T-3418-74
Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Plaintiff)
v.
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and all other per
sons having claims against the plaintiff, its ship
Steelton or the fund hereby to be created
(Defendants)
Trial Division, Addy J.—Toronto, June 14;
Ottawa, July 21, 1977.
Maritime law — Torts — Plaintiff's ship colliding with and
destroying bridge over canal — Whether or not economic loss
legally compensable — Whether or not plaintiff can deduct
from fund amounts it would have to pay claimants in U.S.
action — Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, ss. 647,
648.
In this action, initiated pursuant to sections 647 and 648 of
the Canada Shipping Act, for limitation of liability for dam
ages caused by plaintiffs ship colliding with and destroying a
bridge over the Welland Canal, decision was reserved with
respect to three matters. The first concerned a claim for the
loss of profits of two ships held up by the obstruction of the
canal. The second concerned a claim for the extra cost of
shipping cargo from Toronto rather than through the canal.
The final matter was the plaintiffs right to claim against the
fund paid into Court, any amount that it might have to pay
claimants in the U.S. action out of the total limited amount
that it paid into court in the United States.
Held, the claims against the fund are dismissed. Where the
damage is solely of the nature of an economic loss, the general
law is such damage is not recoverable even where it might have
been foreseeable and where the proper causal relationship exists
between the tortious act and the damage (as the Court would
be prepared to find in the first matter under consideration).
Although economic loss is not outside the scope of liability for
negligence, the range of cases where economic loss not depend
ent upon physical damage of some sort is recoverable remains
very limited. The second claim is still further removed from
plaintiffs responsibility. It meets neither the foreseeability test
nor the direct consequence test. Moreover, the argument that
there should be a distinction between the right of recovering an
economic loss consisting of a disbursement and one consisting
of a loss of profits, is rejected. Lastly, where a tort on which the
claims are founded has been committed in Canada, this Court
must not allow any credit against the limitation fund here for a
claim declared valid by a foreign court unless that claim would
have been recognized as valid at law in Canada.
Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. The Queen [1978] 1 F.C. 147,
applied; Star Village Tavern v. Nield [1976] 6 W.W.R.
80, applied; Hunt v. T. W. Johnstone Co. Ltd. (1977) 69
D.L.R. (3d) 639, applied; Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Wash-
ington Iron Works [1974] S.C.R. 1189, applied.
ACTION.
COUNSEL:
F. O. Gerity, Q.C., and N. H. Frawley for
plaintiff Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
Bernard Deschênes, Q.C., Robert Décary and
Duff Friesen for defendant St. Lawrence
Seaway Authority.
D. E. Pezzack for claimant Bell Canada.
R. Ayre for claimant Ontario Hydro.
No one appearing for claimant Joseph &
Reginald Rocco.
J. A. Baird for claimant National Steel
Corporation.
No one appearing for claimant Daniel &
Josephine Lacroix.
No one appearing for claimant Luria Bros. &
Co. Inc.
No one appearing for claimant John & Mary
Hill.
Dan Branoff for claimant Wayne Soap
Company.
SOLICITORS:
McMillan, Binch, Toronto, for plaintiff Beth-
lehem Steel Corporation.
de Grandpré, Colas, Amyot, Lesage, Des -
chênes & Godin, Montreal, for defendant St.
Lawrence Seaway Authority.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant St. Lawrence Seaway Author
ity.
D. E. Pezzack, c/o Bell Canada, Toronto, for
claimant Bell Canada.
R. Ayre, c/o Ontario Hydro, Toronto, for
claimant Ontario Hydro.
Forestell, Talmage, Hugill & Taylor, Wel-
land, for claimant Joseph & Reginald Rocco.
Holmested & Sutton, Toronto, for claimant
National Steel Corporation.
Mark J. G. LaRose, Welland, for claimant
Daniel & Josephine Lacroix.
Ed Joyce, c/o Luria Bros. & Co. Inc., New
York, for claimant Luria Bros. & Co. Inc.
John & Mary Hill, Port Robinson, for claim
ant John & Mary Hill.
Yuffy & Yuffy, Windsor, for claimant Wayne
Soap Company.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
ADDY J.: The present action was instituted pur
suant to sections 647 and 648 of the Canada
Shipping Act' by the plaintiff (hereinafter
referred to as "Bethlehem Steel") for limitation of
liability for damages caused by a ship which it
owned and which ran into a lift bridge over the
Welland Ship Canal, effectively destroying it,
obstructing the canal and causing damage to other
adjacent property such as telephone and electric
cables. Shipping through the canal was also
delayed for several days as a result of the obstruc
tion caused by the collapsed bridge.
The accident occurred by reason of pilot error
for which Bethlehem Steel is, at law, responsible.
It admitted liability at an early stage and request
ed in this action that it be granted the benefit of
the above-mentioned sections, the amount to be
paid into Court in accordance with the said sec
tions being based on the ship's tonnage. As a
result, pursuant to an order of my brother Cat-
tanach J., an amount of $680,733.56 was paid into
Court in full satisfaction of all legal claims arising
out of the accident. As there has been no appeal
from the order limiting the amount of liability, the
above amount, plus accrued interest to date of
distribution, constitutes the total fund available for
distribution.
In addition to the defendant, the St. Lawrence
Seaway Authority, owner of the bridge and of the
canal, several other claimants are involved. Others
were barred from claiming in this action by reason
of their having failed to conform to orders of this
Court requiring that their claims be filed within a
limited time or, in some cases, by reason of their
failure to undertake to refrain from ever claiming
in any other court of law for any damages result
ing from the accident.
' R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9.
Another similar action (hereinafter referred to
as the "U.S. action") was instituted before the
United States District Court of the Northern Dis
trict of Ohio, Eastern Division. This last-men
tioned action also involved several claimants, some
of whom had originally attempted to qualify as
claimants in the present action while at the same
time maintaining their claims in the U.S. action.
Pursuant to similar provisions as to limitation of
liability in the United States, the sum of $850,000
was also paid into court there by Bethlehem Steel
as a party to the U.S. action. The last-mentioned
action is still pending.
The quantum of the claims in the present action
was referred by me to Mr. J. A. Preston, the
Prothonotary of this Court in Toronto, for the
purpose of assessing the claims filed and reporting
thereon. His report was duly issued and considered
by me and the parties at the present hearing.
At the conclusion of the evidence and of the
argument on the various claims, I delivered oral
judgment as to the validity or otherwise of certain
claims and confirmed or varied assessments con
tained in the report of the learned prothonotary.
No useful purpose would be served in reiterating in
these reasons my findings thereon.
I did, however, reserve on three matters with
regard to which I now wish to state my findings.
The first concerns a claim filed by National Steel
Corporation for loss of profits of two of its ships
which were each held up for about two weeks, by
reason of the obstruction of the canal by the
damaged bridge. The claimant lost substantial
operating profits. The learned prothonotary fixed
the amount of this loss at $243,680.20. I hereby
confirm his finding as to quantum. The real issue,
however, is whether it is recoverable at law from
Bethlehem Steel.
The question of whether a pure economic loss
where there has been no damage to the person of
the claimant or to property in which the claimant
might have some actual or potential proprietory
interest, is a complicated one and has been con
sidered on many occasions. It is certainly not one
of the areas where the law excels by its clarity or
where its various approaches to solving problems
are necessarily consistent or totally reconcilable.
Our modern society bestows upon us many
advantages and innumerable benefits, most of
which result directly from or depend upon a multi
tude of very intricate and intimate relationships
which exist between its various members, groups
and services. There is, however, a price to be paid
for these benefits. In addition to contributing a
considerable portion of our income and thus of the
fruits of our daily labour and of allowing our
actions, and even our relationships to be regulated
and controlled to a large extent, we must frequent
ly forego the redress of certain wrongs even where
the recognition of a right of redress might appeal
to one's instinctive thirst for perfect justice or
satisfy some theoretically desirable entitlement to
compensation.
The redress of what might appear to be a real
wrong will not be recognized where its enforce
ment would greatly impede the proper functioning
of our society or, because of its intricate interrela
tionships, ultimately result in greater wrongs than
those for which relief is contemplated. Such prob
lems must frequently be solved pragmatically and
it matters little whether we declare that the limits
which must be imposed are dictated by policy,
common sense or by the more philosophically
acceptable concepts of social justice or of legal
theory. The important thing is that the law, in this
necessarily hazy area of human relations, must lay
down rules which define limits that can be recog
nized by all members of our society in order that
they may be aware of their respective rights, duties
and responsibilities and govern themselves accord
ingly.
In the law of torts generally, the courts, in order
to formulate logically defensible basis for creating
liability on the one hand and, on the other hand,
for imposing limits to the responsibility for dam
ages which might otherwise flow from a tortious
act or omission, have applied to the problem of
remoteness of damages three main tests. The first
test is whether the alleged tortfeasor had a duty of
care to the claimant; in applying this test difficul
ties arise in defining the nature of the duty and in
establishing the class of people to whom it is owed.
At times in order to restrict and at other times to
enlarge the area of responsibility, the courts have
resorted to the added tests of "foreseeability" of
the nature of the damage and of causality, that is,
of determining whether the damage was a direct
consequence of the negligent act or whether it
really resulted from some other intervening cause.
The courts also at times refer to remoteness of
damage as a separate test distinct from the other
three. I, however, find difficulty in appreciating
how, from the standpoint of legal theory, damage
can be too remote if the nature of that damage is
reasonably foreseeable, for it has been well estab
lished that once the nature of the damage is
reasonably foreseeable it is no answer to say that
its actual extent was not.
The extent and applicability of these various
tests have been exhaustively discussed by many
learned authors in a multitude of leading cases
which clearly indicate that, although the area of
liability has gradually been extended, there still
exist some very definite limitations.
Much of this jurisprudence has been considered
and reviewed by my brother Collier J. in the case
of Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. The Queen and Canadi-
an National Railway Company v. The "Harry
Lundeberg" 2 Having regard to this recent and
comprehensive review, no useful purpose would be
served in again examining the development of the
law in the light of the applicability of the above-
mentioned tests.
It is clear that the above tests apply and can
serve to either found or defeat a claim in tort when
actual physical damage occurs. But where the
damage is solely of the nature of an economic loss,
the general law is that such damage is not recover
able even where it might have been foreseeable
and where the proper causal relationship between
the tortious act and the damage exists, as I would
be prepared to find in the case at bar. There are, of
course, exceptions to this general rule such as
actions for the intentional tort of deceit, actions by
a master for injury to his servant and cases where
there has been a misstatement negligently made
by someone presumably possessed of a special
knowledge where it might reasonably be foreseen
2 [1978] 1 F.C. 147.
that the statement would be relied upon by some
body such as the person claiming the economic loss
and that economic loss might in fact ensue. Since
the well-known and widely discussed obiter dictum
of the House of Lords in the case of Hedley Byrne
& Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 3 , which
obiter has been applied by Canadian courts on
several occasions, it is clear that economic or
pecuniary loss is not outside the scope of liability
for negligence. But, in my view, the range of cases,
where economic loss which is not dependent upon
physical damage of some sort is recoverable,
remains nevertheless very limited.
In the Gypsum Carrier Inc. case, to which I
have referred above, a ship collided with a railway
bridge spanning the Fraser River. The Canadian
National Railway Company and other parties, as
users of the bridge, claimed for economic losses
resulting from the delay in repairing the heavily
damaged bridge. Collier J. held that, as they had
no easement or other proprietory right in the
bridge but merely contractual rights obtained in
exchange for certain fees to run their trains over
the bridge, damages for economic loss could not be
recovered as the loss was too remote. He also held
that recovery was not permitted notwithstanding
that they may have enjoyed some sort of licence to
the use of the bridge as the result of their contracts
which were incorrectly described as easement
contracts.
The relationship between the claimants and the
damaged object in the Gypsum Carrier Inc. case
was much more intimate than that which existed
between the claimants National Steel Corporation
and the damaged bridge in the case at bar. In the
former case, the damaged object was the very
thing which was used by the claimants and they at
least had certain contractual rights covering it.
Recovery was also denied in two other important
Canadian decisions of Star Village Tavern v.
Nield 4 and Hunt v. T. W. Johnstone Co. Ltd. 5
3 [1964] A.C. 465.
4 [1976] 6 W.W.R. 80.
5 (1977) 69 D.L.R. (3d) 639.
These cases were reviewed by Collier J. in the
Gypsum Carrier Inc. case and I will refrain from
further commenting on them except to say that I
fully agree with these decisions.
The fairly recent case of Rivtow Marine Ltd. v.
Washington Iron Works 6 is apparently the first
one where the Supreme Court of Canada was
called upon to consider whether judgment could be
recovered in a negligence action for economic loss
standing alone and not dependent upon physical
injury. In that case, the plaintiff was the charterer
of a log barge equipped with two cranes. The first
defendant was the manufacturer and designer of
the cranes and the second defendant was the sole
distributor and representative of the manufacturer
in the area. Both defendants were fully aware for
some time of a serious defect in the design and
construction of the cranes and they also knew that
the plaintiff was going to use them and were fully
aware of the express use to which the cranes would
be put. Notwithstanding this, they failed to warn
the plaintiff, who might otherwise have had the
defects remedied during a period of the year when
little or no work was available. It was also held
that the defendants were fully aware of the fact
that the plaintiff looked to them for advice regard
ing the machinery and for its inspection and repair
when necessary.
Because of a fatal accident on another compa-
ny's barge, which was equipped with an identical
crane, the plaintiff was advised by the Workmen's
Compensation Board of British Columbia to
obtain a certificate as to the soundness of the
cranes and, as a result of the inspection, the plain
tiff was obliged to carry out repairs at the height
of the very profitable working season. The plaintiff
sued for the cost of repairing the cranes and for
loss of use during the repair period.
The judgment of seven of the Judges constitut
ing the majority of the Court, which upheld the
judgment of the Trial Judge, was delivered by
Ritchie J. It was held that there was no liability
for the cost of repairs and for such economic loss
as would have occurred in any event if the warning
of the defects in the cranes had been given
immediately, but, that there was liability for the
6 [1974] S.C.R. 1189.
excess of economic loss which occurred because of
failure to warn. The dissenting view of the remain
ing two Judges, that is, Hall J. and Laskin J. (as
he then was), was delivered by the latter. They
would have allowed the cost of repairs in the
amount of the consequent economic loss which
would have occurred in any event if the repairs
had been carris out during a slack season as well
as the economic loss which occurred by reason of
the repairs being carried out during the highly
profitable period.
As to the cost of repairs in the economic loss
which would have occurred even if the repairs had
been carri:s out during the slack season, the
majority of the Court disallowed both on the
grounds that liability for the cost of repairing the
damage to a defective article itself and for the
economic loss flowing from the manufacturer's
negligence is akin to liability under an express or
implied warranty of fitness and is therefore of
contractual origin and cannot be enforced against
the manufacturer by a person not party to the
contract.
The minority judgment would have found liabil
ity on the basis that a mere threat of physical
harm, as well as physical harm itself, should also
constitute grounds for recovery. It is abundantly
clear, however, that the whole Court were of the
view that the liability for the excess economic loss
due to failure to warn was properly founded on a
failure to warn where there was a clear duty to do
so in that particular case and that such failure to
warn constituted an independent tort on which the
liability could be founded. Ritchie J. had this to
say on behalf of the majority at page 1215 of the
above-mentioned report:
... I am satisfied that in the present case there was a proximity
of relationship giving rise to a duty to warn and that the
damages awarded by the learned trial judge were recoverable
as compensation for the direct and demonstrably foreseeable
result of the breach of that duty. This being the case, I do not
find it necessary to follow the sometimes winding paths leading
to the formulation of a "policy decision."
Laskin J., on behalf of the minority, had this to
say at page 1216:
I agree with the award of damages so far as it goes, but I would
enlarge it to include as well the cost of repairs.
He had this to state at pages 1218 and 1219:
Support for such recovery in the present case will not lead to
"liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class", to borrow an often-quoted state
ment of the late Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche
(1931), 255 N.Y. 170, at 179. The pragmatic considerations
which underlay Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1875) 10
Q.B. 453 will not be eroded by the imposition of liability upon
Washington as a negligent designer and manufacturer: cf
Fleming James, "Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal", (1972), 12
Jo.S.P.T.L. 105. Liability here will not mean that it must also
be imposed in the case of any negligent conduct where there is
foreseeable economic loss; a typical instance would be claims by
employees for lost wages where their employer's factory has
been damaged and is shut down by reason of anther's negli
gence. The present case is concerned with direct economic loss
by a person whose use of the defendant Washington's product
was a contemplated one, and not with indirect economic loss by
third parties, for example, persons whose logs could not be
loaded on the appellant's barge because of the withdrawal of
the defective crane from service to undergo repairs. It is
concerned (and here I repeat myself) with economic loss result
ing directly from avoidance of threatened physical harm to
property of the appellant if not also personal injury to persons
in its employ.
The learned Judge also had this to say at pages
1221 and 1222:
This rationale embraces, in my opinion, threatened physical
harm from a negligently designed and manufactured product
resulting in economic loss. I need not decide whether it extends
to claims for economic loss where there is no threat of physical
harm or to claims for damage, without more, to the defective
product.
It is therefore clear, in my view, that the Rivtow
case, supra, does not in any way change the law as
it was previously formulated and recognized by
Canadian courts. Even if the minority judgment
were followed at some later date, liability would
only be extended from cases where there was
actual physical harm to those where physical harm
to the property of the claimant was threatened.
There certainly was no threat of physical harm to
the property of the claimant National Steel Corpo
ration by Bethlehem Steel in the case at bar.
Finally, from a factual standpoint, the Rivtow
case, unlike the case at bar, would tend to fall
within the general category of product cases such
as the classical decision of M'Alister (or Donog-
hue) v. Stevenson' where special norms of liability
apply.
It was suggested, although not forcibly argued,
that recovery might be allowed on the grounds of
public nuisance. The obstruction of the seaway,
which might constitute the nuisance, was caused
by an inadvertent act of negligence and not by any
wilful or deliberate action of the plaintiff and the
obstruction was not allowed to continue nor pro
longed by any further wilful act or negligent act or
omission of the plaintiff. There did not therefore
exist in the plaintiff the required guilt or intent to
commit the type of petty offence which is required
to found an action for public nuisance as opposed
to one for private nuisance. In stating this, I do not
wish to convey the impression that if the plaintiff
were guilty of creating a public nuisance, the
damages claimed by the National Steel Corpora
tion would necessarily be recoverable at law.
For the above reasons the claim of National
Steel Corporation is disallowed in its entirety.
The second matter on which I reserved was the
claim of Wayne Soap Company, a shipper of
merchandise. The claimant shipped tallow by ship
through the canal and claims the extra costs of
having to ship the tallow by truck overland to
Toronto where it could be loaded for shipment to
Europe.
Since the claim of National Steel Corporation
has not been allowed, it is patently obvious that, as
this claimant is still further removed from the
orbit of responsibility of Bethlehem Steel, its claim
must also be disallowed. Furthermore, it would
neither meet the foreseeability test nor the direct
consequence (causality) test.
I also completely reject the argument that there
should be a distinction between the right of recov
ering an economic loss which consists of a dis
bursement actually made as in the claim of Wayne
Soap Company, where it claims for costs of truck
ing, and that which consists of loss of profits as in
the case of National Steel Corporation.
7 [1932] A.C. 562.
The final matter on which I reserved was the
right of Bethlehem Steel Corporation to claim
against the fund paid into Court, any amount
which it might have to pay claimants in the U.S.
action out of the total limited amount of $850,000,
which it paid into court in the United States.
A shipowner has the right to claim against his
own limitation fund amounts of damages which he
may have been called upon to pay in another
jurisdiction. (Refer Leycester v. Logan$; Rankine
v. Raschen 9 ; The "Crathie" 10 ; The "Kronprinz
Olav""; and "T" Steam Coasters ("Coaster") v.
Owners of Cargo Laden in `Dokka" 12 .)
Section 648(4) of the Canada Shipping Act
recognizes this principle and provides as follows:
648... .
(4) In making a distribution under this section of the
amount determined to be the liability of the owner of a ship,
the Court may, having regard to any claim that may subse
quently be established before a court outside Canada in respect
of that liability, postpone the distribution of such part of the
amount as it deems appropriate.
This section allows postponement, at my discre
tion, of distribution of part of the amount of
$680,733.56 paid into Court in the present case.
The right of recovery of the claimants in the
U.S. action has not yet been determined. It
appears that the very great majority of those
claims, if not all of them, will fall within the same
category as the claims of National Steel Corpora
tion and of Wayne Soap Company which I have
disallowed. It appears also, following a ruling by
Krupanski J., who heard the application dealing
with the limitation fund to be deposited in the U.S.
action, that, following the same principles recog
nized by Canadian courts and most nations of the
Western World, United States courts, in order to
determine liability in tort cases, apply the lex loci
delicti commissi.
8 (1857) 26 L.J. (N.S.) 306.
9 4 Ct. of Sess. Cas. (4th series) 725.
10 [1897] P. 178.
11 [1921] P. 52.
12 (1921-2) 10 Ll. L.Rep. 592.
It is nevertheless of prime importance to bear in
mind that where the tort on which the claims are
founded has been committed in Canada, this Court
must not allow any credit against the limitation
fund here for a claim declared valid by a foreign
court unless that claim would have been recog
nized as valid at law in Canada; it would be
nothing short of ludicrous to hold otherwise, for
Canadian claimants would then be obliged to
suffer a reduction in the amount to which they
would otherwise have been entitled to receive from
the fund merely because a claimant has chosen to
appeal to a foreign jurisdiction rather than to a
Canadian court where his claim would have failed.
Thus, when exercising judicial discretion on the
period of postponement to be allowed, if any, it is
important to bear in mind that, even if a claim has
been allowed in the U.S. action, it might still be
subject to contestation here in so far as Bethlehem
Steel's right to claim a credit therefor against the
limitation fund here is concerned. In exercising
that discretion, it must also be borne in mind that
an indefinite or an exceedingly lengthy postpone
ment would work an injustice against the other
claimants who, after all, are obliged to see their
otherwise legitimate claims reduced by reason of
the special privilege allowed the shipowner by the
legislation providing for limitation of liability. The
accident occurred in August 1974 and all but three
years have since elapsed. There have been several
postponements and delays but they are not, in my
view, attributable to Bethlehem Steel but rather to
former claimants before this Court who are now
claiming in the U.S. action.
There might still be some complicated issues to
be decided in the U.S. action and, having no idea
of the amount of work before the United States
court, it becomes almost impossible to predict
when it might finally dispose of the matter. Fur
thermore, it is patently obvious that I have no
control over the time to be taken to resolve what
ever issues might remain to be decided in that
jurisdiction.
With these considerations in mind and, having
regard to the state of the U.S. action as I presently
view it, I feel that a partial interim distribution of
the fund should take place immediately among all
of the legitimate claimants with the exception of
Bethlehem Steel and that the ultimate date of final
distribution should take place within six months.
There will therefore be a temporary pro rata
provision made against the funds in favour of
Bethlehem Steel as if it had a valid claim of
$850,000 (i.e.: the total amount paid into the
limitation fund in the U.S. action) and, subject to
that provision, immediate distribution of the
remainder of the fund plus accumulated interest
thereon to date shall take place pro rata among the
other claimants in accordance with the claims
which I have allowed.
The share of the fund represented by the $850,-
000 claim of Bethlehem Steel shall be set aside to
be distributed finally on or before the 1st of
March, 1978.
At the time of final distribution the amount
remaining shall be paid out as follows:
1. Should the claims allowed in the U.S. action
and recognized as enforceable under our law,
equal or exceed the amount of $850,000, then
the total amount remaining in the fund plus
accumulated interest shall be paid out to Beth-
lehem Steel.
2. Should there be no such valid United States
claims allowed, then the balance shall be paid
out pro rata among the other successful claim
ants in this action.
3. Should the total of such valid proven claims
as are allowed in the U.S. action be less than
$850,000, then the balance of the fund shall be
distributed between Bethlehem Steel and the
other successful claimants, as if such total
allowed claims in the United States had been
known at the present time and prorated with the
other claims against the total fund.
4. Should there be no final decision from the
United States Trial Court as of the 1st of
March, 1978, as to the validity of the claims
made there, then the balance of the fund shall
be paid out pro rata among the successful claim
ants in this action without taking into account
any possible liability of Bethlehem Steel in the
U.S. action.
As there will always remain the possibility,
remote as it may be, of a challenge of the validity
according to our law of any award made in the
U.S. action, the above order for final distribution
shall remain subject to any further order of this
Court issued for the purpose of allowing it to
finally dispose of any such challenge.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by any
former order, Bethlehem Steel shall pay on a
party-and-party basis all costs of all claimants
before this Court, including unsuccessful claim
ants, but not those of any claimants who withdrew
in order to claim in the U.S. action.
Formal judgment shall issue in accordance with
these reasons and the oral findings announced in
open Court at the time of the trial.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.