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A-243-76
Antares Shipping Corporation (Plaintiff) (Respondent)
v.
The Ship Capricorn (alias the Ship Alliance), Delmar Shipping Limited and Portland Shipping Company Inc. (Defendants) (Appellants)
Court of Appeal, Ryan and Le Dain JJ. and Hyde D.J.—Montreal, March 8 and 9, 1977.
Jurisdiction — Appeal from order refusing "D" leave to file conditional appearance and stay of proceedings — Whether proper exercise of discretion under Rule 401 — Whether Rule 1716 applied — Whether service ex juris properly ordered — Whether Federal Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae — Federal Court Rules 401 and 1716.
Defendant D argues that the Trial Division was not properly exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 401 in refusing it leave to file a conditional appearance in order to apply to have a stay of proceedings pending the hearing of its motion to have the proceedings set aside. D claims that Rule 1716 did not empow er the Court to compel it to become a defendant in an action in rem, that an arbitration agreement between the parties and the institution of proceedings by the plaintiff against D in New York were not disclosed at the ex parte proceedings for service ex juris and that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae.
Held, the appeal is dismissed. Leave to file a conditional appearance is not a right and the principle governing the exercise of discretion under Rule 401, i.e., whether the defend ant has raised a prima facie doubt as to the regularity of the proceedings or the jurisdiction of the Court was adhered to. The objection to joinder under Rule 1716 was not raised in the Trial Division and therefore cannot be considered on appeal; the objection to service ex furls has already been dealt with by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Federal Court is the only one capable of enforcing its judgment; and the question of jurisdiction ratione materiae can be raised at any point in the proceedings and did not have to be decided by the Trial Division exercising its discretion under Rule 401.
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
Guy Vaillancourt for plaintiff.
S. J. Harrington for Delmar Shipping
Limited.
Gilles de Billy, Q.C., for Portland Shipping
Co. Inc.
SOLICITORS:
Langlois, Drouin, Roy, Fréchette & Gau- dreau, Quebec, for plaintiff.
McMaster, Minnion, Patch, Hyndman, Legge, Camp & Paterson, Montreal, for Delmar Shipping Limited.
Gagnon, de Billy, Cantin, Dionne, Martin, Beaudoin & Lesage, Quebec, for Portland Shipping Co. Inc.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
LE DAIN J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Trial Division refusing leave to file a condition al appearance. The issue is whether the Court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 401 of the Federal Court Rules, which reads as follows:
Rule 401. A defendant may, by leave of the Court, file a conditional appearance for the purpose of objecting to
(a) any irregularity in the commencement of the proceeding;
(b) the service of the statement of claim or declaration, or notice thereof, on him; or
(c) the jurisdiction of the Court, and an order granting such
leave shall make provision for any stay of proceedings neces sary to allow such objection to be raised and disposed of.
There have been several steps taken and judg ments rendered in the proceedings in which the parties have become involved with reference to an alleged agreement for the sale of the Ship Capricorn (also known as the Ship Alliance) by the appellant Delmar Shipping Limited to the respondent Antares Shipping Corporation (herein- after referred to as "Antares"), but it is sufficient for present purposes to refer briefly to the general nature of the action and to the judgments which appear to have a bearing on the issue in this appeal. Over three years ago, Antares instituted an action in rem in which it concluded for a declara tion that a sale of the ship by the appellant to the respondent Portland Shipping Company Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Portland") was null and void, and that in consequence the appellant remained the owner of the ship; an order that the appellant perform its obligations under the alleged agreement for the sale of the ship to Antares; and
damages. By an order of the Trial Division under Rule 1716 the appellant and Portland were added as defendants in the action. Judgments of the Trial Division and of this Court dismissing an applica tion for an order for service ex juris on the appel lant and Portland were reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, and pursuant to its judgment an order for such service was issued by the Trial Division. On being served the appellant applied for leave to file a conditional appearance and for a stay of proceedings of thirty days to enable it to move to have the proceedings set aside on grounds of objection falling within the terms of Rule 401. The Trial Division dismissed the appellant's application in the following terms:
Motion denied. Defendant Delmar has failed to show any irregularity or lack of jurisdiction of this Court. Costs to the Plaintiff.
The appellant contends that its grounds of objection to the proceedings are such that the Trial Division could not by a proper exercise of its discretion under Rule 401 refuse leave to file a conditional appearance. Those grounds of objec tion, as formulated in the argument before this Court, may be summarized as follows:
1. Rule 1716 did not empower the Trial Divi sion to compel the appellant to become a defendant in an action in rem, and, further, the statement of claim, as amended pursuant to the order of the Trial Division, was not endorsed with a reference to the order, as required by Rule 1716;
2. In the ex parte proceedings for an order for service ex juris it was not disclosed to the courts that the alleged agreement for the sale of the ship contained a provision for arbitration, and, further, that Antares had instituted proceedings against the appellant in respect of the said agreement in the State of New York;
3. The Federal Court lacks jurisdiction ration materiae.
Leave to file a conditional appearance is not a matter of right. In our opinion, the principal con sideration which should govern the exercise of the
discretion under Rule 401 is whether the defend ant has prima facie raised sufficient doubt as to the regularity of the proceedings or the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court that justice requires he be permitted to appear in such a manner as to avoid any waiver of his objections. As we read the reasons for the order of the Trial Division, the Court came to the conclusion that there was not sufficient prima facie merit in the objections invoked by the appellant to warrant the granting of leave to file a conditional appearance. We are unable to find any reason for interfering with this exercise of its discretion.
It was conceded in this Court that the objection to the joinder of the appellant under Rule 1716 was not raised before the Trial Division. It cannot, therefore, in our opinion, be a basis for holding that the Trial Division failed to exercise its discre tion properly.
In so far as the objection to service ex juris is concerned, we cannot see how it could possibly succeed in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. In our respectful opinion the reasoning in that judgment turns essentially on the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is the only one in which a judgment could be effectively enforced. The provision for arbitration and the fact that a suit has been instituted in the State of New York would not appear to have any bearing on this consideration.
In so far as the objection to jurisdiction ratione materiae is concerned, such an objection can be made at any stage of the proceedings, and it is, therefore, not an improper exercise of the discre tion under Rule 401 to refuse leave to file a conditional appearance for the purpose of making such an objection.
For all of these reasons we are of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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