A-740-75
Shell Canada Limited (Shell Canadian Tankers
(1964) Limited) (Appellant) (Defendant)
v.
Laurentian Pilotage Authority (Respondent)
(Plaintiff)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Le Dain JJ. and
Marquis D.J.—Quebec, June 28 and 29, 1977.
Maritime law — Pilotage fees — Two pilots assigned to
steer ship — Whether appellant, according to by-laws of
pilotage authority, responsible for fees for two pilots or for
those of only one pilot — Pilotage Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 52,
s. 43 — Quebec Pilotage District General By-law, SOR/57-51,
s. 6 as amended by SOR/72-5, s. 1; SOR/72-388, s. 3 as
amended by SOR/73-135, s. I — Interpretation Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. I-23, s. 36(/),(g) and (h) — Canada Shipping Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, ss. 307 and 330.
Appellant is owner of a ship that made several voyages in a
compulsory pilotage area under respondent's jurisdiction.
During these voyages, the respondent ordered the ship to take
aboard not one but two pilots, and subsequently demanded
double the pilotage dues set out in the tariff. Appellant main
tained it did not owe additional money because the regulations
under which the tariffs assessed had been repealed and it paid
only half the amount demanded. Respondent instituted pro
ceedings to obtain the remainder. The Trial Division allowed
this action and held that, according to the by-laws then in
effect, respondent was entitled to double the stated dues. The
appellant appeals this decision.
Held, the appeal is allowed. The Trial Judge's decision that
section 6(1) referred to the new Schedule C as well as the
repealed Schedule A was based on section 36 of the Interpreta
tion Act. Schedule A of the old by-law was simply repealed,
however, and nothing took its place as a schedule to this
by-law. The Interpretation Act cannot serve as a basis for
dismissing the appellant's claim that section 6(1)•, of the old
by-law was rendered ineffective by the amendments made to
the new regulations in 1973 and by the revocation at the same
time of Schedule A of the old by-law. Since the main purpose
of section 6(1) was to impose the obligation of paying the dues
set in Schedule A, and not to establish the principle of payment
of double pilotage dues, the argument that the section referred
to the existing tariff as well as the repealed Schedule A is much
less forceful. The reference to Schedule A in section 6(1) was
not a redundancy but an essential part of the provision which
ceased to have effect when Schedule A ceased to exist.
APPEAL.
COUNSEL:
Jacques A. Laurin for appellant.
Guy P. Major and Michel Bourgeois for
respondent.
SOLICITORS:
McMaster, Minnion, Patch, Hyndman,
Legge, Camp & Paterson, Montreal, for
appellant.
Guy P. Major, Montreal, for respondent.
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment delivered orally by
PRATTE J.: Appellant is the owner of a ship
which, in 1973, made several voyages in a compul
sory pilotage area located in the region that the
Pilotage Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 52, places under
respondent's jurisdiction. During these voyages
respondent required the ship to take on board not
one but two pilots and subsequently demanded
that appellant pay double the pilotage dues set out
in its tariff. Appellant maintained that it did not
owe respondent additional money because two
pilots rather than one had been assigned to steer
its ship, and therefore paid only half the amount
demanded. Respondent then instituted proceedings
to obtain the remainder. The Trial Division
allowed this action and held' that, according to the
by-laws then in effect, respondent was entitled to
double the stated pilotage dues in cases where two
pilots were assigned to a ship. It is this decision
that is disputed by appellant.
The pilotage that gave rise to this claim was
provided shortly after the Pilotage Act came into
force. At that time pilotage was regulated by the
new legislation and also by by-laws. Some of these
by-laws had been adopted under the new Act
(sections 14 and 22) by the Pilotage Authorities
established by that Act; others had been adopted
under the Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
S-9, before the new Act came into force. Accord
ing to section 43 of the new Act, this latter group
were to remain in effect for two years unless
revoked by the new Pilotage Authorities.
1 [1976] 2 F.C. 102.
The pilotage dues claimed by respondent were
incurred in the area previously known as the
Quebec Pilotage District during April, May, June
and July 1973. In order to find out which by-laws
apply in this case, and also in order to be able to
understand the problem raised by the case, it is
necessary to know what by-laws applied before the
Pilotage Act came into force on February 1, 1972
and what amendments were subsequently made to
them.
When the Pilotage Act came into force, pilotage
in the Quebec District was governed by a general
by-law adopted under the Canada Shipping Act.
This by-law, entitled the "Quebec Pilotage District
General By-law", contained a great many adminis
trative provisions regarding pilotage and in addi
tion section 6(1) imposed the obligation of paying
pilotage dues. This section read as follows:
6. (1) The pilotage dues as set forth in Schedule A shall be
paid for the services of each pilot used in respect of each vessel
unless exempted by the Act or by this By-law.
Schedule A of the by-law, to which this section
refers, contains the tariff of pilotage dues.
After the Pilotage Act came into force, these
by-laws remained in effect under the transitional
provisions contained in section 43.
On September 18, 1972, respondent adopted
tariff regulations. These regulations, however, did
not concern the Quebec Pilotage District but only
the rest of the area under respondent's jurisdiction.
I mention them because on March 8, 1973 they
were amended to include the area we are interest
ed in. On that date the regulations were amended
by the addition of Schedule C, containing a new
tariff of pilotage charges for the Quebec District,
and of subsection 3(3) requiring payment of the
charges set out in Schedule C. This subsection was
not worded in the same way as section 6(1) of the
old by-law, but read as follows:
3...
(3) The charges set forth in Schedule C are prescribed as the
pilotage charges to be paid to the Authority for pilotage on and
after the date of the coming into force of this subsection.
On the day these amendments were adopted
respondent, acting under section 43(6) of the Act,
revoked Schedule A of the old "Quebec Pilotage
District General By-law". 2 This by-law, however,
still contained section 6(1), cited above, which
thenceforth referred to a Schedule A that no
longer existed.
The Trial Judge held that these provisions of the
by-law obliged appellant, whose ship had been
steered by two pilots, to pay double the pilotage
charges set out in the tariff contained in Schedule
C of the new regulations. In his view, since "sec-
tion 6(1) authorizing payment of the second pilot
was never repealed, it remains in effect and now
refers to the new Schedule C." The Judge appears
to have based this conclusion on section 36(f),(g)
and (h) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
I-23. I do not find this argument convincing. Sec
tion 36 applies "Where an enactment ... is
repealed and another enactment ... is substituted
therefor." Contrary to what has been said by
counsel for the respondent, nothing of the kind
took place in this case. Schedule A of the old
by-law was simply repealed, and nothing took its
place as a schedule to this by-law. Therefore, the
Interpretation Act cannot serve as a basis for
dismissing appellant's claim that section 6(1) of
the old by-law was rendered ineffective by the
amendments made to the new regulations in 1973,
and by the revocation at the same time of
Schedule A of the old by-law.
The principal argument put forward by counsel
for the respondent was different. He maintained
that the circumstances surrounding the adoption
and amendment of the by-laws I have mentioned
(in particular, the fact that section 6(1) of the old
by-law was not repealed) revealed an intention of
retaining the principle of what he called "payment
of double pilotage dues" established by section
6(1). From this he concluded that the regulations
and by-laws must be interpreted in such a way as
2 Appellant has not disputed the validity of this revocation.
to give effect to this principle, or in other words,
that section 6(1) of the old by-law must be inter
preted as referring not only to Schedule A but
rather to the existing tariff. This argument would
have a great deal of force if the purpose of section
6(1) had been solely or mainly to state the rule of
payment of double pilotage dues. It might then
have been possible to interpret the reference to
Schedule A in that section as a simple redundancy.
In fact, however, the main purpose, of section 6(1)
was not to establish the principle of payment of
double pilotage dues. Its main purpose was to
impose the obligation of paying the dues set by
Schedule A. The relationship between section 6(1)
and Schedule A in the old by-law was the same as
the relationship between section 3(3) and Schedule
C in the new regulations. The reference to
Schedule A in section 6(1) was therefore not a
redundancy but an essential part of this provision,
which consequently ceased to have effect when
Schedule A ceased to exist.
Counsel for the respondent advances the subsidi
ary argument that, regardless of the old by-law,
the obligation to pay double pilotage dues results
from the wording of Schedule C of the new regula
tions, since in several subsections of that Schedule
the word "pilot" is singular rather than plural. I
find this argument difficult to understand. Accord
ing to section 26(7) of the Interpretation Act,
"Words in the singular include the plural...."
One must therefore avoid attaching too much
importance to the use of the singular in the tariff.
In addition, since pilotage is usually provided by a
single pilot, it does not seem strange to me that the
author of the tariff used the word pilot in the
singular rather than the plural when referring to
this service.
For these reasons I would allow the appeal, set
aside the decision of the Trial Division and dismiss
respondent's action with costs for the trial as well
as the appeal.
* * *
LE DAIN J. concurred.
* * *
MARQUIS D.J. concurred.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.