A-30-79
DeVilbiss (Canada) Limited, Phelan and Smith
Limited and Waffle's Electric Limited (Appli-
cants)
v.
Anti-dumping Tribunal (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Urie, Ryan JJ. and Kelly D.J.—
Toronto, June 3 and 4; Ottawa, July 20, 1982.
Anti-dumping — S. 28 application to review and set aside
decision of Anti-dumping Tribunal whereby it found dumping
of certain "integral horsepower induction motors" Deputy
Minister, pursuant to s. 14 of Anti-dumping Act, made pre
liminary finding of dumping of "integral horsepower induction
motors" as result of which inquiry scheduled before Anti-
dumping Tribunal — Meaning of phrase "integral horsepower
induction motors" crucial to determination of whether goods
within offending class — Tribunal heard evidence regarding
issue from both parties at outset of inquiry but withheld
decision on meaning of phrase until conclusion of proceedings
— Whether Tribunal exceeded jurisdiction in purporting to
define class of goods to which preliminary determination of
dumping applied — Whether Tribunal violated rules of natu
ral justice by withholding decision regarding scope of inquiry
Anti-dumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-15, ss. 13(1), 14,
16(1),(3), 19, 20 — Anti-dumping Tribunal Rules of Proce
dure, C.R.C., c. 300, Rule 9 — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970
(2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
This is a section 28 application to review and set aside a
decision of the Anti-dumping Tribunal wherein it was found
that there had been dumping of certain integral horsepower
induction motors which had caused, was causing or was likely
to cause material injury to the production in Canada of like
goods. In April 1978, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue
for Customs and Excise authorized an investigation pursuant to
subsection 13(1) of the Anti-dumping Act in respect of the
dumping of integral horsepower induction motors from the
United States. In October 1978, the Deputy Minister made a
preliminary determination of dumping pursuant to section 14 of
the Act as a result of which an inquiry was held before the
Anti-dumping Tribunal. The meaning of the phrase "integral
horsepower induction motors", which was crucial to the deter
mination of which goods came within the offending class, was
raised at the outset of the inquiry and the Tribunal received
evidence from all parties but did not make its finding before it
proceeded with the balance of the inquiry. The issues con
sidered by the Court were whether the Tribunal, in attributing
a meaning to the phrase in question, acted beyond its jurisdic
tion by purporting to define the class of goods to which the
preliminary determination of dumping applied and whether, by
withholding its decision regarding the scope of the inquiry, the
Tribunal violated the rules of natural justice.
Held, the application is granted. The jurisprudence estab
lishes that the formulation of the class of goods pursuant to
subsection 13(1) of the Act for the purposes of the preliminary
determination is the responsibility of the Deputy Minister.
When the Tribunal finds that certain dumped goods which are
within the class defined by the Deputy Minister in his prelim
inary determination are "like goods" to certain goods produced
in Canada, it has made a finding of fact which ought not be
disturbed by the Court unless there was no evidence upon
which it could have been made or because a wrong principle
was applied in making it. Subsection 16(1) plainly limits the
Tribunal's inquiry to goods to which the preliminary determi
nation applies. However where the Tribunal has difficulty in
identifying the goods to which the preliminary determination
applies it must try to ascertain the meaning of the words and
may do so by permitting the introduction of evidence from
industrial experts. This will not necessarily result in a redefini
tion of the class of goods formulated by the Deputy Minister.
The Tribunal did not therefore err or exceed its jurisdiction in
endeavouring, in the circumstances, to determine by evidence
what was meant by the words "integral horsepower induction
motors". It had a duty to perform which necessarily included
the interpretation of the class of goods formulated in the
preliminary determination. How it achieved the interpretation
was up to it to decide so long as it acted properly as a judicial
or quasi-judicial body. Because the Tribunal wanted to hear
evidence from all parties on the issue of the definition and to
have time to consider that evidence before making a decision on
its meaning the parties might reasonably have expected that
they would be given an opportunity to lead evidence if the
Tribunal decided that the narrower definition was the correct
one. However, the Tribunal continued with the hearing without
deciding what class of goods was the subject of the inquiry and
its failure to make a ruling regarding the scope of the inquiry
may have deprived one or more of the parties of the opportunity
to lead evidence specifically directed to the class of goods the
Tribunal subsequently found to be the subject of the inquiry
and to controvert, correct or comment on the evidence or
information relevant to the finding of the Tribunal. The failure
to afford the parties such an opportunity resulted in a denial of
natural justice.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
CONSIDERED:
Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and
Excise v. Trane Company of Canada, Limited, [1982] 2
F.C. 194 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Magnasonic Canada Limited v. Anti-dumping Tribunal,
[1972] F.C. 1239 (C.A.); Mitsui and Co. Limited et al. v.
Buchanan, et al., [1972] F.C. 944 (C.A.); In re Anti-
dumping Act and in re Y.K.K. Zipper Co. of Canada
Ltd., [ 1975] F.C. 68 (C.A.); Remington Arms of Canada
Limited v. Les Industries Valcartier Inc. et al., [1982] 1
F.C. 586 (C.A.); Sarco Canada Limited v. Anti-dumping
Tribunal, et al., [ 1979] 1 F.C. 247 (C.A.); Dryden House
Sales Limited, carrying on business under the firm name
and style of Ambassador-Dryden House v. Anti-dump
ing Tribunal, [1980] 1 F.C. 639 (C.A.).
COUNSEL:
J. M. Coyne, Q.C. and P. S. Bonner for
applicants.
J. L. Shields for respondent.
R. P. Hynes for Attorney General of Canada.
SOLICITORS:
Herridge, Tolmie, Ottawa, for applicants.
Soloway, Wright, Houston, Greenberg,
O'Grady, Morin, Ottawa, for respondent.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
Attorney General of Canada.
Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington,
Toronto, for Leeson Electric (Canada) Ltd.
Stitt, Baker & McKenzie, Toronto, for Reli
ance Electric Ltd. and Reliance Electric Co.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
URIE J.: This application, brought pursuant to
section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970
(2nd Supp.), c. 10, seeks to set aside the decision
of the Anti-dumping Tribunal ("the Tribunal")
dated January 9, 1979 in which the Tribunal
found that the dumping into Canada of certain
integral horsepower induction motors "has caused,
is causing or is likely to cause material injury to
the production in Canada of like goods".
The matter, initiated by the Deputy Minister's
preliminary determination, has already been
before this Court in the case of Deputy Minister of
National Revenue for Customs and Excise v.
Trane Company of Canada, Limited', by way of
an appeal pursuant to section 20 of the Anti-
dumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-15 ("the Act")
from a decision of the Tariff Board which allowed
an appeal by the Trane Company brought pursu
ant to section 19 of the Act from a final determi-
[1982] 2 F.C. 194 (C.A.).
nation of dumping made by the Deputy Minister.
The appeal from the Tariff Board was dismissed in
this Court.
For consistency and accuracy in the recitation of
the factual background leading to this application
it is convenient to set out hereunder the following
excerpt from the reasons for judgment of Le Dain
J., speaking for the Court, in the Trane appeal [at
pages 196-198]:
On April 6, 1978, pursuant to subsection 13(1) of the Act,
the Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and
Excise caused an investigation to be initiated respecting the
dumping into Canada of "integral horsepower induction
motors, one horsepower (1 h.p.) to two hundred horsepower
(200 h.p.) inclusive ... originating in or exported from the
United States of America." On October 10, 1978 the Deputy
Minister made a preliminary determination of dumping, pursu
ant to section 14 of the Act, respecting goods described as
"integral horsepower induction motors, one horsepower (1 h.p.)
to two hundred horsepower (200 h.p.) inclusive, excluding
vertical-shaft pump motors generally referred to as vertical
P-base or vertical P-flange motors, originating in or exported
from the United States of America". Following that decision an
inquiry was conducted by the Anti-dumping Tribunal pursuant
to subsection 16(1) of the Act, and on January 9, 1979 the
following "Finding" was made by the Tribunal:
The Anti-dumping Tribunal, having conducted an inquiry
under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 16 of the
Anti-dumping Act, consequent upon the issue by the Deputy
Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise of a
preliminary determination of dumping dated October 10,
1978 respecting the dumping into Canada of integral horse
power induction motors, one horsepower (1 h.p.) to two
hundred horsepower (200 h.p.) inclusive, excluding vertical-
shaft pump motors generally referred to as vertical P-base or
vertical P-flange motors, originating in or exported from the
United States of America, finds, pursuant to subsection (3)
of section 16 of the Act, that the dumping of the above-men
tioned goods, excluding:
1) single phase motors;
2) submersible pump motors for use in oil and water wells;
3) arbor saw motors; and
4) integral induction motors for use as replacement parts
in
i) absorption cold generator pumps manufactured by
The Trane Company,
ii) Centravac Chillers manufactured by The Trane
Company, and
iii) semi-hermetic compressors and hermetic compres
sors manufactured by The Trane Company,
has caused, is causing, and is likely to cause material injury
to the production in Canada of like goods.
The "Statement of Reasons" which accompanied the "Find-
ing" of the Tribunal contained the following discussion at pages
5 and 6 of the meaning of the words "integral horsepower" in
which the Tribunal concluded that the preliminary determina
tion of dumping did not apply to two digit frame size motors:
Evidence was adduced early in the proceedings concerning
the significance of the words "integral horsepower" used in
the Deputy Minister's preliminary determination. One inter
pretation, based on the usual meaning of the word "integral",
and supported by EEMAC, was that the preliminary deter
mination applied to motors of one horsepower or more. If this
interpretation is correct, inclusion of the words "integral
horsepower" is unnecessary in view of the subsequent more
precise specification, that the motors in question are "one
horsepower (1 h.p.) to two hundred horsepower (200 h.p.)
inclusive".
Accordingly, the Tribunal looked for an interpretation
which, avoiding such redundancy, would represent a positive
and relevant contribution to the definition of the class of
goods in question. It did not have far to search, as there was
ample evidence to demonstrate that the terms "integral" and
"fractional" are in widespread use in the industry to distin
guish between classes of induction motors on a basis other
than their precise horsepower.
The technical standards of the industry in North America
are established mainly by NEMA (National Electrical
Manufacturers Association), an American association whose
standards are, with few exceptions, adopted by EEMAC.
NEMA has issued formal definitions for induction motors,
which have been accepted by EEMAC and are reflected in
the price lists and promotional literature of some EEMAC
members, relating the terms "integral" and "fractional" to
frame size identification. Under these definitions, "integral
horsepower" motors have frames identified by three digit
numbers while "fractional horsepower" motors have two
digit frame numbers. Perhaps at one time, three digit frames
were used only for motors of one horsepower and above, and
two digit frames only for those below one horsepower; this
would explain how the present usage developed. But if this
was once the case, it is certainly not so today; in fact
"fractional horsepower" motors (in two digit frames) may
have ratings as high as five horsepower while there are
"integral horsepower" motors (in three digit frames) having
ratings less than one horsepower.
In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal is satisfied that the
preliminary determination of dumping applies to induction
motors having power ratings in the range of one to two
hundred horsepower and constructed in three digit frames. It
does not apply to motors with two digit frames ("fractional
horsepower" motors), even if their power ratings are in the
one to two hundred horsepower range, or to motors with
three digit frames ("integral horsepower" motors) of power
ratings less than one horsepower. In addition, of course, there
is the specific exclusion of "vertical-shaft pump motors gen
erally referred to as vertical P-base or vertical P-flange
motors".
It is the above decision of the Tribunal which
the applicants seek to set aside.
It should first be observed that the complainants
before the Tribunal were the Electrical and Elec
tronic Manufacturers Association of Canada
("EEMAC") and six of its members in their
individual capacities. The applicants in these pro
ceedings were intervenants in the hearings before
the Tribunal. They filed a memorandum of points
of argument in which it was stated that:
At the present time however, the Applicants do not seek to
disturb the findings of the Anti-dumping Tribunal and, indeed,
the Applicants have sought to obtain the dismissal of this
proceeding by filing Consents to the dismissal of it by the bulk
of the parties who filed Notice of Intention to Participate. On
the other hand, the Applicants do resist any attempt by any
other party to modify the existing Order of the Anti-dumping
Tribunal.
At the outset of the proceedings the applicants'
counsel sought leave to withdraw from the pro
ceedings without making any submissions, which
leave was granted. Counsel for the Electrical and
Electronic Manufacturers Association of Canada
and for the Attorney General of Canada, appear
ing on behalf of the Deputy Minister of National
Revenue for Customs and Excise, both of whom
refused to consent to the withdrawal of the section
28 application, argued in support of that applica
tion. Counsel for the Tribunal opposed it. No
question was raised or could have been raised as to
the status of any of these parties to appear and
their right to be heard.
Two issues were raised in the application. The
Tribunal, in excluding induction motors having
frames identified by two-digit numbers from the
scope of its finding,
,(a) acted beyond its jurisdiction in purporting
to define the class of goods to which the prelim
inary determination of dumping applied, and
(b) erred in law in making its finding in the
absence of any evidence to support such a
finding.
The scheme of the Act has been reviewed by this
Court on a number of occasions 2 so that it will not
be necessary to do so again. Suffice it to say that
the jurisprudence discloses that the formulation of
the class of goods pursuant to subsection 13(1) of
the Act, for the purpose of the preliminary deter
mination, is the responsibility of the Deputy Min
ister. When the Tribunal finds that certain
dumped goods which are within the class defined
by the Deputy Minister in his preliminary determi
nation, are, in its view, "like goods" to certain
goods produced in Canada, it has made a finding
of fact which ought not to be disturbed by this
Court unless there was no evidence upon which it
could have been made or because a wrong princi
ple was applied in making it. Under subsection
16(3), the Tribunal may make its order in respect
of all or any of the "goods to which the prelim
inary determination applies" and its decision as to
whether there should be an exclusion or not is a
question of fact or the exercise of a discretion,
neither of which is a question of law falling within
subsection 28(1)(b) of the Federal Court Act (see
the Dryden House Sales Limited case, supra,
pages 642-643).
In this case the Deputy Minister made a prelim
inary determination of dumping in respect of the
goods described as follows:
... integral horsepower induction motors, one horsepower
(1 h.p.) to two hundred horsepower (200 h.p.) inclusive, exclud
ing vertical-shaft pump motors generally referred to as vertical
P-base or vertical P-flange motors, originating in or exported
from the United States of America. [Emphasis added.]
The Tribunal found, pursuant to subsection
16(3) of the Act, that the dumping of the above-
mentioned goods excluding certain additional
motors "has caused, is causing, and is likely to
cause material injury to the production in Canada
of like goods". However, as will have been
observed from the quotation from the "Statement
2 Magnasonic Canada Limited v. Anti-dumping Tribunal,
[ 1972] F.C. 1239 (C.A.); Mitsui and Co. Limited et al. v.
Buchanan, et al., [1972] F.C. 944 (C.A.); In re Anti-dumping
Act and in re Y.K.K. Zipper Co. of Canada Ltd., [1975] F.C.
68 (C.A.); Remington Arms of Canada Limited v. Les Indus
tries Valcartier Inc. et al., [1982] 1 F.C. 586 (C.A.); Sarco
Canada Limited v. Anti-dumping Tribunal, et al., [1979] 1
F.C. 247 (C.A.); Dryden House Sales Limited, carrying on
business under the firm name and style of Ambassador-Dry-
den House v. Anti-dumping Tribunal, [1980] 1 F.C. 639
(C.A.).
of Reasons" of the Tribunal earlier set out herein,
the Tribunal, not being certain of the meaning of
the words "integral horsepower" as used in the
Deputy Minister's preliminary determination,
heard evidence, early in the proceedings in respect
of the meaning to be ascribed to them. It is helpful
to repeat its conclusion here:
In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal is satisfied that the
preliminary determination of dumping applies to induction
motors having power ratings in the range of one to two hundred
horsepower and constructed in three digit frames. It does not
apply to motors with two digit frames ("fractional horsepower"
motors), even if their power ratings are in the one to two
hundred horsepower range, or to motors with three digit frames
("integral horsepower" motors) of power ratings less than one
horsepower. In addition, of course, there is the specific exclu
sion of "vertical-shaft pump motors generally referred to as
vertical P-base or vertical P-flange motors".
In the Trane case, supra, this Court held that it
was permissible to refer to the reasons of the
Tribunal to try to determine what the words "inte-
gral horsepower" meant to the Tribunal. It was
found that the reasons disclose that it did not
intend to, and did not in fact, make a finding of
material injury with respect to two-digit frame size
motors. However, the Court also said this [at page
2061:
Whether the Tribunal had the authority to determine the scope
of its inquiry by purporting to define the class of goods
described in the preliminary determination of dumping is not in
my opinion the issue in this appeal. The issue is whether, as a
matter of fact, the Tribunal made a finding of material injury
with respect to two digit frame size motors. If the Tribunal
erred in excluding such motors from its inquiry and finding, the
error might affect the validity of the Tribunal's decision ....
The issue left in abeyance in the Trane case is
one of the issues before us in this application.
Counsel for EEMAC contended that the Tri
bunal is not empowered to interpret words used in
the preliminary determination of dumping. To do
so would, he said, permit the Tribunal to redefine
the class of goods encompassed by the determina
tion either by abridging or enlarging it. This it is
not entitled to do, in counsel's view, because of the
words of subsection 16(1) reading:
16. (1) The Tribunal ... shall, in respect of the goods to
which the preliminary determination of dumping applies, make
inquiry ...
Certainly the words plainly limit the Tribunal's
inquiry to the goods "to which the preliminary
determination ... applies". However, in some
cases, as here, the Tribunal may have difficulty in
determining the goods to which the determination
applies. If that is so it must endeavour to ascertain
the meaning of the words. One of the ways in
which that can be done is by permitting the adduc
ing of evidence from those knowledgeable in the
industry producing the goods at issue to ascertain,
if possible, what the words mean to such persons.
That is what the Tribunal did in the case at bar.
To do so does not, in my view, necessarily result in
a redefinition of the class of goods formulated by
the Deputy Minister, as counsel argued. Embark
ing on such a fact-finding mission at the hearing
therefore, does not mean that the Tribunal is
exceeding its jurisdiction as alleged by counsel.
Counsel for EEMAC, in his original presenta
tion, argued that there is a legal obligation on the
Tribunal to obtain from the Deputy Minister clari
fication of the class of goods dumped if it is unsure
what the class is. He agreed that there was no
statutory obligation to do so but said that the
obligation was implicit in the wording of Rule 9 of
the Anti-dumping Tribunal Rules of Procedure,
C.R.C., c. 300. 3 However, in reply, counsel
conceded that there was no legal obligation to
3 9. The Deputy Minister shall, in accordance with para
graph 14(2)(c) of the Act, submit to the Secretary for filing
(a) the complaint, if any, and all relevant information pro
vided to him by the complainant;
(b) in the absence of a complainant, the evidence upon
which the Deputy Minister relied to reach his opinion that
the dumping of goods is causing injury to the production in
Canada of like goods;
(c) a description of the goods dumped;
(d) information concerning the quantity and value of
(i) the production in Canada of like goods, and
(ii) the importation of like goods;
(e) information concerning the proportion of imports of the
goods dumped or like goods that he discovers being dumped;
(f) the margins of dump; and
(g) any other available information in his possession relating
to the inquiry.
adjourn the inquiry and to remit an unclear pre
liminary determination to the Deputy Minister for
clarification. To do so would be wise and prudent,
he said, to ensure that the Tribunal did not exceed
its jurisdiction by enlarging or abridging the scope
of its inquiry. Counsel for the Attorney General,
on the other hand, did not retreat from his conten
tion that there was a legal obligation to remit but
he could not point out the source of the obligation.
I am of the opinion that the Tribunal did not err
or exceed its jurisdiction in endeavouring, in the
circumstances of this case, to determine by evi
dence what was meant by the words "integral
horsepower induction motors". It had a duty to
perform, which duty necessarily included the inter
pretation of the class of goods formulated in the
preliminary determination. How it achieved the
interpretation was up to it to decide so long as it
acted properly as a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
However, that does not end the matter. Counsel
for the Attorney General of Canada, supported by
counsel for EEMAC, took the position that if the
Tribunal permitted evidence to be adduced to
assist in determining the meaning to be ascribed to
words in the determination and a question was
raised as to its jurisdiction to do so, it must give its
decision on that question before continuing the
inquiry. In failing to decide the question before
continuing, the parties were in the position of
being unaware of the scope of the inquiry with
respect to what goods evidence should directed and
argument addressed. It was argued that failure to
render its decision on the preliminary question
before the hearing proceeded on the merits, con
stituted an error in law and, in counsel's view,
vitiated the whole proceedings.
A perusal of the evidence to which counsel
referred us indicates clearly that the question of
the meaning of the words "integral horsepower
induction motors" was raised at a preliminary
meeting of the parties with the Board as well as
very early in the hearing before the Tribunal. An
"initial ruling" as to what the words meant was
requested at the meeting "because they affect
directly the evidence I would seek to adduce", one
counsel said. It is equally clear that the Chairman
of the Tribunal declined to make a ruling at the
preliminary meeting, on the basis that evidence
and argument would be required before an inter
pretation could be given. It is interesting to note
that it does not appear that either at that stage or
at any later stage did any party suggest that
clarification of the meaning of the words in the
preliminary determination be sought from the
Deputy Minister.
The position of the Tribunal was reiterated by
the Chairman at the opening of the hearing and
evidence was elicited from witnesses for the pur
pose of ascertaining the meaning of the words.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Tribunal did not,
during the course of the hearing, disclose to the
parties what it found to be their meaning. It was
not until the Tribunal handed down its decision
and gave its "Statement of Reasons" did it become
known that the Tribunal had held that the prelim
inary determination of dumping applied to induc
tion motors having power ratings in the range of
one to two hundred horsepower and constructed on
three-digit frames and did not apply to motors
with two-digit frames.
Counsel argued that the question thus is, did the
failure of the Tribunal to make a decision on the
meaning to be given to the term "integral horse
power" in respect of induction motors, prior to
proceeding with its inquiry, thereby depriving the
parties of the opportunity to adduce evidence and
address arguments to the specific goods under
inquiry, (albeit those goods were part of a larger
class of goods with respect to which evidence was
adduced) constitute an error in law or of
jurisdiction?
In my view, the question is not one of jurisdic
tion in the usual sense in which that term is used.
Neither do I view the error as one of law per se,
but rather, as I see it, the Tribunal, by withholding
its decision as to the scope of its inquiry, may have
been in breach of a principle of natural justice.
Counsel for EEMAC referred us to a number of
excerpts from the transcript of evidence at the
preliminary meeting and at the inquiry hearings
themselves. A perusal of those excerpts leaves no
doubt in my mind that the Tribunal not only
declined to make the ruling requested as to the
meaning of the terms but did so because its mem
bers were very uncertain at those times of the
meaning which the term should be given. They
wanted to hear evidence on the matter, not only
that led by the complainants but also evidence
from the opposing parties and time to consider
that evidence before making a decision on the
meaning. It seems to me, then, that any of the
parties, having in mind what had transpired at the
preliminary meeting and in the early stages of the
hearing concerning the meaning to be attributed to
the term "integral horsepower induction motors",
might reasonably have expected that they would
have been given an opportunity to lead evidence if
the Tribunal decided that the narrower definition
of the disputed term was the correct one. However,
the Tribunal continued with the hearing without
deciding what class of goods was the subject of the
inquiry. Its failure to make the ruling as to the
scope of the inquiry, may have deprived one or
more of the parties of the opportunity not only to
lead evidence specifically directed to the class of
goods the Tribunal subsequently found to be the
subject of the inquiry but to controvert, correct or
comment on the evidence or information relevant
to the finding the Tribunal is required to make by
virtue of section 16 of the Act, namely, whether
the importation of the three-digit motors had
caused, was causing or would cause material
injury to the production of like motors in Canada.
The failure to afford the parties such an opportu
nity, in my opinion, constituted a denial of natural
justice.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the
section 28 application should be allowed, the deci
sion of the Tribunal under review should be set
aside and the matter should be returned to the
Tribunal for a re-hearing in a manner not incon
sistent with these reasons.
In view of this finding, it would not be proper
for me to comment on the second issue raised,
namely, that there was no evidence upon which the
Tribunal could have reached its decision with
respect to the three-digit motors only.
RYAN J.: I agree.
KELLY D.J.: I concur in the reasons for judg
ment herein of Urie J.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.