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T-3687-76
Calona Wines Limited (Appellant) v.
Registrar of Trade Marks (Respondent)
•
Trial Division, Marceau J.—Montreal, June 1;
Ottawa, June 17, 1977.
Trade marks — Appeal from decision of Registrar rejecting application for registration of mark "Fontana Bianco" — Whether "Fontana" primarily name or surname of a person who is living or who has died within the preceding thirty years
— Word not normally associated in Canada with family name
— Appeal allowed — Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10, s. 12(1)(a).
The Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the appellant's application for the registration of the trade mark "Fontana Bianco"—a mark to be used in Canada in association with wine. The Registrar was satisfied that "Fontana" was primarily the name or surname of an individual who is living or who has died within the preceding thirty years.
Held, the appeal is allowed. The Court is not convinced that the purchasing general public of Canada would respond to the word "Fontana", used in conjunction with the word "Bianco" on the label of a bottle of wine, by spontaneously thinking of it as being the surname of an individual. A Canadian of ordinary intelligence and of ordinary education in English or French would be just as likely, if not more likely, to respond to the word by thinking of it as a brand or mark of some business, or else as a geographical name, or even more simply as an invented word for fountain or fontaine, as to respond to it by thinking of it as the name of some Canadian family.
Standard Oil Co. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [1968] 2 Ex.C.R. 523, followed; Registrar of Trade Marks v.
Coles Book Stores Ltd. [1974] S.C.R. 438, followed.
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
Daniel Lack for appellant. Claude Joyal for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Ogilvy, Cope, Porteous, Montgomery, Renault, Clarke & Kirkpatrick, Montreal, for appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
MARCEAU J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks rendered on
September 14, 1976 rejecting the application by the appellant for the registration of the trade mark FONTANA BIANCO on the basis of its proposed use in Canada in association with wines.
The respondent refused the application because he was satisfied "that the mark is not registrable by virtue of paragraphs (a) and (c) subsection (1) of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act since the word `Fontana' is a word that is primarily merely the name or surname of individuals who are living or have died within the preceding thirty years". These paragraphs of section 12 read as follows:
12. (1) Subject to section 13, a trade mark is registrable if it is not
(a) a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the preceding thirty years;
(b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French languages of the character or quality of the wares or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin;
(c) the name in any language of any of the wares or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to be used;
It must be pointed out that while the objection based on section 12(1)(a) of the Act is quite understandable and clearly explained in the respondent's communications to the appellant as well as in the pleadings herein, nowhere is there to be found any indication as to how and why section 12(1)(c) would also apply and counsel for the respondent, at the hearing, could not be more specific. Assuming that the objection based on section 12(1)(c) referred to the part of the trade mark formed by the word "Bianco" which, accord ing to the new Encyclopedia of Wines by Alexis Lachine, is a word sometimes used in Italy for "white wine", the appellant has formally accepted, as a solution to the objection, a disclaimer of the word apart from the trade mark as a whole, pursu ant to section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10. I consider that such a disclaimer (which is acknowledged by the respondent in his statement of facts filed in reply to the notice of appeal) renders inoperative the objection based on section 12(1)(c).
We are therefore left with the main objection based on section 12(1)(a) which applies to the part of the trade mark being the word "Fontana". The issue is whether the respondent was justified in deciding that the word Fontana was "primarily merely" the surname of an individual within the meaning of section 12(1)(a), so that the trade mark of which it was to be a part was not registrable.
It seems clear to me that the respondent's con clusion was essentially based on two facts, the first being that the word "Fontana" has no dictionary meaning either in French or English and the second that it has been found to be the surname off a certain number of people in Canada. Were these facts decisive and sufficient to support the conclu sion? I don't think so.
The principles according to which section 12(1)(a) of the Act was to be construed and applied have been discussed and set out by Presi dent Jackett (as he then was) in the well-known case of Standard Oil Co. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [ 1968] 2 Ex.C.R. 523. At pages 532-533 he says:
The test must be what, in the opinion of the respondent or the Court, as the case may be, would be the response of the general public of Canada to the word. My conclusion is that a person in Canada of ordinary intelligence and of ordinary education in English or French would be just as likely, [if the two characters (surname and invented word) are of equal importance, it cannot be said that it is "primarily merely" a surname], if not more likely, to respond to the word by thinking of it as a brand or mark of some business as to respond to it by thinking of some family of people (that is, by thinking of it as being the surname of one or more individuals).
I have probably been influenced in coming to the conclusion that I have expressed as to how the word "primarily" in section 12(1)(a) should be applied by the fact that applying the provision solely by reference to the existence of a dictionary meaning of a proposed trade mark would make practically every invented word vulnerable to attack as a proposed trade mark by anyone assiduous enough to pursue his searches for its use as a surname somewhere in the world (or, indeed, in a country such as Canada even if the search were restricted to Canada). I cannot believe that section 12(1)(a) was intended virtually to eliminate the creation of new words for purposes of proposed trade marks)
' See also The Registrar of Trade Marks v. Coles Book Stores Ltd. [ 1974] S.C.R. 438.
The word "Fontana" in the subject mark is by no means a common surname in Canada: the Office Action emanating from respondent dated February 20, 1975 shows a mere 41 people, in the whole of Canada, bearing it as their family name. Fontana may be the name of some people but it is as well, as was established, the name of several geographic locations in the world; and if the present appeal succeeds, it may also become a fanciful word selected by the appellant to use it in conjunction with the word "Bianco" to carry the suggestion to Canadians of a white fountain. Now, applying the test, I cannot convince myself that the purchasing general public of Canada would respond to the word "Fontana", used in conjunc tion with the word "Bianco" on the label of a bottle of wine, by spontaneously thinking of it as being the surname of an individual. My conclusion is that a Canadian of ordinary intelligence and of ordinary education in English or French would be just as likely, if not more likely, to respond to the word by thinking of it as a brand or mark of some business, or else as a geographical name, or even more simply as an invented word for fountain or fontaine, as to respond to it by thinking of it as the name of some Canadian family.
It is my opinion that the respondent was wrong in deciding that the trade mark FONTANA BIANCO was not registrable by virtue of paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 12 of the Trade Marks Act on the ground that the word "Fontana" was primarily merely the name or surname of individuals.
The appeal will therefore be allowed.
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