 79 above, the evidence in this proceeding is that the CSS equipment used by CSIS maintains contact with an individual’s mobile device [***[for a few seconds]***] In addition, CSIS operates its CSS equipment in a manner that does not degrade or otherwise affect in any perceptible way the quality of service experienced by the user of a device that is in the vicinity of a CSS. In addition, with one exception, the CSS equipment does not have the capacity to capture either the content of any communications made by the users of mobile devices, or the information stored on their mobile devices. The one exception relates to the [***] Finally, CSIS deletes the information that was captured from the mobile devices of third parties during its CSS operations very quickly, often within [***] days, and in any event as soon as an operational report has been written with respect to a given CSS operation.

[157]   The manner in which CSS operations are conducted is such that the subject of investigation generally would not be aware that he or she is the target of such an operation, although he or she may suspect that this is the case.

Whether the IMSI/IMEI Identifiers have been Abandoned or Disclosed to One or More Third Parties

[158]   The Attorney General places significant emphasis upon the fact that the IMSI and IMEI numbers that are obtained through CSS operations are captured from the public airwaves, in a context in which that information is being “offered” to cell towers by the mobile device(s) of the subject of investigation. In this regard, the Attorney General draws a parallel between the IMSI and IMEI identifiers that are “voluntarily” provided to TSPs, and the electricity consumption information that was provided to electricity providers in Plant, above. The Attorney General also draws a parallel to cases such as Patrick, above, where it was found that a reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist in respect of information that had been “abandoned” in the garbage.

[159]   However, in my view, the average person likely would consider his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers to be more personal and confidential than electricity consumption data, [***]

[160]   In addition, as with the heat emanating from their home, the average person likely would not consider his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers to have been “abandoned” when they are disclosed to cell towers by their mobile device(s) (Tessling, above, at paragraph 41). In contrast to garbage, which they are aware will eventually find its way to a municipal dump that may be accessible by persons who are not associated with the garbage collection and disposal process, the average person is likely to consider that his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers will remain confidential as between them and their TSP, unless police obtain a warrant to obtain such information from their TSP. Moreover, in contrast to the implied waiver of privacy rights that may be said to be given to allow members of the general public to approach one’s home for a purpose that would be considered by the homeowner to be legitimate (Evans, above, at paragraphs 6 and 14), there is no similar implied waiver of a person’s privacy rights in his or her IMSI and IMEI identifiers vis-à-vis the general public, when their mobile device offers that information to the cellular environment.

The Extent to which the Search Technique is Intrusive in Relation to the Identified Privacy Interest

[161]   In my view, CSS technology is minimally intrusive in respect of individuals’ informational and territorial privacy interests. Initially, all that is obtained are “bare” IMSI and IMEI numbers that simply reveal the identity of an individual’s TSP, the individual’s Mobile Subscriber Identification Number, the make and model of the mobile device in question, and its serial number. Neither the mobile device nor its contents are accessed in any way. Likewise, no information that that might be available through the device is captured, and, with the one exception [***] CSIS cannot access the content of communications made on the mobile device.

[162]   [***] begin to put together an initial profile of the subject of investigation’s [***[contacts]***] and communication patterns”. It is this very information that may assist CSIS to establish the “reasonable grounds to believe” required to obtain a warrant, as set forth in subsections 21(1), 21(3), 21(3.1), 21.1(1), 21.1(3) and 21.1(4) of the Act, or the renewal of a warrant under section 22. [***]

[163]   Although CSIS may be able to begin putting together an initial profile of the subject of investigation’s [***[contacts]***] and communications patterns, it is difficult to see how the inferences that it may be able to draw regarding the individual’s personal activities would be particularly strong or invasive. [***]

The Relevant Statutory and Contractual Framework

[164]   The relevant statutory framework within which CSIS conducts CSS operations for the purposes of attributing a wireless device to a known subject of investigation is the mandate that it has been accorded by section 12 of the Act. Pursuant to that provision, CSIS is required to collect, to the extent that is strictly necessary, and analyze and retain information and intelligence in respect of activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada. For the reasons explained at paragraph 119 above, I will consider the state’s interest in its security at the second stage of the analysis contemplated by section 8 of the Charter, which is addressed in Part VII.C.(2)(b) below. For now, I will continue to focus solely on the perspective of individuals who may be subject to intrusive activities by CSIS under section 12 of the Act.

[165]   The Attorney General maintains that the national security context in which CSS operations may be deployed is closer to the regulatory and administrative contexts than to the criminal law context. In essence, the Attorney General appears to maintain that individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in the national security context than in the criminal context, because the former context often does not result in criminal prosecutions against individuals, thereby engaging individuals’ liberty interests. In other words, there is a lower possibility of individuals ultimately being prosecuted in whole or in part on the basis of personal information that CSIS may capture than there is of them being prosecuted on the basis of similar information that the police might capture.

[166]   In my view, this alone does not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in the national security context than in the criminal context.

[167]   In assessing whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of any personal information gathered by agents of the state, the relevance of the statutory context in which the information is gathered depends upon the severity of the potential consequences for those individuals (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Charkaoui II), at paragraph 53), the nature of the conduct addressed by the legislation in question, and the purposes for which the legislation was enacted to regulate that conduct (Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 495–496 and 509–510).

[168]   Insofar as potential consequences are concerned, CSIS’s investigative activities under section 12 may very well lead to outcomes that are even more severe for individuals than in the criminal context (Charkaoui II, at paragraph 54). This includes deportation to countries where they may face death or longer prison terms than they would potentially face in Canada. In addition, information captured by CSIS may not only be shared with law enforcement and other agents of the state in Canada, and ultimately lead to criminal charges, but also with foreign governments. Indeed, as noted at paragraph 146 above, the possibility of this occurring with respect to IMSI and IMEI identifiers was specifically identified by [***] Among other things, this may have significant adverse consequences for individuals’ ability to travel outside Canada and for their ability to obtain new employment or maintain their existing employment. Moreover, the stigma associated with being a subject of investigation under the Act is likely closer to that which is associated with being charged and convicted of serious crimes than it is to any stigma that might be associated with being charged and convicted of public welfare, regulatory or economic offences, even where a significant prison sentence is imposed (Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 509–517).

[169]   Turning to the nature of the conduct addressed by section 12 of the Act, I consider that most of the types of activities that are included within the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” that is set forth in section 2 of the Act are much closer to the “true” crimes that are the subject of criminal legislation, than to the typical offences that are established by public welfare, regulatory and economic legislation.

[170]   Whereas the nature of the conduct addressed by the latter types of legislation is such that individuals can be taken to have accepted certain terms and conditions of entry into the economic/regulatory field, or upon their entry into the country, I do not think that the same can be said, at least not to the same degree, with respect to activities that may attract CSIS’s intrusive scrutiny under section 12. While members of the public likely recognize and expect that CSIS will investigate threats to the security of Canada using some intrusive means, they also likely expect that it will do so only subject to safeguards that either protect their rights under the Charter, or that place reasonable limits on intrusions on those rights. That is something that will be assessed in Part VII.C.(2)(b) of these reasons below.

[171]   Regarding the purpose of the legislation, again, I consider the investigation of threats to the security of Canada pursuant to section 12 and the collection of information or intelligence pursuant to section 16 of the Act to be closer in nature to the purposes of criminal legislation than to the purposes underlying the types of public welfare, regulatory or economic legislation in respect of which low expectations of privacy have been found to exist (see e.g., Thomson Newspapers, above, at pages 505–506, 508–509 and 515–516; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash; Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, at pages 443–447; Colarusso, above, at pages 37–38 and 40). Nevertheless, I accept that members of the public likely are prepared to accept some reduction in their privacy rights to enable CSIS to investigate activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada. However, in the absence of any submissions from the Attorney General or the amici regarding the nature of such reductions of privacy, it is difficult for me to discuss in the abstract what they may be. In my view, these will likely need to be addressed over time, and assessed by reference to the totality of their respective contexts.

[172]   Insofar as IMSI and IMEI identifiers are concerned, I am satisfied that those whose activities may be subject to investigation under section 12 of the Act, and whose anonymity interests may be implicated by what CSIS is able to do with that information, are not likely to have a reduced expectation of privacy. This is because of what they would likely believe, if they were fully informed, CSIS may be able to begin learning about their private activities upon capturing that information. As I have mentioned, this can include beginning to build a personal profile on them that may extend to (i) determining “[***[contacts]***] or communications patterns” [***] (ii) drawing inferences about [***[them]***] CSIS has tremendous resources available to do these things, including its Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC), which was discussed in some detail in X (Re), above, at paragraphs 37 and following. In one passage, Justice Noël observed as follows:

… The ODAC processes and analyzes data such as (but not limited to): [***] The end product is intelligence which reveals specific, intimate details on the life and environment of the persons the CSIS investigates. The program is capable of drawing links between various sources and enormous amounts of data that no human being would be capable of [***]

(X (Re), above, at paragraph 42.)

[173]   I agree with the amici that these potential encroachments on individuals’ anonymity distinguish the reasonable expectations of those whose activities may be subject to investigation or information gathering by CSIS, from the reasonable expectations of third parties whose IMSI and IMEI numbers are incidentally obtained in the course of a CSS operation and then destroyed before anything further is done with those numbers. As noted by the amici, such early destruction of the IMSI and IMEI information of third parties serves to preserve the anonymity of those individuals, including the anonymity that is inherent in people’s use of their mobile devices.

[174]   I will observe in passing that the Attorney General did not identify any legislation whatsoever, whether regulatory, economic or otherwise, that permits the surreptitious capture of otherwise inaccessible information about individuals’ telephones without a warrant.

[175]   Turning to the relevant contractual framework, no evidence was provided regarding the contractual obligations of TSPs towards their subscribers. However, I agree with the amici that if the average person were aware that mobile devices disclose IMSI and IMEI identifiers to the cellular environment when they are in idle mode, he or she likely would believe that such information is only being disclosed to their TSP. This is in part due to the fact that individuals generally consider their phones to be private. This important consideration distinguishes the facts in this case from those in Plant, Tessling and Gomboc, above.

[176]   Specifically, one of the factors that was considered to be particularly relevant by the Supreme Court in Plant was that members of the public at large could make inquiries to the municipal electricity commission in question concerning the electricity consumption at a particular address (Plant, above, at page 294). In Tessling, a factor that appears to have been accorded significance was that the heat information that was captured by the police was obtained from the exposed external walls of the accused person’s home, and some extent of heat emanating from a home “is obvious to even the most casual observer” (Tessling, above, at paragraphs 41 and 46–47). By contrast, the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with mobile devices are stored inside those devices, and only released to the cellular environment for the limited purpose of accessing the cellular network of an individual’s TSP. Finally, in Gomboc, the Court placed considerable significance on the fact that paragraph 10(3)(f) of the Code of Conduct Regulation [Alta. Reg. 160/2003] enacted pursuant to the Electric Utilities Act, S.A. 2003, c. E-5.1, permitted the disclosure of customer information “to a peace officer for the purpose of investigating an offence if the disclosure is not contrary to the express request of the customer”. Accordingly, the Court considered that Mr. Gomboc had been given “express notice that such cooperation might occur”, yet failed to request that his customer information be kept confidential (Gomboc, above, at paragraphs 31, 33, 82 and 95).

[177]   The amici also referred to publicly available information, which I agree can be relevant to an assessment of the objective reasonableness of the subjective expectation that individuals likely have that the IMSI and IMEI numbers of their mobile devices will not be intercepted by agents of the state. In my view, the information in question lends support to the view that individuals have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with their mobile devices.

[178]   In particular, the amici noted that the Gone Opaque publication discussed at paragraph 145 above reports that the protection of the confidentiality of IMSI identifiers was embraced by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute as one of its five security goals in respect of telephones operating on the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) system (Gone Opaque, above, at page 9). The same page of that report also discusses the assignment of Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) numbers to further protect the confidentiality of IMSI numbers, although it is not clear whether the use of such numbers is confined to Europe or extends to Canada.

[179]   The amici further referred to a page on Wikipedia entitled “International mobile subscriber identity,” which states: “To prevent eavesdroppers identifying and tracking the subscriber on the radio interface, the IMSI is sent as rarely as possible and a randomly generated TMSI is sent instead” (Wikipedia, “International Mobile Subscriber Identity”, online: (2017) ˂https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity˃).

[180]   Although there is no evidence regarding [***] the amici submitted that the evidence of [***] regarding the circumstances in which IMSI and IMEI identifiers are released by mobile devices suggests that those circumstances may have been carefully calibrated to make it more difficult for such information to be surreptitiously intercepted. [***] However, given [***] evidence that [***], I do not consider the inference drawn by the amici on this point to be strong.

[181]   In any event, I am satisfied that the information from the Gone Opaque report and Wikipedia discussed above provides some support for the view that individuals’ subjective expectation of privacy in the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with their mobile devices is objectively reasonable.

Is the Use of CSS Technology Objectively Unreasonable?

[182]   The amici submit that CSS equipment is intrusive technology for which CSIS requires a warrant to operate. In this regard, the amici rely on the following passage in X (Re), above, at paragraphs 161–162:

When conventional means of investigation do not allow to meaningfully advance an investigation, subsections 21(1), 21(2), and specifically 21(2)b) (further referred to simply as “section 21”) come into play to allow the CSIS to apply for warrants before the Court. The application must show, on reasonable grounds, that the information sought is factually related to a threat to the security of Canada as referred to in subsections 21(1), 12(1), and as defined in section 2. The affidavit in support of the warrant application and the examination that follows at the hearing are determinative for the designated judge charged with deciding whether to issue the warrant or not. As the Pitfield Report rightly noted when discussing this primary function, the definition of the “threats to the security of Canada” at section 2 of the Act:

... constitutes the basic limit on the agency’s freedom of action. It will establish for the CSIS, its Director, and employees the fundamental standard for their activities. It will enter crucially into judicial determination of whether a particular intrusive investigative technique can be used. [Emphasis added.]

Canada. Parliament. Senate. Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada (November 1983) (Chair: P.M Pitfield), at page 12, paragraph 31.)

Section 21 supports advancing an investigation when conventional means are not sufficient and intrusive methods are necessary. The role of the Court, in such cases, is to ensure all requirements of the legislation are respected in the application for warrants and that the measures sought are justified in light of the facts put forward. Section 21 does not create a separate scheme wholly distinct from the primary function of CSIS as described in subsection 12(1); rather, section 21 complements the primary function of “investigating threats” by establishing procedural requirements when an application for warrants is sought. [Emphasis in original.]

[183]   I do not read the foregoing passage as suggesting that CSIS requires a warrant whenever it wishes to gather information through the use of new technology. Indeed, the underlined words in the passage from the Pitfield Report [Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada (November 1983) (Chair: P. M. Pitfield)] that Justice Noël quoted specifically refer to a particular intrusive technique.

[184]   In Tessling, above, at paragraph 30, the Supreme Court made it clear that there is no “free-standing prohibition on [the use of] electronic or other technologies without a warrant.” (See also, Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 54, and Gomboc, above, at paragraph 40.) Rather, the question is: does the technology “in fact intrude on the reasonable sphere of privacy of an individual?” The answer to this question requires an assessment of the “totality of the relevant circumstances”. In that assessment, in this particular case, I do not consider that there is anything about the use of CSS technology per se that would justify a conclusion that the use of that technology is objectively unreasonable.

Conclusion Regarding the Objective Reasonableness of Individuals’ Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Relation to the IMSI and IMEI Identifiers of their Mobile Devices

[185]   In my view, a purposive consideration of the foregoing factors leads to the conclusion that individuals’ subjective expectations of privacy in relation to the IMSI and IMEI information on their mobile devices are objectively reasonable.

[186]   The principal factors that support this conclusion include:

i.     The fact that information pertaining to one’s mobile telecommunication devices and their use is generally considered to be very personal and private in nature. This includes information that could well be revealed through CSIS’s analysis of IMSI and IMEI identifiers, which could assist CSIS to build a profile on the individual in question by (i) “determining [***[contacts]***] and communications patterns”, [***] (ii) drawing inferences about an individual [***] Even though CSIS may not know the identity of the individual whose IMSI and IMEI information is obtained through the use of CSS technology, these are not trivial encroachments on that individual’s anonymity interests. In a thriving democratic society, it is objectively reasonable that individuals would likely expect that this personal information would remain private, and not be surreptitiously captured by the state.

ii.    The nature of the potentially serious consequences that may be faced by individuals who are subjects of investigation or information gathering under the Act.

iii.   The nature of the conduct addressed by section 12 of the Act—which is frequently closer to “true” crimes than to the types of regulatory offences established by the public welfare, regulatory and economic legislation that has been considered in the jurisprudence with respect to section 8 of the Charter.

iv.    The fact that if the average person were aware that mobile devices emitted IMSI and IMEI identifiers to the cellular environment when they are in idle mode, he or she would likely believe that such information is being made available only to TSP.

v.     The information in the Gone Opaque report, and available on Wikipedia, which suggests that some steps have been taken in at least some quarters of the telecommunications industry to protect the confidentiality of IMSI numbers.

(v)   Conclusion Regarding Whether the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Constitutes a “Search”

[187]   Based on all of the foregoing, I conclude that CSIS’s capture of the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with [***] mobile devices through the use of CSS technology constituted a “search” within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. In my view, this conclusion is supported by the confidential nature of IMSI and IMEI identifiers, the private and personal nature of the additional information that CSIS may be able to assemble upon obtaining IMSI and IMEI identifiers, the direct nature of [***] interest in that information, the subjective expectation of privacy that [***] likely had in respect of that information, and the objective reasonableness of that subjective expectation.

[188]   It bears underscoring that, in a thriving democratic society, it is objectively reasonable that individuals would likely expect that the personal information that may be revealed to CSIS once it begins to analyze captured IMSI and IMEI identifiers will remain private, and will not become known to agents of the state.

[189]   Although intrusions on individuals’ anonymity interests do not always engage section 8 of the Charter, I find that the capture of IMSI and IMEI information does reach this threshold, because of the profiles of individuals that CSIS can begin to build upon acquiring that information. Among other things, those technical and personal profiles can assist CSIS to construct a mosaic that reveals who an individual associates with, [***] draw inferences regarding the person’s beliefs. As I have previously noted, it is those very profiles that may ultimately assist CSIS to obtain a warrant to acquire subscriber information and engage in even more intrusive activities. However, until CSIS is able to obtain that subscriber data and exercise other warranted powers, its capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers is only minimally intrusive. This is because neither the mobile device nor its contents, nor anything that might be accessed through the mobile device, can be accessed in any way through CSIS’s CSS operations. Moreover, with the one exception of [***] CSIS cannot access the content of communications made on mobile devices; and CSIS has assured the Court that it does not use its CSS equipment to access such content.

(b)  Is CSIS’s Interception of IMSI and IMEI Numbers Unreasonable?

[190]   Given that CSIS’s capture of the IMSI and IMEI numbers from [***] mobile devices constituted a search, and given that CSIS’s searches were conducted without a warrant, they were presumptively unreasonable (Spencer, above, at paragraph 68; Goodwin, above, at paragraph 56; Hunter, above, at pages 160–161).

[191]   To overcome that presumption, and in the absence of any suggestion that it was not feasible to seek a warrant before CSIS used CSS technology to capture the IMSI and IMEI identifiers associated with [***] mobile devices, the Attorney General must demonstrate that the “searches” were authorized by law, that the law in question is reasonable, and that the manner in which the searches was carried out was reasonable (see jurisprudence cited at paragraph 133 above). These issues will be addressed below.

(i)    Was the “Search” Authorized by Law?

[192]   The Attorney General submits that CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI numbers, without a warrant, for the purpose of identifying a subject of investigation’s mobile electronic device(s) is authorized by section 12 of the Act. As has been noted, that provision states as follows:

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23

Collection, analysis and retention

12 (1) The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.

No territorial limit

(2) For greater certainty, the Service may perform its duties and functions under subsection (1) within or outside Canada.

[193]   The amici disagree with that assertion for several reasons, some of which I will discuss in the next section below, when I address whether the framework established by sections 12 and 21 of the Act can be considered to be a “reasonable law” for the present purposes.

[194]   The amici state that section 12 is not a freestanding power to search once section 8 of the Charter has been engaged. They maintain that this would be inconsistent with the words of sections 12 and 21, when “read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 602, at paragraph 10). More specifically, they assert that section 12 simply identifies CSIS’s duties and functions and does not confer on CSIS the power to conduct searches that engage section 8 of the Charter. In this regard, they draw an analogy to the policing context, where the police have a duty to investigate crime, but do not have an unfettered power to search. The amici maintain that the power to search must be granted by statute or by the common law. However, this begs the question of whether section 12 confers such a power.

[195]   The amici submit that interpreting section 12 as conferring powers on CSIS personnel to conduct a search when section 8 of the Charter has been engaged is inconsistent with the manner in which this Court has previously interpreted section 12 of the Act. In this regard, they note that in X (Re), above, Justice Noël observed that “[w]hen conventional means of investigation do not allow [CSIS] to meaningfully advance an investigation, subsections 21(1), 21(2), and specifically paragraph 21(2)b) … come into play to allow the CSIS to apply for warrants before the Court” (X (Re), above, at paragraph 161). As discussed above at paragraphs 182–183, I do not interpret Justice Noël’s use of the term “conventional means of investigation” as suggesting that a warrant is required any time any new technology that cannot be characterized as “conventional” is used by CSIS. This would be contrary to the express teaching of the Supreme Court in Tessling, above, at paragraph 30; and in Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 54.

[196]   The plain language of section 12 requires CSIS to collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and to analyze and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada. This provides CSIS with the explicit authority to investigate such threats in those circumstances.

[197]   The provisions in section 21, while linked to sections 12 and 16, simply describe the circumstances in which a warrant may be sought and issued, when (i) the Director of CSIS or any employee designated by the Minister for the purpose, believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant is required to enable CSIS to investigate a threat to the security of Canada, or to perform the duties and functions set forth in section 16 of the Act, and (ii) a judge of this Court is satisfied of that fact, and of the matters described in paragraphs 21(2)(a) and (b) (Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157, 387 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (Mahjoub FCA), at paragraph 178). It is implicit that such belief on the part of the Director or a Minister’s designate, and such determination by this Court, would be informed by the requirements of the common law as to when warrants are required for those purposes.

[198]   In my view, there is nothing in the language of section 21, or elsewhere in the Act, that would support the view that CSIS is required to obtain a warrant anytime that it engages in a minimally intrusive “search” within the meaning of the Charter. The language of section 12, as limited in the manner discussed at paragraphs 212–216 below, provides CSIS with all the authority it requires to investigate activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, without a warrant, unless a warrant is required at common law.

[199]   The view that CSIS requires a warrant every time that a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is engaged would conflate the two elements in section 8 of the Charter into a single element, by effectively reading out the requirement that a search be “unreasonable” before it may be found to be contrary to section 8.

[200]   The amici further suggest that requiring a warrant before seeking to obtain IMSI and IMEI identifiers through the use of CSS technology would be consistent with the implicit requirement that the police must obtain a general warrant under section 487.01 of the Criminal Code, or a transmission data recorder warrant under section 492.2, before they may use a CSS to obtain and attribute IMSI and IMEI numbers to a suspect. However, the fact that Parliament may have determined that police require a warrant to use a CSS to attribute IMSI and IMEI numbers to an individual would not provide a sufficient basis for inferring that CSIS is also required to obtain a warrant in such circumstances. Among other things, police do not have available to them the powers conferred by section 12 of the Act.

[201]   The amici also maintain that it is for Parliament to decide whether to allow CSIS to use a CSS to intercept and attribute the IMSI and IMEI numbers of a mobile device to a subject of investigation, based on “reasonable grounds to suspect”. I agree, and I find that Parliament implicitly did so when it passed section 12 of the Act. Therefore, CSIS’s use of a CSS for that particular purpose is “authorized by law”, as contemplated by the jurisprudence cited at paragraph 133 above.

(ii)   Is Section 12 of the Act a Reasonable Law?

[202]   As discussed at paragraph 134 above, the factors to be considered in assessing whether a law which authorizes a search is reasonable include the nature and purpose of the law, the degree of intrusiveness that it authorizes, the mechanism of intrusion authorized, the extent to which it provides for judicial supervision, and any other safeguards or “checks and balances” that it contains to constrain the extent of the state’s intrusion on individuals’ privacy interests. Depending upon the circumstances and the legislative scheme, the availability of oversight may assist to overcome the presumptive unlawfulness of a warrantless search. These factors will be addressed below.

The Nature and Purpose of Section 12

[203]   Section 12 gives CSIS a critical, central and arguably essential role in Canada’s national security apparatus. It does this by requiring CSIS to collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyze and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, and in relation thereto, to report to and advise the Government of Canada.

[204]   The amici maintain that the “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard set forth in section 12 is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search by CSIS. I disagree.

[205]   The Supreme Court explicitly recognized very early on in its consideration of section 8 of the Charter that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard may not be required “where state security is involved” (Hunter, above, at pages 167–168).

[206]   The Court has subsequently reiterated that the “balancing of interests can justify searches on a lower standard where privacy interests are reduced, or where state objectives of public importance are predominant” (Chehil, above, at paragraph 23). In brief, the standard required to withstand scrutiny under section 8 “may vary depending on the context” (Rodgers, above, at paragraph 35).

[207]   In addition to circumstances in which privacy interests are reduced or state objectives of public importance are predominant, the Supreme Court has recognized that a standard that is lower than “reasonable grounds to believe” may be justified where the search method is highly accurate (Goodwin, above, at paragraph 67), particularly where the search is minimally intrusive and narrowly targeted (A.M., above, at paragraphs 13 and 42; Kang-Brown, above, at paragraphs 25, 60, 210 and 213).

[208]   In each of Chehil, A.M. and Kang-Brown, above, the Supreme Court found that the “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard did not contravene section 8, notwithstanding the absence of judicial pre-authorization. The Court reached similar findings in respect of customs searches (R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (Simmons), at pages 527–529; R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652, at paragraphs 37 and 48) and a search for drugs on a student in a high school by a vice-principal (R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at paragraph 50).

[209]   Applying the foregoing to CSIS’s use of CSS technology to intercept the IMSI and IMEI identifiers of [***] mobile electronic devices, each of the factors identified above is present. That is to say, state objectives of public importance (i.e., national security) are predominant, the intrusive nature of the search was minimal, and the method of the search was both highly accurate and narrowly targeted, given that the IMSI and IMEI information that was captured from third parties was not used for any purpose, and was quickly destroyed.

[210]   Accordingly, the fact that section 12 authorized CSIS to engage in that minimally intrusive search of [***] mobile devices on a “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard, and without prior judicial authorization, does not, in and of itself, render either section 12 or the search unreasonable (Mahjoub FCA, above, at paragraphs 176–177).

[211]   Indeed, I consider that the national security objectives permeating section 12 will generally be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the state interest, when searches conducted by CSIS are minimally intrusive (Jarvis, above, at paragraph 71; Mahjoub FCA, above). As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[o]ne of the most fundamental responsibilities of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens” (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at paragraph 1). One need look no further than the recent terrorist attacks in Barcelona, London, Paris and Berlin, and the October 2014 attack on our very own Parliament, to appreciate why the interests of the state will generally predominate when the state’s interest in national security collides with an individual’s interest not to be subject to a minimally intrusive search. In such circumstances, the right to life, liberty and security of the person of individuals who may be in danger of serious harm (Tse, above, at paragraph 21), namely, innocent victims of terrorist attacks, will typically prevail over the interests that are engaged when a minimally intrusive search is conducted by CSIS.

[212]   Another factor that is important to consider in assessing the reasonableness of section 12 is whether it is overbroad or vague. The Attorney General submits that section 12 is neither, because it imposes objective standards and strict limits on the collection of information by CSIS. I agree.

[213]   In particular, CSIS may collect, analyze and retain information for the purposes of an investigation, only in respect of activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting “threats to the security of Canada”. The latter is defined in detail in section 2 of the Act, while the “reasonable grounds to suspect” requirement is a “robust” standard that is well known in Canadian law (Chehil, above, at paragraphs 3 and 26–37; Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 75). These objective parameters are further reinforced and narrowed by the fact that the scope of information that may be collected by CSIS is explicitly limited to that which “is strictly necessary”.

[214]   In X (Re), above, at paragraph 185, Justice Noël found that this limitation also implicitly applies to the retention of information collected by CSIS. I consider it important to invoke judicial comity and follow Justice Noël’s position on this, without any further analysis, given the importance of consistency by this Court in respect of this very important issue. I will simply pause to note that neither the Attorney General nor the amici took any issue with this interpretation of section 12 in this proceeding.

[215]   Taken together, these limitations ensure that section 12 is neither overbroad nor vague and that the information collected by CSIS is rationally connected to the fulfillment of the mandate that section 12 has conferred upon CSIS. These limitations also ensure that section 12 “strikes the appropriate balance between the public interest in investigating threats to the security of Canada and [a subject of investigation’s] privacy rights” in respect of activities that are only minimally intrusive (Mahjoub, above, at paragraph 35, affd Mahjoub FCA, above, at paragraphs 176–177).

[216]   In the presence of these clearly ascertainable and understandable limitations, it cannot be said that section 12 “so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate” (R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at page 643; Wakeling, above, at paragraph 62). On the contrary, section 12, read together with the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” set forth in section 2 of the Act, clearly articulates the scope of activities that may be investigated by CSIS.

[217]   Having regard to the foregoing, I find that the nature and purpose of section 12 support the view that section 12 is a reasonable law.

The Degree of Intrusiveness Authorized by Section 12

[218]   The limitations discussed above ensure that CSIS does not have a mandate to engage in intrusive investigations in relation to persons whose activities fall outside of those limitations. In other words, CSIS has no mandate under section 12 to investigate persons whose activities do not give rise to reasonable grounds to suspect that they constitute threats to the security of Canada. The investigative powers provided to it under section 12 are confined to those whose activities meet this robust threshold, and then are further confined to the collection of information that “is strictly necessary”, as well as to the four categories of activities articulated in the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” provided in section 2 of the Act.

[219]   For the narrowly circumscribed scope of remaining activities that fall within the purview of section 12, CSIS may collect, analyze and retain information that ranges from non-intrusive to highly intrusive. However, once it moves beyond minimally invasive collection activities, it will require a warrant. In brief, by including the provisions of section 21 pertaining to warrants in the Act, Parliament implicitly contemplated that CSIS would not conduct collection activities under section 12 that are more than minimally intrusive, without first obtaining judicial pre-authorization under section 21. It can be inferred from this framework that, in the absence of a warrant, section 12 only provides CSIS with the ability to engage in non-intrusive or minimally intrusive activities.

The Extent to Which the Act Provides for Judicial Supervision

[220]   The amici submit that section 12 is not a reasonable law because it does not fall within any of the few exceptions that have been recognized to the general requirement that searches by agents of the state must be judicially pre-authorized on a standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”. In this regard, they assert that exceptions to the requirement of judicial pre-authorization have only been recognized in exigent circumstances (e.g., R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, at page 243), the customs context (e.g., Simmons, above, at page 528), “sniffer dog” searches (e.g., Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 60) and searches incident to detention and arrest (e.g., R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at paragraphs 38–40).

[221]   The amici maintain that in each of these cases, the existence of after-the-fact judicial control was an important factor in the absence of judicial pre-authorization of the search. They add that no after-the-fact method of judicial control exists in respect of either warrantless or warranted searches under section 21 of the Act, because the individual who was the subject of the search may never learn that the search occurred.

[222]   In my view, the Supreme Court’s teachings in respect of judicial supervision of warrantless searches are more nuanced than suggested by the amici.

[223]   The jurisprudence relied upon by the amici does not support the proposition that a minimally invasive search necessarily contravenes section 8 of the Charter in the absence of prior judicial authorization or after-the-fact judicial control. As I have already discussed the absence of prior judicial authorization at paragraphs 207–210 above, I will confine the discussion below to after-the-fact judicial control.

[224]   The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that assessment of a warrantless search under section 8 will depend on a careful balancing of the legitimate interests of the state and the legitimate interests of the person who was the subject of a warrantless search in each particular case (Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 24; A.M., above, at paragraph 37; Rodgers, above, at paragraphs 26–27; Jarvis, above, at paragraphs 61–62; Colarusso, above, at pages 52–53; McKinlay, above, at pages 645–646). This balancing must be conducted as part of the overall assessment of whether the search was authorized by law, the law in question is reasonable, and the manner in which the search was carried out was reasonable.

[225]   In a trilogy of “sniffer dog” cases (Kang-Brown, A.M.  and Chehil, above) the Supreme Court placed considerable importance on the availability of after-the-fact judicial review of the warrantless searches that were conducted, in assessing the overall reasonableness of those searches. However, that appears to have been in part because of concerns regarding the reliability of individual dogs (Chehil, above, at paragraphs 25 and 48–54; A.M., above, at paragraphs 84–86 and 90), in part because of “the significance and quality of the information obtained about” the concealed contents of a person’s belongings or “on his … person” (Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 58), and in part because “[t]he consequences of a false indication by a sniffer dog can be severe” (Chehil, above, at paragraph 49).

[226]   Those cases can be distinguished from CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI numbers from an individual’s wireless electronic devices. This is because that technology is highly reliable and therefore does not give rise to the potentially severe consequences associated with a “false positive”. Moreover, it intrudes far less on an individual’s privacy rights than a dog sniff, which can give rise to strong inferences about the concealed contents of an individual’s luggage, handbag or backpack, etc., or about what is on a person. In brief, IMSI and IMEI information cannot give rise to any inferences whatsoever about the contents stored on, or available through, a mobile device. IMSI and IMEI identifiers also cannot assist CSIS to make strong inferences about the specific content of communications made over a mobile device.

[227]   The highly reliable nature of CSS technology, and the degree to which it intrudes on an individual’s privacy interests, also distinguishes this case from Goodwin, above, at paragraph 72, where the Court considered the unavailability of after-the-fact judicial review of a licence suspension following a breathalyzer search to be critical, “particularly given the concerns about the reliability of the [breathalyzer device], the lack of an intermediate step between the [Breathalyzer analysis] and the roadside suspension, and the immediacy of the penalties that ensue.”

[228]   In the particular circumstances of this case, I consider the nature of the state’s interest (national security) to be sufficiently important that the absence of any requirement in the Act for a post-judicial review of each and every intercept of IMSI and IMEI identifiers by CSIS does not render section 12 unreasonable. This is especially so because of the minimal nature of CSIS’s intrusion on an individual’s privacy interests, the fact that such minimal intrusions are authorized by law (i.e., section 12), the fact that section 12 contains the various limitations discussed at paragraphs 212–216 above, the additional checks and balances that I will discuss below, and the fact that a warrant from this Court will be required [***] At the time that CSIS seeks such a warrant, the Court would have an opportunity to review the reasonableness of CSIS’s grounds to suspect that the individual’s activities may constitute threats to the security of Canada. Prior to that time, the potential consequences of the search to the individual would be very limited, if any.

[229]   I recognize that this after-the-fact judicial control under the Act is only available where CSIS decides to seek warranted powers in respect of the subject of investigation. According to [***] The IMSI and IMEI numbers subsequently captured are then used to assist CSIS to execute the warranted powers against the correct wireless device. However, where a warrant has not been obtained prior to a CSS operation, there may be no opportunity for any judicial control in respect of any minimal intrusions that may occur in relation to the privacy rights of (i) subjects of investigation who do not become the subject of requests for warrants, or (ii) third parties. Nevertheless, this is broadly analogous to the situation that exists in the sniffer dog cases discussed above. In those cases, after-the-fact judicial control would only be available if criminal proceedings were instituted against an individual whose person or luggage, etc., had been subjected to a sniffer dog search (Chehil, above, at paragraph 53; A.M., above, at paragraph 90; Kang-Brown, above, at paragraph 59). Thus, the absence of some form of after-the-fact judicial control in respect of all minimally-invasive searches that may be conducted under a law does not, in and of itself, appear to render that law unreasonable.

The Presence of Other “Checks and Balances” or Accountability Measures

[230]   In addition to the after-the-fact judicial review that the Act contemplates will occur if CSIS wishes to link IMSI and IMEI numbers that it has captured from an individual’s mobile devices to the specific personal identity of that person, the Act provides for a number of other accountability measures or “checks and balances”.

[231]   Specifically, subsection 6(1) stipulates that the Director of CSIS is “under the direction of the Minister” in exercising his control and management of CSIS and all matters connected therewith. Furthermore, subsection 6(2) stipulates that the Minister may issue written directions to the Director. The Attorney General notes that one such direction, entitled “Ministerial Direction for Operations and Accountability”, states that CSIS’s “[o]perational activities must be reasonable and proportional to the threat” and that it “shall seek to minimize intrusions on human rights, including privacy, to the extent possible and in accordance with Canadian law”. Also, subsection 6(4) requires the Director of CSIS to provide an annual report to the Minister with respect to its operational activities during the year. I consider it appropriate to take judicial notice of recent public statements made by the current Minister that indicate that he takes his role under section 6 of the Act very seriously.

[232]   In addition, pursuant to subsection 20(2), the Director of CSIS is required to report to the Minister where he is of the opinion that an employee may, on a particular occasion, have acted unlawfully in the purported performance of CSIS’s duties and functions under the Act. I note in passing that such reports are also required to be provided to the Attorney General (subsection 20(3)).

[233]   Moreover, CSIS’s activities are subject to review by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which was established pursuant to subsection 34(1) of the Act. The extensive functions of the SIRC are set forth in subsection 38(1), and include generally reviewing the performance by CSIS of its duties and functions. Pursuant to subsection 20(4), a copy of any report prepared by the Director under subsection 20(2) and provided to the Attorney General under subsection 20(3) must also be given to the SIRC, which is then mandated by paragraph 38(1)(a)(iv) to review that report. SIRC is also mandated to submit a certificate to the Minister stating the extent to which it is satisfied with CSIS’s annual report and stating whether, in its opinion, any of CSIS’s activities described in that report (i) are not authorized by or under the Act or contravene any directions issued by the Minister under subsection 6(2), or (ii) involve an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise by CSIS of any of its powers.

[234]   As noted at paragraph 11 of these reasons above, the Court first learned of the existence of CSIS’s use of CSS technology when it was provided with a copy of one of SIRC’s classified reports. As with SIRC’s revelation (in that same report) of CSIS’s use of metadata, this appears to have led, at least in part, to CSIS becoming more transparent with this Court about its use of CSS technology. I consider SIRC’s oversight of CSIS’s activities in respect of metadata and CSS technology to have been essential in this regard.

[235]   In my view, the roles and responsibilities of the Minister, SIRC and CSIS’s Director described above assist in ensuring that section 12 is a reasonable law for the purposes of assessing whether the minimally invasive searches that it authorizes are reasonable.

Conclusion Regarding the Reasonableness of Section 12

[236]   Based on the foregoing assessment in Part VII.C.(2)(b)(ii) immediately above, I conclude that section 12 is a reasonable law. In my view, this conclusion is supported by the following:

i.     Nature and purpose of section 12: Section 12 gives CSIS a critical, central and arguably essential role in Canada’s national security apparatus. Parliament’s objective in conferring this role upon CSIS is of predominant importance, relative to the minimal intrusions that are authorized under section 12 (Chehil, above, at paragraph 23; Tse, above, at paragraph 21). In this context, the “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard, together with the absence of judicial pre-authorization, are justified, particularly where (i) the minimal intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy is as narrowly targeted and as highly accurate as CSIS’s use of CSS technology, and (ii) CSIS destroys the IMSI and IMEI information incidentally captured from third parties very quickly, without conducting any analysis of that information whatsoever, once it has been confirmed that it does not come from a wireless device owned or operated by a subject of investigation. The limitations contained in section 12, and in the definition of “threat to the security of Canada” that is set forth in section 2 of the Act, ensure that section 12 is neither overbroad nor vague and that the information collected by CSIS is rationally connected to the fulfillment of the mandate that section 12 has conferred upon CSIS.

ii.    Degree of intrusiveness authorized by section 12: The limitations described above ensure that CSIS does not have a mandate to engage in intrusive investigations in relation to persons whose activities fall outside of those limitations. For the narrowly circumscribed scope of remaining activities, CSIS may collect, analyze and retain information that ranges from non-intrusive to highly intrusive. However, the provisions in section 21 of the Act pertaining to warrants contemplate that CSIS may not engage in activities that are more than minimally intrusive without a warrant.

iii.   Extent to which the Act provides for judicial supervision: The judicial supervision contemplated in the provisions of section 21 of the Act would be triggered as soon as CSIS seeks powers to engage in investigative activities against an individual that are more than minimally-intrusive in nature. Such activities would include obtaining subscriber information in respect of the mobile devices that have been attributed to an individual pursuant to a CSS operation. At that time, the Court would have an opportunity to evaluate, among other things, the reasonableness of the grounds to suspect that the individual’s activities may constitute threats to the security of Canada. Such after-the-fact judicial control is broadly analogous to the judicial scrutiny that is triggered in other contexts, and only after criminal proceedings have been initiated against the individual whose privacy rights were intruded upon.

iv.    The Act contemplates a meaningful oversight role for SIRC, which SIRC has provided. In addition, the Act stipulates that the Director of CSIS is “under the direction of the Minister” in exercising his control and management of CSIS and all matters connected therewith. The Director is also subject to a number of reporting obligations to the Minister, including providing an annual report that is tabled in Parliament. Moreover, the Minister has the authority to issue written directions to the Director, and one such direction that has been issued imposes significant constraints on the Director, which extend beyond those that are contained in section 12.

(iii)  Was the Manner in Which the Search was Carried Out Unreasonable?

[237]   The bulk of the evidence adduced in this proceeding regarding the manner in which CSS operations are conducted relates to CSS operations generally, rather than to the specific CSS operation that was conducted in respect of [***]

[238]   In addition, the IMSI and IMEI information that was captured from third parties at the time of CSIS’s CSS operations against [***] devices was destroyed before any analysis was performed in respect of that information; and that information was not included in the report that was prepared by CSIS in respect of the CSS operations in question. [***] In view of the fact that I am addressing various issues relating to those types of powers in [***] which is being released contemporaneously with this decision, I will refrain from commenting upon the issue further here.

[239]   With respect to CSIS’s CSS operations generally, the evidence adduced in this proceeding is more extensive. In particular, [***] testified that CSIS’s equipment maintains contact with mobile devices [***[for a few seconds]***] Based on the fact that an average telephone call from a mobile device typically takes approximately five to fifteen seconds to go through, and will persist in trying to connect a call for “up to tens of seconds”, [***] has testified that CSS operations have no discernible adverse impact on the experience of a user of a mobile device. For greater certainty, [***] testified that CSIS’s CSS equipment does not cause active calls to be dropped.

[240]   In addition, CSIS’s CSS operations do not impact upon the ability of mobile device users to place a 911 call, because the first legitimate network in any given area that receives such a call will connect it, even if that tower is operated by a TSP with which the mobile user does not have a relationship.

[241]   Furthermore, with one exception, the CSS equipment operated by CSIS does not have the ability to intercept the content of any communications, or to obtain any information stored in a mobile device. [***] testified that CSIS has a policy of not capturing such content.

[242]   Finally, [***] testified that CSIS deletes the IMSI and IMEI information that it captures from the mobile devices of third parties very quickly, often within [***] days, and in any event as soon as an operational report has been written with respect to a particular CSS operation or set of operations. Moreover, once it is concluded that such IMSI and IMEI information does not relate to the mobile devices that are the focus of a CSS operation, [***] no analysis whatsoever is conducted in respect of that information.

[243]   Having regard to the all of foregoing, I am satisfied that the manner in which CSIS’s CSS operations are presently conducted is not unreasonable.

(iv)  Conclusion Regarding the Reasonableness of CSIS’s Use of CSS Technology

[244]   For the reasons summarized at the end of Parts VII.C.(2)(b)(i)–(iii) above, I have found that CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI identifiers from the mobile device(s) of a subject of investigation is authorized by section 12 of the Act, that section 12 is a reasonable law, and that the manner in which CSIS currently conducts its CSS operations is not unreasonable. In reaching these findings, I have been mindful of the need to adopt “a purposive approach […] that emphasizes the protection of privacy as a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and autonomy as well as to the maintenance of a thriving democratic society” (Spencer, above, at paragraph 15).

[245]   Based on those findings, I conclude that this activity, as currently conducted by CSIS, is not unreasonable. In other words, I concur with SIRC’s finding that CSIS does not require a warrant to engage in this activity, provided that it is conducted in the manner described in my reasons above. I note that although the amici came to a contrary conclusion, they observed that this activity was “just over the threshold” at which a warrant would be required. They added that the contrary conclusion could also reasonably be reached.

[246]   This conclusion rests largely on the particular evidence adduced in this proceeding, regarding the manner in which CSIS currently conducts its CSS operations, and regarding the current capabilities of CSIS’s CSS equipment. I expect that the measures I have identified in concluding that CSIS’s capture of IMSI and IMEI identifiers is minimally intrusive, and therefore lawful, will be scrutinized by both the Minister and by SIRC, in their future consideration of CSIS’s use of CSS technology.

VIII.      Conclusion

[247]   For the reasons that I have set forth above, CSIS’s use of CSS technology to capture IMSI and IMEI identifiers from [***] wireless devices, without a warrant, engaged section 8 of the Charter because that activity constituted a “search”. This is because it assisted CSIS to build a profile on him, including by helping CSIS to begin to “determine his [***[contacts]***] and communications patterns”, with the aid of information already available to CSIS. This engaged [***] rights under section 8 of the Charter, because it de-anonymized his use of his wireless devices, which are very personal in nature.

[248]   However, that activity was not “unreasonable”, as contemplated by section 8. Therefore, it was not unlawful.

[249]   This is because the “searches” were narrowly targeted, highly accurate and minimally-intrusive, largely due to measures that CSIS implements when conducting its CSS operations. If those measures had not been adopted by CSIS, I may well have reached a different conclusion.

[250]   More particularly, the searches were not unreasonable because neither the mobile devices nor their contents, nor anything that might be accessed through the mobile devices, could be accessed in any way by CSIS’s CSS equipment. Moreover, with the one exception [***] that equipment cannot access the content of communications made on mobile devices. CSIS has assured the Court that it does not use its CSS equipment to access such content.

[251]   In addition, CSIS’s equipment maintains contact with mobile devices [***[for a few seconds]***] Based on the fact that an average telephone call from a mobile device typically takes approximately five to fifteen seconds to go through, and will persist in trying to connect a call for “up to tens of seconds”, the uncontested evidence is that CSIS’s CSS operations have no discernible adverse impact on the experience of a user of a mobile device. Moreover, CSIS’s CSS operations do not impact upon the ability of mobile device users to place a 911 call, because the first legitimate network in any given area that receives such a call will connect it, even if that tower is operated by a TSP with which the mobile user does not have a relationship.

[252]   Finally, CSIS deletes the IMSI and IMEI information that it captures from the mobile devices of third parties very quickly, often within [***] days, and in any event as soon as an operational report has been written with respect to a particular CSS operation or set of operations. Moreover, once it is concluded that such IMSI and IMEI information does not relate to the mobile devices that are the focus of a CSS operation, [***] no analysis whatsoever is performed in respect of that information.

[253]   In my view, the expeditious destruction of third party IMSI and IMEI information, together with CSIS’s policy of performing no further analysis in respect of such information, are essential to ensuring that a CSS operation is reasonable, and is not overbroad (Chehil, above, at paragraph 51). These steps are also critical to ensuring that there is a meaningful nexus between the individual(s) whose information is retained and analyzed by CSIS, and the threat to the security of Canada contemplated by section 12.

[254]   The retention of third party IMSI or IMEI information beyond a very short period of time, or the analysis of such information for a purpose other than simply assisting to identify the mobile device(s) of a subject of investigation, is not authorized by section 12. For this purpose, a “very short period of time” would be measured in days or weeks, although I will remain open to being persuaded that there are sound reasons for aligning this period with the [***] for the destruction of third party information that is applicable in other contexts, including the retention of certain types of metadata (X (Re), above, at paragraph 253). I expect that this will be the subject of further exchanges with the Attorney General following the release of this decision.

[255]   I also consider it to be significant [***]

[256]   I will simply add three further concluding remarks.

[257]   First, CSIS should not be relying on the language of [***] or on any other warrant, to conduct any CSS operations whatsoever. Should CSIS wish to obtain a warrant to conduct such operations, it should request explicit language authorizing it to do so.

[258]   Second, where CSIS wishes to rely on any information that it has directly or indirectly obtained from a CSS operation, in any future applications that CSIS may make to the Court for warrants, it should ensure that the Court is informed of the following, relative to the evidence that was provided in this proceeding: (i) any changes to the manner in which it conducts CSS operations; (ii) any changes to the capabilities of the equipment that it uses in such operations; and (iii) any changes in the purposes for which such equipment is used.

[259]   Finally, I consider that the use of CSS technology to conduct the “bulk” capture of the IMSI or IMEI identifiers associated with the mobile devices of members of the general public would not be authorized by section 12. Given the speculative nature of such an operation, it would therefore not meet the test for a warrantless search (Kang-Brown, above, at paragraphs 26 and 75).

JUDGMENT in [***]

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that CSIS’s warrantless use of CSS technology to capture the identifying characteristics of [***] mobile devices was not unlawful. It did not contravene the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2, the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 or section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]. Although CSIS’s use of a CSS against [***] constituted a “search”, the search was not “unreasonable” because it was narrowly targeted, highly accurate and minimally intrusive.

The present judgment and reasons shall, within seven days of receipt, be reviewed jointly by the amici curiae and the Attorney General with a view to making a joint recommendation to the Court regarding redactions to the version of the judgment and reasons that will be made public. The Attorney General and the amici must be guided by the open Court principle in their consultation and determination. Any contentious issues shall be drawn to my attention or to the attention of another designated judge, if I am unable to exercise my judicial function.

APPENDIX    I

 

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23

Definitions  

2 In this Act,

…

threats to the security of Canada means

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,

(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,

(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and

(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,

but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d). (menaces envers la sécurité du Canada)

…

Management of Service     

Role of Director

6 (1) The Director, under the direction of the Minister, has the control and management of the Service and all matters connected therewith.

Minister may issue directions

(2) In providing the direction referred to in subsection (1), the Minister may issue to the Director written directions with respect to the Service and a copy of any such direction shall, forthwith after it is issued, be given to the Review Committee.

Directions deemed not to be statutory instruments

(3) Directions issued by the Minister under subsection (2) shall be deemed not to be statutory instruments for the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act.

Periodic reports by Director

(4) The Director shall, in relation to every 12-month period or any lesser period that is specified by the Minister, submit to the Minister, at any times that the Minister specifies, reports with respect to the Service’s operational activities during that period, and shall cause the Review Committee to be given a copy of each such report.

Measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada

(5) The reports shall include, among other things, the following information in respect of the Service’s operational activities, during the period for which the report is made, to reduce threats to the security of Canada:

(a) for each of the paragraphs of the definition threats to the security of Canada in section 2, a general description of the measures that were taken during the period in respect of the threat within the meaning of that paragraph and the number of those measures;

(b) the number of warrants issued under subsection 21.1(3) during the period and the number of applications for warrants made under subsection 21.1(1) that were refused during the period; and

(c) for each threat to the security of Canada for which warrants have been issued under subsection 21.1(3) before or during the period, a general description of the measures that were taken under the warrants during the period.

…

Duties and Functions of Service

Collection, analysis and retention

12 (1) The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.

No territorial limit

(2) For greater certainty, the Service may perform its duties and functions under subsection (1) within or outside Canada.

…

Collection of information concerning foreign states and persons

16 (1) Subject to this section, the Service may, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, assist the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of

(a) any foreign state or group of foreign states; or

(b) any person other than

(i) a Canadian citizen,

(ii) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or

(iii) a corporation incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province.

Limitation

(2) The assistance provided pursuant to subsection (1) shall not be directed at any person referred to in subparagraph (1)(b)(i), (ii) or (iii).

Personal consent of Ministers required

(3) The Service shall not perform its duties and functions under subsection (1) unless it does so

(a) on the personal request in writing of the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and

(b) with the personal consent in writing of the Minister.

…

Judicial Control   

Application for warrant

21 (1) If the Director or any employee designated by the Minister for the purpose believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate, within or outside Canada, a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16, the Director or employee may, after having obtained the Minister’s approval, make an application in accordance with subsection (2) to a judge for a warrant under this section.

Matters to be specified in application for warrant

(2) An application to a judge under subsection (1) shall be made in writing and be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant deposing to the following matters, namely,

(a) the facts relied on to justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16;

(b) that other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or why it appears that they are unlikely to succeed, that the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation using only other investigative procedures or that without a warrant under this section it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada or the performance of the duties and functions under section 16 referred to in paragraph (a) would not be obtained;

(c) the type of communication proposed to be intercepted, the type of information, records, documents or things proposed to be obtained and the powers referred to in paragraphs (3)(a) to (c) proposed to be exercised for that purpose;

(d) the identity of the person, if known, whose communication is proposed to be intercepted or who has possession of the information, record, document or thing proposed to be obtained;

(e) the persons or classes of persons to whom the warrant is proposed to be directed;

(f) a general description of the place where the warrant is proposed to be executed, if a general description of that place can be given;

(g) the period, not exceeding sixty days or one year, as the case may be, for which the warrant is requested to be in force that is applicable by virtue of subsection (5); and

(h) any previous application made under subsection (1) in relation to a person who is identified in the affidavit in accordance with paragraph (d), the date on which each such application was made, the name of the judge to whom it was made and the judge’s decision on it.

Issuance of warrant

(3) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to the Statistics Act, where the judge to whom an application under subsection (1) is made is satisfied of the matters referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) set out in the affidavit accompanying the application, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing the persons to whom it is directed to intercept any communication or obtain any information, record, document or thing and, for that purpose,

(a) to enter any place or open or obtain access to any thing;

(b) to search for, remove or return, or examine, take extracts from or make copies of or record in any other manner the information, record, document or thing; or

(c) to install, maintain or remove any thing.

Activities outside Canada

(3.1) Without regard to any other law, including that of any foreign state, a judge may, in a warrant issued under subsection (3), authorize activities outside Canada to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada.

Matters to be specified in warrant

(4) There shall be specified in a warrant issued under subsection (3)

(a) the type of communication authorized to be intercepted, the type of information, records, documents or things authorized to be obtained and the powers referred to in paragraphs (3)(a) to (c) authorized to be exercised for that purpose;

(b) the identity of the person, if known, whose communication is to be intercepted or who has possession of the information, record, document or thing to be obtained;

(c) the persons or classes of persons to whom the warrant is directed;

(d) a general description of the place where the warrant may be executed, if a general description of that place can be given;

(e) the period for which the warrant is in force; and

(f) such terms and conditions as the judge considers advisable in the public interest.

Maximum duration of warrant

(5) A warrant shall not be issued under subsection (3) for a period exceeding

(a) sixty days where the warrant is issued to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada within the meaning of paragraph (d) of the definition of that expression in section 2; or

(b) one year in any other case.

…

Security Intelligence Review Committee

Security Intelligence Review Committee

34 (1) There is hereby established a committee, to be known as the Security Intelligence Review Committee, consisting of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members, all of whom shall be appointed by the Governor in Council from among members of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada who are not members of the Senate or the House of Commons, after consultation by the Prime Minister of Canada with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons and the leader in the House of Commons of each party having at least twelve members in that House.       

Term of office

(2) Each member of the Review Committee shall be appointed to hold office during good behaviour for a term not exceeding five years.

Re-appointment

(3) A member of the Review Committee is eligible to be re-appointed for a term not exceeding five years.

Expenses

(4) Each member of the Review Committee is entitled to be paid, for each day that the member performs duties and functions under this Act, such remuneration as is fixed by the Governor in Council and shall be paid reasonable travel and living expenses incurred by the member in the performance of those duties and functions.

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Functions of Review Committee

38 (1) The functions of the Review Committee are

(a) to review generally the performance by the Service of its duties and functions and, in connection therewith,

(i) [Repealed, 2012, c. 19, s. 381]           

(ii) to review directions issued by the Minister under subsection 6(2),

(iii) to review arrangements entered into by the Service pursuant to subsections 13(2) and (3) and 17(1) and to monitor the provision of information and intelligence pursuant to those arrangements,

(iv) to review any report or comment given to it pursuant to subsection 20(4),

(v) to monitor any request referred to in paragraph 16(3)(a) made to the Service,

(vi) to review the regulations, and

(vii) to compile and analyse statistics on the operational activities of the Service;

(b) to arrange for reviews to be conducted, or to conduct reviews, pursuant to section 40; and

(c) to conduct investigations in relation to

(i) complaints made to the Committee under sections 41 and 42,

(ii) reports made to the Committee pursuant to section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and

(iii) matters referred to the Committee pursuant to section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Review of measures               

(1.1) In reviewing the performance by the Service of its duties and functions the Review Committee shall, each fiscal year, review at least one aspect of the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.

Review Committee’s other functions

(2) As soon as the circumstances permit after receiving a copy of a report referred to in subsection 6(4), the Review Committee shall submit to the Minister a certificate stating the extent to which it is satisfied with the report and whether any of the Service’s operational activities described in the report, in its opinion,

(a) is not authorized by or under this Act or contravenes any directions issued by the Minister under subsection 6(2); or

(b) involves an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise by the Service of any of its powers.

Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21

Actions relating to international affairs and defence

51 (1) Any application under section 41 or 42 relating to personal information that the head of a government institution has refused to disclose by reason of paragraph 19(1)(a) or (b) or section 21, and any application under section 43 in respect of a file contained in a personal information bank designated as an exempt bank under section 18 to contain files all of which consist predominantly of personal information described in section 21, shall be heard and determined by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or by any other judge of the Court that the Chief Justice may designate to hear the applications.

Special rules for hearings

(2) An application referred to in subsection (1) or an appeal brought in respect of such application shall

(a) be heard in camera; and

(b) on the request of the head of the government institution concerned, be heard and determined in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National Capital Act.

Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2

Minister’s powers

5 (1) Subject to any regulations made under section 6, the Minister may, taking into account all matters that the Minister considers relevant for ensuring the orderly establishment or modification of radio stations and the orderly development and efficient operation of radiocommunication in Canada,

(a) issue

(i) radio licences in respect of radio apparatus,

(i.1) spectrum licences in respect of the utilization of specified radio frequencies within a defined geographic area,

(ii) broadcasting certificates in respect of radio apparatus that form part of a broadcasting undertaking,

(iii) radio operator certificates,

(iv) technical acceptance certificates in respect of radio apparatus, interference-causing equipment and radio-sensitive equipment, and

(v) any other authorization relating to radiocommunication that the Minister considers appropriate,

and may fix the terms and conditions of any such licence, certificate or authorization including, in the case of a radio licence and a spectrum licence, terms and conditions as to the services that may be provided by the holder thereof.

…

Prohibitions

9 (1) No person shall

(a) knowingly send, transmit or cause to be sent or transmitted any false or fraudulent distress signal, message, call or radiogram of any kind;

(b) without lawful excuse, interfere with or obstruct any radiocommunication;

(c) decode an encrypted subscription programming signal or encrypted network feed otherwise than under and in accordance with an authorization from the lawful distributor of the signal or feed;

(d) operate a radio apparatus so as to receive an encrypted subscription programming signal or encrypted network feed that has been decoded in contravention of paragraph (c); or

(e) retransmit to the public an encrypted subscription programming signal or encrypted network feed that has been decoded in contravention of paragraph (c).

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46

Definitions

183 In this Part,

…

private communication means any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it; (communication privée)

…

Interception

184 (1) Every one who, by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, wilfully intercepts a private communication is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

Saving provision

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to

(a) a person who has the consent to intercept, express or implied, of the originator of the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it;

(b) a person who intercepts a private communication in accordance with an authorization or pursuant to section 184.4 or any person who in good faith aids in any way another person who the aiding person believes on reasonable grounds is acting with an authorization or pursuant to section 184.4;

(c) a person engaged in providing a telephone, telegraph or other communication service to the public who intercepts a private communication,

(i) if the interception is necessary for the purpose of providing the service,

(ii) in the course of service observing or random monitoring necessary for the purpose of mechanical or service quality control checks, or

(iii) if the interception is necessary to protect the person’s rights or property directly related to providing the service;

(d) an officer or servant of Her Majesty in right of Canada who engages in radio frequency spectrum management, in respect of a private communication intercepted by that officer or servant for the purpose of identifying, isolating or preventing an unauthorized or interfering use of a frequency or of a transmission; or

(e) a person, or any person acting on their behalf, in possession or control of a computer system, as defined in subsection 342.1(2), who intercepts a private communication originating from, directed to or transmitting through that computer system, if the interception is reasonably necessary for

(i) managing the quality of service of the computer system as it relates to performance factors such as the responsiveness and capacity of the system as well as the integrity and availability of the system and data, or

(ii) protecting the computer system against any act that would be an offence under subsection 342.1(1) or 430(1.1).

Use or retention

(3) A private communication intercepted by a person referred to in paragraph (2)(e) can be used or retained only if

(a) it is essential to identify, isolate or prevent harm to the computer system; or

(b) it is to be disclosed in circumstances referred to in subsection 193(2).  

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429 ….

Colour of right

(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence under sections 430 to 446 where he proves that he acted with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right.