Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

T-3277-76
Pierre Isidore Girard (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Defendant)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, February 22; Ottawa, March 4, 1977.
Crown — Contract for personal services — Whether, with out contractual agreement, plaintiff entitled to holiday pay pursuant to s. 40 of Canada Labour Code — Whether plaintiff employed pursuant to section 13, 14 or 16 of National Film Act — Exclusion of National Film Board from provisions of Canada Labour Code — Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, ss. 27(2) and 40 — National Film Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-7, ss. 10(1)(d), 13 and 14 — Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35, s. 2.
Plaintiff is claiming holiday pay under the provisions of the Canada Labour Code in the absence of any such entitlement having been agreed to in his contract with the National Film Board. Defendant admits that the plaintiff was employed by the Board but argues that the provisions of the Code do not apply.
Held, the claim is dismissed. At issue is not whether the plaintiff was an employee of the National Film Board within the meaning of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, but whether in the absence of any contractual agreement he is entitled to holiday pay. He could only be so entitled by virtue of section 40 of the Canada Labour Code and section 27 of the Code excludes from its provisions departments or agencies, such as the National Film Board, that are governed by the Financial Administration Act.
ACTION. COUNSEL:
Pierre Isidore Girard appearing on his own
behalf.
Patricia Gariépy for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Pierre Isidore Girard, Montreal, for himself.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defendant.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
WALSH J.: Plaintiff claims the sum of $770.60 representing 4% of the amount of $19,265 which he earned while working for the National Film
Board of Canada from September 1973 to July 1975, as a result of a series of contracts with them, as holiday pay during this period. Defendant admits that the amounts are correct but the date of the period of employment was up to September 8, 1975. It denies, however, that any holiday pay is due as the result of the terms of his employment and states that the provisions of the Canada Labour Code' do not apply in his case.
During the period in question he was employed as an assistant editor or sound editor on both French and English productions. With the excep tion of a series of invoices for the period between January and March 1974 when he simply invoiced the Board on a per diem basis varying between $30 and $40 a day and was paid these amounts without deductions his employment resulted from a series of contracts some calling for $100 weekly pay ments and others for amounts of $40, $45, or $50 a day payable every two weeks. These latter con tracts calling for payment on a per diem basis have a clause stating that "statutory holidays falling within this period shall be considered as paid holidays". His pay slips indicate that deductions were made regularly for federal and provincial income tax, Quebec Hospital Insurance, Canada Pension Plan and Unemployment Insurance. On the other hand he was unable to join the union and no deductions were made for the public service pension plan nor for the medical plan nor was he required to take any oath of secrecy when taking up his employment.
He states that he worked a regular eight-hour day like anyone else and considers that he was a regular employee. As an example, in cases where he was merely rendering services to an employer, he submitted a number of invoices which he ren dered from time to time to one Sonolab Inc. on an hourly basis for which he was paid the gross amount without any deductions.
' R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1.
Mr. Gilles Roy, the Assistant Personnel Direc tor of the National Film Board, testified that there are several different types of employees. First there is the regular employee covered by section 13 of the National Film Act 2 . Subsection (3) of this section reads as follows:
(3) Subject to the plan of organization approved under this section and subject to subsection (4), the Board may appoint persons for a term or during pleasure to fill the positions established by the plan, prescribe their conditions of employ ment and provide for their promotion, salary and salary increases, but the provisions of the Public Service Employment Act relating to political partisanship and, where applicable, the condition of employment relating to payment of gratuity on death pursuant to the Financial Administration Act apply to the persons appointed under this section.
Subsection (4) provides that the appointment of such a person to a continuing position at a salary exceeding five thousand dollars is not effective until approved by the Governor in Council. Sub section (5) provides that such an employee shall take an oath of office and secrecy.
The second class of employee is covered by section 14 which reads as follows:
14. Thé Board may employ such persons in positions other than in continuing positions in the plan approved under section 13, as may be required from time to time for the operations of the Board and may determine their remuneration and condi tions of employment.
Mr. Roy contends, however, that plaintiff's employment was by virtue of a series of contracts made pursuant to section 10(1) (d) of the Act which reads as follows:
10. (1) Subject to the direction and control of the Minister, the Board may, for the purposes for which it is established,
(d) enter into contracts in the name of the Board, including contracts for personal services;
Except for the period between January and March 1974, when plaintiff appears to have been employed on a per diem basis and paid accordingly on a separate form headed "Invoice for Goods and/or Services" which indicates that these were contracts for services and the 4% holiday pay would certainly not apply, plaintiff's employment was by a series of contracts in which the pay clause No. 2 is left blank to be filled in when the contract is negotiated. Apparently occasionally
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-7.
such a negotiated pay clause calls for the payment of 4% holiday pay on termination but this was not the case in any of the contracts made with plain tiff. According to Mr. Roy he was engaged as a "pigiste". This is a term which is somewhat dif ficult to translate but the collective agreement between the National Film Board and Le Syndicat général du Cinéma et de la Télévision, Technical Category, Article 40 translates pigisme as free lancing. This Article reads as follows:
40.01 The Employer maintains the principle and the practice of obtaining the services of regular employees and freelancers. It is agreed that services of freelancers shall not be obtained to circumvent the provisions of this agreement or to terminate employment of regular employees.
40.02 The Employer agrees to consult the Syndicat every three months on the matter of utilization of freelancers.
According to Mr. Roy plaintiff's name was includ ed on the list of freelancers sent to the union every three months. Unlike full-time employees they are free to take other employment at the same time if they wish. The reason they do not form part of the union is that their salaries vary according to the agreements made. While Mr. Roy contended that such freelance employees engaged under section 10(1)(d) normally are paid 10% to 15% more than similar full-time employees, which would compen sate for the fact that they are not paid 4% vacation pay, plaintiff denies that he was receiving more. It was conceded that there is a variation in pay between the various freelancers as appears in fact from the different rates of pay paid to plaintiff himself under various agreements.
Mr. Roy further testified that at some time the National Film Board had requested an opinion as to whether unemployment insurance deductions should be made from such employees and the answer was in the affirmative. Since this was never appealed there is no decision by an Umpire under the Unemployment Insurance Act on this issue.
Two decisions of the Public Service Staff Rela tions Board were referred to. The first dated
May 1, 1974, No. 147-8-7, is a decision by virtue of section 33 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act on application by Le Syndicat général du Cinéma et de la Télévision seeking to establish the affiliation of one Mr. Leblanc to its negotiation unit. Mr. Leblanc was employed by the National Film Board under somewhat similar conditions to plaintiff in the present case and at page 6 of the decision it is stated:
[TRANSLATION] Mr. Leblanc did the same work during the same working hours and under the same supervision as regular employees of the sound synchronization service.
At page 7 it is stated:
[TRANSLATION] The parties agree that persons employed as "pigistes" by respondent are not employees in the sense under stood in the collective agreement or the Public Service Staff Relations Act and that they do not belong to a negotiation unit. 3
Analyzing the provisions of section 2 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act 4 which reads as follows:
2. In this Act
"employee" means a person employed in the Public Service, other than
(a) a person appointed by the Governor in Council under an Act of Parliament to a statutory position described in that Act,
(b) a person locally engaged outside Canada,
(c) a person whose compensation for the performance of the regular duties of his position or office consists of fees of office, or is related to the revenue of the office in which he is employed,
(d) a person not ordinarily required to work more than one-third of the normal period for persons doing similar work,
(e) a person who is a member or special constable of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or who is employed by that Force under terms and conditions substantially the same as those of a member thereof,
(/) a person employed on a casual or temporary basis, unless he has been so employed for a period of six months or more,
(g) a person employed by or under the Board, or
3 Plaintiff testified that eventually he paid union dues volun tarily hoping that the union would in due course be enabled to include the pigistes in the negotiating unit, but in the absence of a change in the collective agreement this is irrelevant.
4 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35.
(h) a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity,
and for the purposes of this definition a person does not cease to be employed in the Public Service by reason only of his ceasing to work as a result of a strike or by reason only of his discharge contrary to this or any other Act of Parliament;
and 10(1)(d) of the National Film Act (supra) the decision concludes at page 11 that section 2 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act does not exclude its application to persons such as Mr. Leblanc who have been employed continuously for over six months, and that as a result he is included in the definition of an employee within the said section 2 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act.
After referring to the terms of the contract of employment and to sections 13, 14 and 10(1)(d) of the National Film Act, the Board concluded that Mr. Leblanc had never at any time been appointed to a regular position and therefore remained a freelance employee despite the fact that he was working by virtue of a series of personal service contracts with his employers and hence could not be considered as affiliated with a negotiating unit of the petitioner.
Another decision was made by the Public Ser vice Staff Relations Board on November 18, 1976, bearing No. 143-8-160 in which Le Syndicat géné- ral du Cinéma et de la Télévision were petitioners seeking to be accredited as a negotiation unit for persons attached to the National Film Board by an employment contract for at least six months and obliged to spend one third of the normal working time required from members of the technical unit doing similar work. That application was heard on the basis that these workers were subject to the same supervision, working at the same place and under the same working conditions, and that in some cases they benefited from some of the social advantages such as paid annual holidays and statu tory holidays and overtime pay. The persons in question were employed by virtue of section 10(1) (d) of the Act and did not take the oath of office required by section 13(5) and were not required to contribute to the retirement pension fund established by virtue of the Public Service Superannuation Act. This decision again referred
to the definition of "employee" in the Public Ser vice Staff Relations Act (supra). It also referred to the definition of "Public Service" in section 2 of this Act which reads as follows:
"Public Service" means the several positions in or under any department or other portion of the public service of Canada specified from time to time in Schedule I;
The National Film Board comes within Part II of Schedule I and is therefore a "separate employer" within the meaning of the definition of "employer" in section 2 which reads as follows:
"employer" means Her Majesty in right of Canada as repre sented by,
(a) in the case of any portion of the public service of Canada specified in Part I of Schedule I, the Treasury Board, and
(b) in the case of any portion of the public service of Canada specified in Part II of Schedule I, the separate employer concerned;
The Board concluded that there is no doubt that persons employed by virtue of section 13(3) or 14 of the National Film Act are persons employed in the Public Service and as a consequence "employees" in the sense of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. It concluded however that persons employed by virtue of section 10(1) (d) of the Act do not occupy "positions" within the meaning of the definition of "Public Service", are therefore not employees within the meaning of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, and that only such employees can be represented by an accredit ed negotiating agent.
This Court is bound neither by the decision of the Minister of National Revenue in connection with the deduction of unemployment insurance contributions from plaintiffs remuneration, nor by the two decisions of the Public Service Staff Rela tions Board although such decisions are of consid erable interest in deciding the present action. On the facts it is clear that in most respects plaintiffs employment more closely resembled a contract of personal service than a contract for services. There are other factors referred to above, however, which indicate that he could not be considered as an
employee of the National Film Board within the meaning of the Public Service Staff Relations Act in view of the manner of his appointment. The issue in the present case is not whether his employ ment came within the terms of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, however, which was the issue in the two cases referred to, but merely whether in the absence of specific reference to it in various employment contracts he is entitled to 4% holiday pay. In the absence of such specific agreement his only right to same would be by virtue of section 40 of the Canada Labour Code. Section 27(2) of that Act, which comes within Part III dealing with standard hours, wages, vacations and holidays, reads as follows:
27. (2) This Part applies to and in respect of any corpora tion established to perform any function or duty on behalf of the Government of Canada other than a corporation that is a department under the Financial Administration Act.
Unfortunately for plaintiff the National Film Board is a department under the Financial Administration Act 5 being designated as such by virtue of Order in Council 1903 of 1952. It there fore does not come within the provisions of Part III of the Canada Labour Code. Plaintiffs claim for holiday pay must therefore fail.
Since the issue has apparently never been raised before, and on the facts plaintiff had considerable justification for feeling that he was so entitled, I exercise my discretion in dismissing his action, as I am obliged to do, by doing so without costs.
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-10.
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