T-2620-76
Professional Institute of the Public Service of
Canada (Applicant)
v.
Anti-Inflation Board, Jean-Luc Pépin, David
Chapman, Claude Castonguay, Jack Biddell, Wil-
liam Ladyman and Harold Renouf (Respondents)
Trial Division, Addy J.—Ottawa, July 21 and 26,
1976.
Practice—Application for injunction restraining respondents
from requesting Administrator under Anti-Inflation Act from
acting on an arbitral award rendered by Public Service Staff
Relations Board—Administrator acting in judicial capacity
Administrator must decide whether he has jurisdiction
Applicant seeking to restrain reference to a tribunal No
precedent—Restraint would be inequitable and Court would be
usurping function of a tribunal in deciding whether or not it
has jurisdiction.
Application for injunction restraining respondents from
asking the Administrator under the Anti-Inflation Act to inter
fere with an arbitral award rendered by the Public Service
Staff Relations Board. Motion was argued at the same time as
the application by the same applicant relying on the same
evidence and arguments for a writ of mandamus against the
Treasury Board in the same matter. (See [1977] 1 F.C. 304.)
Held, the motion is dismissed. Both parties agree that the
Anti-Inflation Board exercising its powers under section 12 of
the Anti-Inflation Act is not acting in a judicial capacity and
the proper procedure to restrain the respondents is by way of
injunction. However, the Administrator in exercising his powers
under sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 is acting in a judicial capacity
and one must assume that a tribunal will, especially in consid
ering whether it has jurisdiction, conform to the law. If there is
no jurisdiction, the matter will end there; if there is, the
injunction sought should not be granted by this Court. There is
no precedent for any court restraining a person from addressing
himself to a tribunal and it would not only be inequitable but
also contrary to law for this Court to grant the injunction
applied for and thereby usurp a function of the tribunal.
APPLICATION for injunction.
COUNSEL:
•
G. Henderson, Q.C., for applicant.
G. W. Ainslie, Q.C., for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Gowling & Henderson, Ottawa, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondents.
The following are the reasons for order ren
dered in English by
ADDY J.: The present application is for an
injunction pursuant to section 18(a) of the Federal
Court Act to restrain the respondents from
requesting the Administrator acting under the
Anti-Inflation Act' from considering, hearing, or
in any way acting on an arbitral award rendered
on the 13th of April, 1976 by the Public Service
Staff Relations Board.
The motion was argued at the same time as
another application by the same applicant against
the Treasury Board and its members for a writ of
mandamus involving the same matters. (Refer
[ 1977] 1 F.C. 304.)
Counsel relied on the same evidence in both
motions and largely on the same arguments in so
far as the merits were concerned as well as some of
the preliminary objections. Rather than repeat the
facts here I refer to my reasons in the mandamus
motion (supra) for the summary of the facts.
Both counsel agreed that the Anti-Inflation
Board, in exercising its powers under section 12 of
the Anti-Inflation Act, is not deciding anything or
determining any rights and is not acting as a
tribunal or in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
and, therefore, the proper procedure available to
restrain the respondents is by way of injunction
and not by prohibition. I am of the same view.
On the other hand, when one considers the type
of investigation carried out by the Administrator
under section 17 and his investigative powers con
tained in sections 18 and 19, and, following his
decision, his powers to prohibit a person from
contravening the guidelines under section 20 and
of requiring a person to pay monies to Her Majes
ty in the right of Canada, he is without the slight
est doubt acting in a judicial capacity and is most
definitely finally determining rights.
As in the case of the above-mentioned applica
tion for mandamus, the main argument of the
applicant in the present motion is that the Anti
1 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 75.
Inflation Board has no longer power to inquire
into, and the Administrator under the Anti-Infla
tion Act has no power to determine, vary or affect,
the award of the Arbitrator under the Public
Service Staff Relations Act 2 , which award has,
since the 12th of July, 1976, become final.
One is not entitled to assume in advance that a
tribunal will arrive at an illegal decision and espe
cially at an erroneous interpretation of its own
jurisdiction; on the contrary, one must assume that
it will conform to the law. The Administrator
under the Anti-Inflation Act, as in the case of
every other tribunal, before dealing with the merits
of the matter before him not only possesses the
required jurisdiction to determine whether he has
jurisdiction in any particular case, but is under a
strict legal duty to do so. If the view of the counsel
for the applicant is the correct one, then, one must
assume that the Administrator will decline juris
diction and the matter will end there. If it is not,
then the injunction should never be granted by this
Court at all.
In effect, what the applicant is requesting is that
certain persons or a body constituted by the
respondents be restrained from referring a matter
to a tribunal. I have never heard, nor has counsel
for the applicant been able to refer me to any
precedent where any person was ever restrained by
a court from addressing himself to another tri
bunal, much less one which has jurisdiction to deal
with the subject-matter. In this respect, I was
invited by counsel for the applicant to be innova
tive, create a new precedent and grant the injunc
tion since, according to him, our law had now
evolved to the extent that this is the proper and
equitable thing to do in the present circumstances.
I completely reject this submission, for, on the
contrary, if the law is developing in any direction
at all, in so far as the question of accessibility of
tribunals is concerned, it is towards making them
ever more accessible to an ever-increasing number
of people on ever-expanding grounds.
It would not only be inequitable, and an injunc
tion should never be granted when it would be
inequitable to do so, but, in my view, it would be
contrary to law for this Court to use the equitable
process of injunction to restrain anybody from
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35, as amended.
recourse to a tribunal even on the grounds that
that particular tribunal might not possess jurisdic
tion for, as previously stated, one must necessarily
presume that, where a tribunal does not possess
jurisdiction, it will in fact come to that conclusion.
That function should not be usurped by this Court.
There is no question here of harassment or abuse
of process.
On this ground alone, the motion will be dis
missed but I wish to emphasize that I am not, in
coming to this conclusion, finding or even indirect
ly suggesting or implying in any way that the
Administrator under the Anti-Inflation Act would
not in fact possess jurisdiction to take what action
he might deem appropriate under the Anti-Infla
tion Guidelines 3 , notwithstanding the arbitral
award under the Public Service Staff Relations
Act. On the contrary, I am deliberately refraining
from dealing with the merits; I consider it this
Court's legal duty to dismiss the motion on the
above-mentioned fundamental ground for objec
tion and I feel that, under the circumstances, it
would be preferable that any tribunal which might
be called upon to deal with the merits of this
current and important issue in the near future, not
be faced with what in effect would be rank obiter
dicta on my part.
I am also refraining from coming to any finding
on the other procedural and substantive objections
raised by the respondents since it appears so evi
dent to me that the application must in any event
fail for the reasons I have stated.
There will be an order dismissing this motion
with costs.
3 SOR/76-1.
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