Judgments

Decision Information

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A-583-76
André Desjardins (Plaintiff) (Appellant) v.
Claude Bouchard, Jean-Paul Gilbert, National Parole Board, and Attorney General of Canada (Respondents)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Le Dain JJ. and Lalande D.J.—Montreal, January 19; Ottawa, April 30, 1982.
Parole — Revocation of pardon — Whether National Parole Board impartial in recommending revocation to Governor in Council — Latter revoking pardon without hearing appellant — Governor in Council having duty to give appellant opportu nity to be heard and to advise him of essential facts before revoking pardon under s. 7 of Criminal Records Act — Appeal allowed — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12, ss. 4, 5, 7, 9 — National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17, s. 64(1).
Judicial review — Equitable remedies — Declarations — Appeal against Trial Division judgment refusing declaration National Parole Board lacked jurisdiction to recommend pardon revocation to Solicitor General — Natural justice and duty of fairness — Governor in Council may not revoke pardon under s. 7 of Criminal Records Act without advising person concerned of essential facts against him and giving him an opportunity to be heard — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12, ss. 4, 5, 7, 9 — National Transporta tion Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17, s. 64(1).
Following an inquiry at which the Board refused to disclose to the appellant the allegations or evidence against him and he in turn refused to make representations, the National Parole Board determined that he was no longer of good conduct and recommended to the Solicitor General that his pardon be revoked. Acting on advice of the Solicitor General and pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Records Act, the Governor in Council revoked the appellant's pardon.
The Trial Judge who heard the action brought by the appel lant to attack that revocation refused to declare the actions, decisions and recommendations of the Board invalid since they were devoid of any legal effect. He also refused to vacate the revocation Order because he concluded that the Governor in Council had observed the requirements of natural justice. The Trial Judge assumed that the pardon had been revoked on account of allegations contained in the Cliche Report, that the appellant knew of these allegations before he appeared before the Board and that he had an opportunity to refute them on that occasion.
Held, the appeal should be allowed.
Per Pratte J.: The Trial Judge properly refused to make the findings sought by the appellant in respect of the Board and two of its members since they have no part in the revocation of a pardon. As for the Order itself, it is not vitiated by the actions of the Board and its members since there was no reason to doubt their impartiality. It was incorrect to assume that the appellant knew of the allegations against him. The power to revoke a pardon is not entirely discretionary since it can only be exercised in the circumstances described by section 7. Further more, the person concerned will be deprived of rights. The Governor in Council, therefore, has a duty to give the person concerned an opportunity to be heard before revoking his pardon. The appellant's pardon was revoked without that op portunity being afforded. This does not mean that the Governor in Council has to hear the person concerned himself or that the person is entitled to know more than the facts which were brought to the attention of the Governor in Council or his advisers and which are said to justify revoking the pardon.
Per Le Dain J.: The record does not support a conclusion that the appellant knew the precise facts relied upon by the Board and the Solicitor General as showing he was "no longer of good conduct". The authority to revoke a pardon is purely statutory and has no basis in the royal prerogative. In spite of the way it conducts its business and the rule of secrecy which governs its proceedings, Cabinet is nevertheless required, by statutory implication, to comply with the duty of procedural fairness when revoking a pardon. It is better that there should be an approximation to procedural fairness than no procedural fairness at all. The Governor in Council must clearly have an inherent or implied power to delegate the hearing function.
Per Lalonde D.J.: The quasi-judicial power conferred on the Governor General in Council by the Act must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of natural justice. The refus al of the members of the Board to disclose to the appellant the way in which he, in their opinion, was no longer of good conduct contravened an elementary rule of justice and vitiated the Order in Council.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
DISTINGUISHED:
The Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.
REFERRED TO:
L'Alliance des professeurs catholiques de Montreal v. The Labour Relations Board of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140; Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [ 1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
COUNSEL:
M. Proulx for plaintiff (appellant). G. Côté for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Proulx, Barot & Masson, Montreal, for plaintiff (appellant).
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondents.
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment rendered by
PRATTE J.: The appellant is challenging the judgment of the Trial Division' which dismissed with costs the action brought by him to have an Order of the Governor in Council set aside. By that Order, made on October 9, 1975, pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Records Act (R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12), the Governor in Council revoked the pardon he had granted the appellant on May 8, 1973.
In order to understand this case, the principal provisions of the Criminal Records Act must be borne in mind. Under that Act, a person who has been convicted of an offence under an Act of the Parliament of Canada may, after a certain time has elapsed since he served his sentence, apply to be granted a pardon. This application must be made to the Solicitor General of Canada, who will forward it to the National Parole Board, and the latter will inquire into the behaviour of the appli cant since his conviction. When it has completed its inquiry, the Board must report its findings to the Solicitor General and make a recommendation to him as to whether the pardon should be granted. However, the Board may not send the Minister a recommendation against granting the pardon unless it has first notified the applicant and given him an opportunity to make to the Board any representations that he believes relevant. If the Board recommends that the pardon be granted, its recommendations must be forwarded to the Gover nor in Council, who may in his discretion grant or deny the pardon. If the pardon is granted, so long as it has not been revoked pursuant to section 7 it has the effects set out in section 5. These two sections read as follows:
' [1976] 2 F.C. 539 [T.D.].
5. The grant of a pardon
(a) is evidence of the fact that the Board, after making proper inquiries, was satisfied that an applicant was of good behaviour and that the conviction in respect of which the pardon is granted should no longer reflect adversely on his character; and
(b) unless the pardon is subsequently revoked, vacates the conviction in respect of which it is granted and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, removes any dis qualification to which the person so convicted is, by reason of such conviction, subject by virtue of any Act of the Parlia ment of Canada or a regulation made thereunder.
7. A pardon may be revoked by the Governor in Council
(a) if the person to whom it is granted is subsequently convicted of a further offence under an Act of the Parliament of Canada or a regulation made thereunder; or
(b) upon evidence establishing to the satisfaction of the Governor in Council
(i) that the person to whom it was granted is no longer of good conduct, or
(ii) that such person knowingly made a false or deceptive statement in relation to his application for the pardon, or knowingly concealed some material particular in relation to such application.
I come now to the facts which gave rise to the action. They are not in dispute and are set forth in the [TRANSLATION] "Joint Statement of Facts" entered by counsel for the parties in the record of the Trial Division, and in the documentary evi dence filed by them.
The text of this "Joint Statement of Facts" is as follows:
[TRANSLATION] The parties to the case at bar, through their undersigned counsel, are in agreement that this case shall be decided on the basis of the following facts, which are admitted by either side, and on the documents to be entered in the record.
1. On May 8, 1973, the plaintiff was granted a pardon by the Governor in Council pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12.
2. As a result of information brought to its attention and in accordance with the wishes of the Solicitor General of Canada, the National Parole Board in fall 1974 undertook an inquiry into the conduct of plaintiff, to determine whether it should recommend that the said pardon be revoked.
3. By a letter dated May 8, 1975, the Minister of Justice of the province of Quebec asked the Solicitor General of Canada if the pardon granted to the plaintiff might be revoked by the Governor in Council, pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of the Criminal Records Act.
4. In the said letter from the Minister of Justice of the province of Quebec, references were made to the report of the Commis-
sion of inquiry into the freedom of activity in the trade union movement in the construction industry. It is admitted by the parties that this Commission was created by the Government of the province of Quebec, with Robert Cliche J. as chairman, and submitted its report to the Government of Quebec on May 2, 1975; it is further admitted that one of the recommendations of the said Commission was that the law should be amended so as to exclude from union duties any persons convicted of certain crimes.
5. By a letter dated May 21, 1975, signed by Mr. Pierre L. Dupuis of the Clemency and Criminal Records Division, the plaintiff was invited to appear before two members of the Board, namely Messrs. Claude Bouchard and Jean-Paul Gil- bert, so that he could have an opportunity to make whatever representations he felt relevant against the recommendation that the Board intended to make to the Solicitor General of Canada, namely that his pardon be revoked.
6. Plaintiff appeared before Messrs. Bouchard and Gilbert on June 2, 1975.
7. At the start of the hearing counsel for the plaintiff, in reference to the notice to appear, raised the lack of jurisdiction by members of the National Parole Board over revocation of the pardon granted to plaintiff on May 8, 1973 pursuant to the Criminal Records Act, in that:
(a) the Criminal Records Act confers no jurisdiction on the Board or its members regarding the revocation of a pardon;
(b) neither the Board nor its members have any jurisdiction to summon the plaintiff, conduct an investigation and make a recommendation to the Solicitor General of Canada.
8. In response to this objection, the members of the Board found that the Criminal Records Act conferred on them juris diction over the revocation of a pardon similar to that which the Act confers on them over the granting of a pardon.
9. During the hearing, the members of the Board did not establish or mention that they were authorized to conduct such an investigation by the Governor General in Council or by any other person.
10. Subject to his objection as to jurisdiction, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the procedure followed by the members created a real apprehension of partiality, since the Board had already decided to recommend to the Solicitor General of Canada that the pardon be revoked before it had even sum moned or heard the plaintiff.
11. The Board members dismissed this objection and invited the plaintiff to make his representations in accordance with the notice to appear.
12. Before making his representations, counsel for the plaintiff asked the members to indicate to him the nature of the allegations or the evidence of misconduct against the plaintiff, so that he could make the representations necessary to refute the allegations or rebut the evidence of misconduct.
13. The members categorically refused to disclose to the plain tiff the allegations or evidence against him, merely stating that their recommendation was based on subparagraph 7(b)(i) of the Criminal Records Act.
14. The members further stated that it was for the applicant to show why the pardon should not be revoked.
15. In view of the position taken by the members, the plaintiff refused any invitation to make representations, stating that he did not know the reasons why his pardon was being revoked or the reasons for the recommendation made by the members or the Board.
16. The hearing was adjourned to allow the plaintiff to make written submissions on the objections in law and as to proce dure, and these were filed.
17. The plaintiff was again summoned to appear on August 15, 1975; counsel for the plaintiff repeated his request regarding the allegations of evidence against the plaintiff.
18. The members of the Board made the same refusal, and the plaintiff refused to make representations for the same reasons.
19. The members of the Board then indicated to the plaintiff that their recommendations would be sent to the Solicitor General of Canada within four to six weeks.
20. Following the aforementioned events, the National Parole Board submitted to the Solicitor General of Canada a report recommending that the pardon granted to the plaintiff be revoked.
21. As appears from Exhibit D-1, the Solicitor General of Canada then recommended to the Governor in Council that the pardon granted to the plaintiff be in fact revoked, pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Records Act.
22. By an Order in Council dated October 9, 1975, the Gover nor in Council in fact revoked the pardon granted to the plaintiff, on the ground that the latter was no longer of good conduct, the whole in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Criminal Records Act.
To this statement of the facts it only needs to be added that counsel for the appellant was informed of the Governor in Council's decision to revoke his client's pardon by a letter from the Registrar of the National Parole Board, the essence of which
reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION] You are requested to inform your client that, following a recent review of his record, the Board contin ues to be reasonably certain that Mr. Desjardins is associating with persons closely connected with organized crime, and that his relations with such persons are such as to suggest that these meetings are more than accidental. As the Board therefore has very good reason to believe that Mr. Desjardins is no longer of good conduct, it has recommended to the Governor General in Council that the pardon granted to Mr. Desjardins on April 3, 1973, be revoked.
On October 9, 1975, acting on advice by the Solicitor General and pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Records Act, His Excellency the Governor General in Council revoked the pardon previously granted to Mr. Desjardins.
A few weeks later, the appellant brought the action dismissed by the Trial Judge. In his state ment of claim, he first complained that respond ents Bouchard and Gilbert and the National
Parole Board had no jurisdiction over the case at bar, that they had acted in a manner which cast doubt on their impartiality, and finally, that they had failed to observe the requirements of natural justice, and in particular the "audi alteram par- tern" rule; the appellant further complained that the Governor in Council had acted at the instance of a third party, without exercising independent judgment, and that he also had disregarded the requirements of natural justice and fairness. The appellant concluded by asking the Court, first, to find that the National Parole Board and respond ents Bouchard and Gilbert had no jurisdiction over the case at bar, and that their actions, decisions and recommendations were invalid, and second, to vacate the Order made on October 9, 1975 revok ing the appellant's pardon.
I think it is clear that the Trial Judge properly refused to make the findings sought by the appel lant in respect of the National Parole Board and respondents Bouchard and Gilbert. It is apparent that, under the Act, the Board and its members have no part in the revocation of a pardon, and accordingly, the recommendation made by them and the decisions they may have taken in this matter were devoid of any legal effect. However, the appellant had no interest in having the Court make a finding to that effect. His interest is limited to a ruling on the validity of the revocation of the pardon. As that revocation was made by an Order of the Governor in Council on October 9, 1975, the only real problem presented by the case at bar is as to the validity of that Order.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the Order of October 9, 1975 was void for two reasons: first, because it had been made on the recommendation of persons whose impartiality might be doubted, and second, because it had been made without observing the requirements of natural justice and fairness.
Counsel for the appellant did not suggest that the Governor in Council could not, in the circum stances, act on the recommendations of third par ties. What he said was that such third parties, in the case at bar respondents Bouchard and Gilbert
and the National Parole Board, had acted in a manner which cast doubt on their impartiality, and that the effect of acting in such a manner was to vitiate the decision of the Governor in Council. In my view, the Trial Judge properly dismissed this argument. Even if I assume that the decision a quo could have been vitiated merely by the fact that it was not taken on the recommendation of impartial persons, I consider, like the Trial Judge, that there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the Board and of respondents Bouchard and Gilbert. The letter which they wrote to appellant on May 21, 1975 could perhaps have been worded differ ently, but contrary to what counsel for the appel lant argued, I see nothing in the terms of that letter to cast doubt on the impartiality of the Board or its members.
The second and principal argument of counsel for the appellant is that the Governor in Council could not validly revoke the pardon he had granted the appellant without first giving him an opportu nity to be heard. In other words, counsel for the appellant maintained that the power of revocation conferred on the Governor in Council by section 7 of the Criminal Records Act could only be validly exercised if it was exercised in accordance with the requirements of natural justice and fairness, which in his submission had not been done in the case at bar. The Trial Judge dismissed this second argu ment of the appellant not because he considered that the Governor in Council was not required, in exercising his power to revoke a pardon, to observe the requirements of natural justice and fairness, but because he concluded that these requirements had been observed in the case at bar. In arriving at this conclusion, the Judge assumed that the pardon granted to the appellant had been revoked on account of allegations contained in the Cliche Report, that the appellant knew of these allega tions when he appeared before respondents Bou- chard and Gilbert, and that he had an opportunity to refute them on that occasion. I cannot share that view. All that the record shows regarding the decision of the Governor in Council is that it was made "acting on advice by the Solicitor General" who, in the written recommendation he submitted to the Cabinet, stated that "certain confidential information" had led the Board to find that the appellant was no longer of good conduct, because
he was associating with persons closely linked to organized crime. The Cliche Report is not in the record, and we do not know its contents. In these circumstances I cannot assume, as the Trial Judge did, that the pardon which was granted to the appellant was revoked because of allegations con tained in that report; I further cannot conclude that appellant did in fact have an opportunity to be heard before his pardon was revoked. If the appel lant had a right to be heard, he also had a right to be first informed of the facts on which the authori ties were relying in exercising the power of revoca tion, since without that information he could not properly be heard. In the case at bar, the appellant was never informed of the reasons why the revoca tion of his pardon was being considered. For this reason, it appears to me that in the circumstances the pardon was revoked without the appellant being furnished an opportunity to be heard.
To decide this case, therefore, it is necessary to know whether the Governor in Council, before revoking the pardon he had granted to the appel lant, was required to observe the "audi alteram partem" rule or, more generally, the requirements of natural justice and fairness. If he was, the appeal must succeed; otherwise, it must be dismissed.
When the legislator confers on a body the power to make decisions affecting the rights of individu als without specifying the way in which this power is to be exercised, it has to be determined by a process of interpretation whether the body con cerned, in exercising this power, must observe the requirements of natural justice and fairness. Accordingly, it was by interpretation of the appli cable legislation, in light of the nature of the power conferred by it, the nature of the body on which the power was conferred and the conse quences of exercising the power, that the Supreme Court of Canada held that the power conferred on the Governor in Council by subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17] is a power of a legislative nature the exer cise of which is not subject to the requirements of natural justice and fairness. 2
2 The Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.
The power conferred on the Governor in Council by section 7 of the Criminal Records Act does not resemble the power conferred on him by subsec tion 64(1) of the National Transportation Act. It is a power the exercise of which affects an individual, rather than the community, by depriv ing him of the rights which proceeded from his pardon. It is a power which is not entirely discre tionary, since it can only be exercised in the cir cumstances described by section 7. It is also not a legislative power which must be exercised primari ly in light of social and political considerations. On the other hand, it is a power which, like that which the Supreme Court had to consider in Inuit Tapirisat, is conferred on the Governor in Council without any direction in the statute as to how it must be exercised.
The Criminal Records Act does not indicate how the power of revocation conferred by section 7 should be exercised. However, it sets out in minute detail in section 4 the procedure to be followed in granting a pardon: the application for a pardon is submitted to the National Parole Board, which causes inquiries to be made and makes its recom mendation; the Board may not recommend against granting the pardon without giving the applicant an opportunity to be heard; if the Board's recom mendation is favourable, it is referred to the Gov ernor in Council who may then grant or deny the pardon.
Counsel for the respondents argued that the Criminal Records Act states in section 4 that a pardon cannot be denied without the applicant being heard. As section 7 is silent on this point, he maintained, relying on the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", that there was no intention to give an applicant the right to be heard before a pardon was revoked. This argument is based on a false premise. Section 4 does not state that an application for a pardon cannot be dis missed without the applicant being heard: it merely provides that the Board may not recom mend dismissal of an application for a pardon without hearing the applicant. If the Board recom mends that the pardon be granted, the applicant
does not have a right to be heard and I think it is clear that, in that case, the Governor in Council can still refuse to follow the recommendation and dismiss the application for a pardon without hear ing the person concerned.
The Governor in Council may thus refuse to grant a pardon without hearing the applicant. Is the same true for the case of revocation? I do not think so. First, the revocation of a pardon seems to me more fraught with consequences for the person concerned than a mere refusal to grant an applica tion for a pardon. In the first case, the person will be deprived of rights, while in the second, he will be denied a privilege. Secondly, while the power to grant a pardon is purely discretionary, this is not true of the power of revocation, which can only be exercised in the circumstances set forth in section 7. It would seem fair that a pardon should not be revoked without first giving the person concerned an opportunity to refute the existence of the facts on which the authority in question will rely in exercising the power of revocation.
I accordingly consider that the Governor in Council may not revoke a pardon under section 7 without giving the person concerned an opportu nity to be heard. Does this mean that the Governor in Council is required, when he wishes to revoke a pardon, to act as a judge would, or that he is subject to all the requirements which, in other words, would be associated with natural justice?— no. The statute confers the power to revoke par dons on the Governor in Council and not on any other authority. The Governor in Council is an executive entity which has its ways of proceeding and which is subject to special rules, such as those regarding the secrecy of its deliberations and the confidential nature of its sources of information. The legislator is familiar with these ways of pro ceeding and these rules, and when he confers a power on the Governor in Council it has to be presumed, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that this power is to be exercised in accordance with these rules and ways of proceed ing. Because of that, the Governor in Council is not required to hear the person concerned himself before revoking a pardon. For the same reason, the person concerned does not have a right before being heard to know the evidence against him: he is only entitled to know the facts which were
brought to the attention of the Governor in Coun cil or his advisers and which are said to justify revoking the pardon.
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Trial Division and, allowing the appellant's action, vacate the Order of October 9, 1975 revoking the pardon which was granted to the appellant. Appellant should be en titled to his costs both at trial and on appeal.
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The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
LE DAIN J.: I have had the advantage of read ing the reasons of my brothers Pratte and Lalande, and while I have experienced considerable difficul ty with this case, I agree with them that the appeal should be allowed and the Order in Council revok ing the appellant's pardon declared null on the ground that he was not given a fair opportunity to meet the case against him.
I am satisfied that the record does not support a conclusion that the appellant knew the precise facts which the National Parole Board and the Solicitor General were relying on as showing that he was a person who was "no longer of good conduct" within the meaning of section 7 of the Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 12. Like my brother Pratte, I think the assumption made by the learned Trial Judge on this question was without foundation, particularly in view of the reference, in the Solicitor General's memorandum to Cabinet, to "confidential" information.
There is, further, no doubt in my mind that the decision to revoke a pardon under section 7 is, because of the grounds on which it may be made and its effect on the rights or interests of the person affected, of a nature which would ordinar ily give rise to a duty to observe the principles of natural justice or at least to comply with the lesser duty of procedural fairness. I do not think it is necessary to cite authority in support of that proposition. This is true, in my opinion, despite the fact that pardons were granted before the Crimi nal Records Act as an exercise of the royal pre rogative of mercy, and that prerogative is pre-
served by section 9 of the Act. The authority to revoke a pardon that has been granted under the Act is purely statutory in nature and has no basis in the royal prerogative. Its character is to be determined entirely from the terms of section 7.
The difficulty, as I see it, is whether, in view of the way the Cabinet conducts its business and the rule of secrecy which governs its proceedings, it is reasonable to ascribe to Parliament an intention that the Governor in Council should be subject to a requirement of procedural fairness in respect of notice, disclosure and hearing when he revokes a pardon pursuant to section 7 of the Act. As the authorities indicate, a fair hearing requires that the person affected be given sufficient notice of what is alleged against him, that he be given sufficient disclosure of the evidence or other ma terial, such as reports, on which the allegations are based, and finally that he be given a sufficient opportunity to meet the case against him by evi dence, if necessary, and representations. How are these requirements to be applied, as a practical matter, to the decision-making process of the Cabinet, which I would characterize, with respect, as informal, inaccessible and inscrutable? The pos sible grounds of decision are not susceptible of being limitatively determined in advance of a meeting of the Cabinet or a committee of Cabinet that effectively deals with the matter. The mem bers of Cabinet cannot be prevented or foreclosed from making their own contribution to the identifi cation and definition of the possible grounds of decision nor, indeed, from submitting additional material in support of them. Notice, to afford a full measure of procedural fairness, would have to be notice of the facts or grounds which the Cabinet agreed to treat as relevant for purposes of decision. A similar problem exists with reference to the duty of disclosure. How, in view of the principle of cabinet secrecy, is the person affected to be given a sufficient disclosure of the basis of the allegations against him, as they are presented to Cabinet, to enable him to meet the case against him? Finally, if there is to be a true opportunity to be heard the evidence adduced and the submissions made on behalf of the person affected must be sufficiently brought to the attention of the Cabinet.
These difficulties have raised a serious question in my mind as to whether a meaningful and reviewable standard of procedural fairness can be imposed, by statutory implication, on the Governor in Council when revoking a pardon. Despite the difficulties, however, I have been unable to per suade myself that it could have been intended by Parliament that a pardon may be revoked on the ground that one has ceased to be a person of good conduct without the person affected having any opportunity whatever to meet the case against him, as that case is presented by the recommendation to Cabinet. It is better in such a matter that there should be an approximation to procedural fairness than no procedural fairness at all.
That it is feasible to have some form of inquiry and to afford some opportunity to be heard before a recommendation is made to revoke a pardon is indicated by the provision in section 4 of the Criminal Records Act for an inquiry by the Na tional Parole Board on an application for pardon and by the fact that the Solicitor General saw fit to cause an inquiry to be made by the Board in the present case. The Governor in Council must clear ly have an inherent or implied power to delegate the hearing function. As for the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", which is invoked because of the express provision for such an inqui ry in section 4 and the absence of a similar provi sion in section 7, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have held, in effect, that this principle of interpretation should not be applied to deny a right to fair hearing. See L'Alliance des profes- seurs catholiques de Montreal v. The Labour Relations Board of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140, at pages 153-154; Nicholson v. Haldimand-Nor- folk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, at pages 321-322.
In coming to the above conclusion I have pro ceeded, with respect, on the assumption that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, does not contain any general implication determinative of the issue in this case. The decision in that case turned essentially on the nature of the review authority conferred on the Governor in Council by subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17, as it applied particular ly to a decision to fix the tolls of Bell Canada, and not on the institutional peculiarities of the deci- sion-making process of the Governor in Council or Cabinet. Estey J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, did say at page 753, "The very nature of the body must be taken into account in assessing the technique of review which has been adopted by the Governor in Council", but that was said with reference to the contention that the whole of the record should have been put before the Cabinet. I do not read into this particular observation an implication that an implied duty of procedural fairness can never be applied to a decision of the Governor in Council, regardless of its nature.
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The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment rendered by
LALANDE D.J.: The power conferred on the Governor General in Council by the Criminal Records Act is a power of a quasi-judicial nature, since section 7 provides, in the case under con sideration, that revocation of a pardon may be ordered "upon evidence establishing" that the person is no longer of good conduct. Such a power must be exercised in accordance with the require ments of natural justice.
Respondents Bouchard and Gilbert, conducting an inquiry for the Solicitor General as members of the National Parole Board, refused to disclose to the appellant, whom they had summoned so that he could make representations to them, the way in which he in their opinion was no longer of good conduct.
The refusal contravened an elementary rule of justice and vitiated the Order in Council made on the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
I would dispose of the appeal as suggested by Pratte J.
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