T-5178-79
E. H. Price Limited (Plaintiff) (Respondent)
v.
The Queen (Defendant) (Applicant)
Trial Division, Smith D.J.—Winnipeg, February 9
and September 27, 1982.
Customs and excise — Sales tax — Crown — Limitation of
actions — Department of National Revenue demanding taxes
and penalties dating back to February 1972 — Assessment
commenced in July 1975 — Department filing certificate in
February 1980, pursuant to s. 52(4) of Excise Tax Act —
Plaintiff pleading collection proceedings barred by limitation
— Defendant applying under R. 474(1)(a) for determination of
questions of law — Is there a limitation period applicable to
an action for collection of taxes and penalties under Excise
Tax Act? — Parliament having constitutional power to estab
lish limitation periods for collection of taxes — Crown's
general immunity re statutes expressly removed with respect to
limitations by general rules in s. 38 of Federal Court Act
Rules subject to exception where "expressly provided by any
other Act" — Provincial laws relating to limitations apply
Manitoba statute establishing 6-year limitation — S. 52 of
Excise Tax Act providing two methods of recovery: by action
and by certificate — Certificate does not become judgment —
S. 52(1) stating taxes or sums payable "recoverable at any
time" — Express provision excepts case from general rules
and exempts Crown from limitation — No particular form of
words required for exception — "At any time" meaning unli
mited period — Court action only affected by phrase — No
conflict between s. 52 and s. 38 — S. 38 making non-exemp
tion from limitation general rule for Crown — Trend toward
eliminating Crown prerogative in relation to limitations —
Exception in s. 38 preserving Crown' prerogative where Parlia
ment provides — Circumstances wherein statutes provide
money recoverable at any time as debt due to Her Majesty —
Amendments to s. 52 of Excise Tax Act supporting judge's
interpretation — Limitation period otherwise applicable: 6
years — Date on which limitation period would have com
menced to run: date when taxes ought to have been paid —
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 38 —
Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-13, s. 52(1) (rep. & sub.
S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 68, s. 21), (4) — The Limitation of
Actions Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L150, ss. 2(a),(h), 3(1)(g),(h) —
The Special War Revenue Act, 1915, S.C. 1915, c. 8, s. 20 —
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, R. 474(1)(a).
The Department of National Revenue (Customs and Excise)
sought to collect, from the plaintiff, sales tax and penalties
dating back to February 1972. The relevant assessment of the
plaintiff was begun in July 1975. In February of 1980, the
Department filed a certificate in the Federal Court, pursuant to
subsection 52(4) of the Excise Tax Act. The plaintiff brought
an action, pleading that the collection proceedings against it
were barred by limitation. The defendant then applied, under
Rule 474(1)(a), for the determination of certain questions of
law, the key question being: Is there a limitation period appli
cable to an action for the collection of taxes and penalties under
the Excise Tax Act?
Held, during the relevant period, there was no limitation
period applicable to an action for the collection of taxes and
penalties under the Excise Tax Act. There is no doubt that
Parliament has the constitutional power to establish limitation
periods relating to proceedings for the collection of taxes; and
by section 38 of the Federal Court Act, the Crown's immunity
is expressly removed with respect to limitations—"Except as
expressly provided by any other Act". Also by virtue of section
38, provincial laws regarding limitations are made applicable to
Federal Court proceedings; and the relevant provision of the
Manitoba statute specifies a 6-year limitation period. However,
one must take account of section 52 of the Excise Tax Act.
That section sets out two methods for the recovery of taxes or
other sums: first, by a court action, as dealt with in subsection
(1); secondly, via a certificate of the Deputy Minister, dis
cussed in subsection (2). Note that the filing of a certificate
does not convert the certificate into a judgment. Subsection
52(1) states that taxes or sums payable are "recoverable at any
time". These words constitute an express contrary provision, as
contemplated by section 38 of the Federal Court Act. Thus,
they oust the general limitation rule set forth in section 38, and
exempt the Crown therefrom. No particular form of words is
required in order for there to be such an express contrary
provision. In this instance, the words "at any time" do refer to
an unlimited period. These words are found only in subsection
(1) of section 52, and therefore relate only to the alternative of
a court action. There is no conflict between section 52 and
section 38. Section 38 has indeed departed from earlier law, in
that the Crown is prima facie bound by the limitation period
stated in that provision, and exempted only where expressly
provided. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the trend towards
eliminating the Crown's immunity in relation to limitations, the
exception in section 38 does entail the preservation of the
privilege of exemption, where Parliament so provides. Parlia
ment has done this, by using the phrase "at any time", in
several statutes. Furthermore, recent amendments to subsection
52(1) of the Excise Tax Act are supportive of the foregoing
views.
COUNSEL:
J. Barry Hughes, Q.C. and P. N. Thorstein-
sson for plaintiff (respondent).
H. Glinter for defendant (applicant).
SOLICITORS:
Inkster, Walker, Westbury, Irish, Rusen &
Hughes, Winnipeg, for plaintiff (respondent).
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant (applicant).
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
SMITH D.J.: This is an application by ,the
defendant under Rule 474(1)(a) for the determi
nation of three questions of law, which are stated
in the notice of motion as follows:
(1) Is there a limitation period applicable to an action for
collection of taxes and penalties under the Excise Tax Act,
1970, R.S.C. Cap E-13;
(2) If the answer to (1) above is yes, what is the limitation
period applicable; and
(3) If the answer to (1) above is yes, what was the date from
which the limitation period commenced for the taxes and
penalties claimed?
An agreed statement of facts signed by the
solicitors for the parties has been filed in the
Court. With the exception of paragraph 9, which
simply states the issues to be decided on this
motion, already stated supra, the statement reads:
1. Representative of the Department of National Revenue,
Customs and Excise, representing Her Majesty the Queen, as a
result of an audit performed on the Plaintiff's business opera
tions, claimed that the Plaintiff was indebted to Her Majesty
the Queen on an accumulating basis since February 1, 1972, in
the amount of $63,127.61.
2. Over the course of the last several years, the Plaintiff and
Defendant have had numerous discussions with respect to the
claimed outstanding taxes accrued and owing, and the Defend
ant has also sent several notices for payment by registered mail
the last of which was sent on September 10, 1979. The Defend
ant continued to send periodic notices for payment to the
Plaintiff by regular mail.
3. The Plaintiff has not acknowledged any liability to pay these
taxes and/or penalties.
4. The total amount claimed by the Defendant due and owing
as of January 31, 1980, is $95,116.06 sales tax and penalty
together with additional penalty at the rate of two-thirds of one
per cent per month on the sum of $63,127.61 from February,
1980.
5. On February 7, 1980, a Certificate dated January 31, 1980,
was filed in this Honourable Court, pursuant to Section 52(4)
of the Excise Tax [sic] certifying as due and owing and unpaid
the following:
Sales Tax Due and Accruing for the Period from
February 1, 1972, to November 30, 1974 $63,127.61
Penalty Accrued to January 31, 1980 31,988.45
$95,116.06
together with additional penalty at the rate of Two-Thirds of
One Per Cent per Month on the said sum of $63,127.61 from
February 1, 1980, to date of payment.
'6. The date of the relevant assessment of the Plaintiff, which
was commenced by Officials of the Department of National
Revenue, Customs and Excise, was July 25, 1975.
7. The accumulated amount of taxes and penalties charged
within the six years preceding the date of the filing of the said
Certificate in this Honourable Court and included in such
Certificate is $17,343.16 and $7,689.22 respectively for a total
of $25,032.38.
'8. The Plaintiff by this Action raises the question of prescrip
tion concerning collection of these taxes and penalties by virtue
of the Excise Tax Act, The Federal Court Act of Canada and
the Limitations [sic] of Actions Act of Manitoba.
There is no doubt that the Parliament of
Canada has the constitutional power to enact that
proceedings for the collection of taxes under the
Excise Tax Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. E-13] or any
other taxing Act of Parliament must be com
menced within a time period established by
Parliament.
Pursuant to this power under the Constitution of
Canada, Parliament has enacted the Federal
Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, section
38 of which reads:
38. (1) Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the
laws relating to prescription and the limitation of actions in
force in any province between subject and subject apply to any
proceedings in the Court in respect of any cause of action
arising in such province, and a proceeding in the Court in
respect of a cause of action arising otherwise than in a province
shall be taken within and not after six years after the cause of
action arose.
(2) Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the laws
relating to prescription and the limitation of actions referred to
in subsection (1) apply to any proceedings brought by or
against the Crown.
In the present case the cause of action arose in
Manitoba. Therefore, in accordance with section
38 of the Federal Court Act, the laws in force in
Manitoba relating to limitation of actions apply to
proceedings in this Court, between subject and
subject, except as otherwise expressly provided in
any other Act. Further, subject to the same excep
tion, the laws of Manitoba relating to limitation of
action apply to proceedings in this Court brought
by or against the Crown. The effect is that the
general immunity of the Crown from the effect of
any enactment, is taken away in respect of statutes
of limitation by the express provisions of section 38
of the Federal Court Act.
The law of Manitoba relevant to this case is
found in paragraph 3(1)(g) of The Limitation of
Actions Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 145 [rep. and sub.]
S.M. 1966-67, c. 32, s. 2 [being para. 3(1)(g) of
R.S.M. 1970, c. L150], which reads as follows:
3. (1) The following actions shall be commenced within and not
after the times respectively hereinafter mentioned:
(g) Actions for the recovery of money (except in respect
of a debt charged upon land), whether recoverable as
a debt or damages or otherwise, and whether a recog
nizance, bond, covenant, or other specialty, or on a
simple contract, express or implied, and actions for an
account or not accounting, within six years after the
cause of action arose.
From this provision it is clear that an action to
recover money (in this case, taxes) recoverable as
a debt must be brought within six years after the
cause of action arose.
I note also that by paragraph 2(a) of the same
Act [R.S.M. 1970, c. L150; being para. 2(a) of
R.S.M. 1954, c. 145 (as am. by S.M. 1966-67, c.
32, para. 1(a))], "action" means any civil proceed
ing, and that by paragraph 2(h) [R.S.M. 1970, c.
L150; formerly para. 2(g) of R.S.M. 1954, c. 145]:
2...
(h) "proceedings" includes action, entry, taking of possession,
distress, and sale proceedings under an order of a court or
under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or conferred
by statute;
Other legislative rules that require consideration
are found in the Excise Tax Act, section 52.
Subsection (1) of this section provides:
52. (1) All taxes or sums payable under this Act shall be
recoverable at any time after the same ought to have been
accounted for and paid, and all such taxes and sums shall be
recoverable, and all rights of Her Majesty hereunder enforced,
with full costs of suit, as a debt due to or as a right enforceable
by Her Majesty, in the Exchequer Court of Canada or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction.
And subsection (4) provides:
52....
(4) Any amount payable in respect of taxes, interest and
penalties under Part II or Parts III to VI, remaining unpaid
whether in whole or in part after fifteen days from the date of
the sending by registered mail of a notice of arrears addressed
to the licensed air carrier or taxpayer, as the case may be, may
be certified by the Deputy Minister of National Revenue for
Customs and Excise and on the production to the Exchequer
Court of Canada or a judge thereof or such officer as the Court
or a judge thereof may direct, the certificate shall be registered
in that Court and shall, from the date of such registration, be of
the same force and effect, and all proceedings may be taken
thereon, as if the certificate were a judgment obtained in that
Court for the recovery of a debt of the amount specified in the
certificate, including penalties to date of payment as provided
for in Part II or Parts III to VI, and entered upon the date of
such registration, and all reasonable costs and charges attend
ant upon the registration of such certificate are recoverable in
like manner as if they were part of such judgment.
There are thus two procedural methods of recov
ering taxes or sums payable under the Excise Tax
Act. "Sums payable" include interest and penal
ties. Subsection (1) provides for recovery by action
in the Exchequer Court of Canada or in any other
court of competent jurisdiction. Subsection (4)
provides a procedure without bringing an action in
court. It enacts that after fifteen days from the
sending by registered mail of a notice of arrears
addressed to the taxpayer, any amount remaining
unpaid may be certified by the Deputy Minister of
National Revenue, Customs and Excise, and that
on production of the certificate to the Exchequer
Court of Canada or a judge or duly-directed offi
cer thereof, the certificate shall be registered in
that Court and shall, from the date of registration,
be of the same force and effect as if it were a
judgment obtained in that Court for the recovery
of a debt of the amount specified in the certificate,
including penalties and all reasonable costs and
charges of the registration. All proceedings may be
taken on the certificate as if it were a judgment of
that Court.
The provisions of subsection (4) do not mean
that the certificate becomes a judgment. It
remains a certificate of the Deputy Minister, but
has the same effect and force and may be acted on
as if it were a judgment.
The references to the Exchequer Court of
Canada in section 52 and other sections of the
Excise Tax Act now mean to the Federal Court of
Canada, which on coming into existence, took
over, inter alia, the functions and duties of the
Exchequer Court of Canada.
The defendant (applicant on this motion) sub
mits that the time limit of six years prescribed in
subsections 38(1) and (2) of the Federal Court
Act and paragraph 3(1)(g) of The Limitation of
Actions Act of Manitoba does not bind the Crown.
This submission is based on the words "Except as
expressly provided by any other Act", at the begin
ning of subsection (2) of said section 38, and the
words "recoverable at any time" in the second line
of subsection 52(1) of the Excise Tax Act. Coun
sel for the applicant [defendant] (Her Majesty the
Queen) contends that the words "recoverable at
any time", as applied to taxes or sums payable
under the Excise Tax Act, mean that there is no
time period within which proceedings to recover
taxes must be taken, and therefore they accord
with what is meant by the words "Except as
expressly provided by any other Act".
The full expression about recoverability of taxes
in subsection 52(1) of the Excise Tax Act is that
"taxes or sums payable under this Act shall be
recoverable at any time after the same ought to
have been accounted for and paid". Read simply in
conjunction with the words "Except as expressly
provided by any other Act", the words "recover-
able at any time" are certainly susceptible of the
above interpretation by Crown counsel.
Counsel for the respondent [plaintiff] maintains
that this interpretation is wrong. His first submis
sion is that the words "at any time" do not amount
to an express contrary provision as intended by the
exception proviso in section 38 of the Federal
Court Act. He thinks such an express contrary
provision would be worded something like: "Not-
withstanding any limitation of action provision
otherwise applicable." I do not agree that any
particular form of words is required. Any words
which clearly mean that the limitation period does
not apply are sufficient to satisfy the exception
proviso. Nor is it necessary that a different limita-
tion period be substituted for that indicated by the
general limitation. Where the Crown is affected,
Parliament may intend that there will be no limi
tation period. Counsel then contends that the
words "at any time" do not mean an unlimited
period of time after the taxes or sums ought to
have been accounted for and paid. He referred to
section 20 of The Special War Revenue Act, 1915
[S.C. 1915, c. 8] as the origin of the provision:
"All taxes or sums payable under this Act shall be
recoverable at any time after the same ought to
have been accounted for and paid ...." At that
date the Crown's privileged position of not being
bound by statutes of limitation had not been
restricted by statute. There would therefore have
been no point in stating that the taxes or sums
were recoverable at any time in the future. Coun
sel concludes from these facts that the words "at
any time" meant, in 1915, and still mean, immedi
ately after the taxes or sums payable ought to have
been accounted for and paid, without waiting for
any period of time to elapse and before judgment
in the ordinary course. On this reasoning, the
words "at any time" in subsection 52(1) of the
Excise Tax Act would not constitute an exception
"expressly provided by any other Act" within the
intention of those words as used in subsection
38(2) of the Federal Court Act, and the limitation
period of six years established by section 38 of the
Federal Court Act and paragraph 3(1)(g) of the
Manitoba Limitation of Actions Act, read to
gether, for actions by Her Majesty in right of
Canada to recover taxes, would not be affected by
those words.
This argument is largely destroyed by the fact
that the words "at any time" are found in subsec
tion (1) of section 52 of the Excise Tax Act. That
subsection deals only with recovery of taxes, with
full costs of suit as a debt due to Her Majesty in
the Federal Court of Canada or other court of
competent jurisdiction. It says nothing about
obtaining security or enforcing payment before
judgment, or about any short cut to secure pay
ment before judgment. The words "at any time"
do not appear in subsection (4) of the section,
which subsection provides a short procedure by
filing a certificate which has the same force and
effect as if the certificate were a judgment. The
two procedures are quite distinct; only the proce
dure by court action is affected by the words "at
any time".
The great change that has taken place in the
status of the Crown in relation to statutes of
limitation may be stated succinctly, as follows.
Under the earlier law the Crown, as stated in the
Interpretation Acts of both Canada and Manitoba,
was not bound by the terms of a statute except
where it was expressly so stated by the statute, and
this rule applied to statutes of limitation. Now, as
provided by section 38 of the Federal Court Act,
the shoe is on the other foot: the Crown is bound
by statutes of limitation except where it is other
wise expressly provided by statute.
It may be useful to state one obvious fact which
has long been true. In modern times, when we
speak of the Crown as being bound or not bound
by the terms of a statute, we are not referring to
the person of the Queen, but to the Government,
either as a whole or the appropriate minister, or to
an officer or employee of the Government. The
Queen acts only through her ministers. In Canada
this means her Canadian ministers or the ministers
of a province, many of whose functions are dele
gated to the appropriate deputy minister or some
other officer or employee.
Another submission of the respondent's [plain-
tiff's] counsel is that section 38 of the Federal
Court Act was enacted in 1970, while the original
provision "at any time" was enacted in 1915, and
that if they conflict, the later enactment must
prevail. Unfortunately for this argument, there is
no conflict between the two provisions. Section 38
provides for an exception, and if the words "at any
time" conform to the exception, they are effective.
The only question is whether they do conform to
the exception.
Counsel's final submission on this point is that
"Section 38 of the Federal Court Act manifests a
clear intention to make the Federal Crown subject
to the same limitations that affect others, con
sistent with, the erosion of ancient Crown preroga
tives .... That clear intention is not to be thwart
ed by a statutory provision carried forward
unchanged from 1915, from an era when Crown
prerogative reigned unchallenged and no one
dreamed of the Crown being affected by limitation
periods." He adds that "construing the words 'at
any time' literally and out of context means the
Crown could commence proceedings today to col
lect tax due on a transaction back in 1915—clearly
an unreasonable result". In his view, if a more
reasonable interpretation of the words "at any
time" is possible and would avoid such an unrea
sonable result, that interpretation should be
adopted.
The first part of this argument is wrong in that
it ignores the exception contained in section 38 of
the Federal Court Act. That exception clearly
means that the Crown's privilege of not being
subject to rules of limitation is preserved in cases
where Parliament so provides. In such cases, the
Crown is not to be subject to the limitations that
affect others. Once again, the only question to be
answered on this point is whether the words "at
any time" conform to the exception.
There are many statutes which provide that in
circumstances described therein money may be
recovered at any time as a debt due to Her Majes
ty. The circumstances in which such a provision
occurs seem generally to be of two types. One type
is where money has been paid to a person by the
Government under the provisions of a statute and
subsequently it becomes clear that he or she was
not entitled to receive the money. The other type is
where money becomes payable to the Crown by an
individual, individuals, or a corporation under the
terms of a statute, and the money has not been
paid as required by the statute.
Counsel for the defendant filed extracts from a
number of Acts of Parliament where such a provi
sion is found. These are:
1. The Adult Occupational Training Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. A-2, s. 14.
2. The Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c.
C-5, subs. 65(2).
3. The Anti-dumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-15,
subss. 33(1), (2).
4. The Industrial Research and Development
Incentives Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-10, subs.
10(3).
5. The Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
O-6, subs. 22(2).
6. The Petroleum Administration Act, S.C.
1974-75-76, c. 47, ss. 76, 86.
7. The War Veterans Allowance Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. W-5, s. 19.
8. The Two-Price Wheat Act, S.C. 1974-75-76,
c. 54, s. 9.
In none of these Acts is there anything to sug
gest that the Crown's right of recovery is subject to
any limitation period. The frequency with which
the provision for recovery of money at any time
has occurred suggests to my mind that it is the
policy of Parliament that in circumstances of these
types the Crown's long-time prerogative right of
not being subject to rules of limitation should be,
and is intended to be, preserved. In my view, the
liability of manufacturers and others to pay excise
tax under the Excise Tax Act arises in circum
stances similar to those in several of the cases cited
supra. I have been unable to find anything in the
words "at any time", as used in all these statutes,
from which I could conclude that they are not
intended to have their grammatical meaning.
Up to this point, I have been referring to section
52 of the Excise Tax Act as it stood during the
whole of the period relevant to this action. How
ever, that section was amended by Parliament in
the session of 1980-81 [S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 68,
s. 21] and in my opinion the amendments have
some relevance to the point I have been discussing,
particularly the amendments to subsection (1). As
amended, subsection (1) reads:
52. (1) Subject to subsections (1.2) and (1.3), no proceedings
to recover taxes or sums payable under this Act shall be
commenced after four years from the time the taxes or sums
first became payable.
(1.1) For the purposes of subsection (1), proceedings are
deemed to be commenced within four years from the time taxes
or sums first became payable under this Act if, on or before the
expiry of that period, an audit or inspection under section 57 of
the records and books of account of the person required to pay
or collect the taxes or sums is commenced or, at the request of
such person, is deferred.
(1.2) All taxes or sums payable under Part I are recoverable
at any time.
(1.3) All taxes or sums payable under this Act are recover
able at any time if payment thereof was avoided by reason of
neglect, wilful default or fraud.
The first point to notice about the new subsec
tion 52(1) is that it provides a general limitation
period of four years from the time the taxes or
sums first became payable, for commencing any
proceedings to recover taxes or sums payable
under the Act. No provision of this kind existed in
the Act prior to this amendment. No conclusion
can be drawn from the amendment as to the state
of the prior law. The wording is, in any event,
equally susceptible of indicating an intent to create
a limitation period where none existed before, or to
reduce an existing general period of six years
under section 38 of the Federal Court Act to four
years.
On the other hand, subsections (1.2) and (1.3)
are significant. Read in the context of a general
four-year limitation in subsection 52(1), the provi
sion in subsection (1.2) that all taxes or sums
payable under Part I are recoverable at any time
can only mean that there is no limitation on pro
ceedings to recover those taxes or sums. Part I is
concerned with a tax payable in respect of certain
insurance premiums. Similarly, the provision in
subsection (1.3) that all taxes or sums (which
appears to mean all except those referred to in
subsection (1.2)) payable under the Act are recov
erable at any time if payment thereof was avoided
by reason of neglect, wilful default or fraud, can
only mean that there is no limitation on proceed
ings to recover taxes or sums where the prescribed
conditions exist. There was no provision of this
kind in the Excise Tax Act prior to this amend
ment, nor is there such a provision in the Federal
Court Act. There is a more limited provision in the
Manitoba Limitation of Actions Act [R.S.M.
1970, c. L150] paragraph 3(1)(h) of which [for-
merly para. 3(1)(g) of R.S.M. 1954, c. 145] pro
vides that "Actions grounded on fraudulent misre
presentation" must be commenced "within six
years from the discovery of the fraud." No fraudu
lent misrepresentation has been alleged in this
case.
The significance of subsections (1.2) and (1.3)
for this case is that they show quite clearly that the
words "at any time" are sometimes used, with
reference to limitation of proceedings, to mean
that no limitation applies. They show further that
the trend toward assimilating the position of the
Crown with that of other persons in respect of
limitation of actions has not yet removed all the
Crown's prerogative rights in this area, which
rights . have in fact been expressly preserved or
possibly restored to some extent by such recent
enactments as subsections 52(1.2) and (1.3) of the
Excise Tax Act.
My final conclusion is that the answer to Ques
tion 1 on this application is that during all the
period relevant to the issues in this case there was
no limitation period applicable to an action for the
collection of taxes and penalties under the Excise
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-13. I have come to this
conclusion reluctantly, but in my view the law is
clear and does not admit of a contrary decision.
In view of my decision on this question, Ques
tions 2 and 3 do not arise. I will simply say that if
my answer had been "Yes" to the first question,
the answer to Question 2 would have been six
years (four years for cases arising after the amend
ments of 1980-81), and the answer to Question 3
would have been the date when the taxes in ques
tion ought to have been paid.
The applicant [defendant] is entitled to the costs
of this application.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.