A-108-76
Nadine Pirotte (Applicant)
v.
Unemployment Insurance Commission and George
A. Addy J., Umpire (Respondents)
and
Deputy Attorney General of Canada (Mis -en-
cause)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Le Dain JJ. and Hyde
D.J.—Montreal, October 13 and November 9,
1976.
Judicial review—Appeal from decision of umpire under
Unemployment Insurance Act—Appellant, ignorant of claims
procedure, followed erroneous advice of employer—Whether
"good cause for delay" within meaning of s. 20(4) of Act and s.
150 of Regulations—Federal Court Act, s. 28—Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, ss. 20(1) and (4),
53, 54 and 55—Unemployment Insurance Regulations, s. 150.
Applicant did not know procedure for claiming unemploy
ment insurance benefits and was wrongly advised by her
employer, with the result that there was a delay in her submis
sion of a claim in the manner prescribed by the Act and
Regulations. The umpire held that there could be no "good
cause for delay" unless the applicant's ignorance or mistake
was the result of misrepresentations by the Unemployment
Insurance Commission. The applicant claims that the umpire
erred in law in coming to this conclusion.
Held, the application is dismissed. Under the Act, compli
ance with the Act and Regulations in submitting a claim is an
essential condition of entitlement to benefits. What Parliament
means by "good cause" must be determined in the light of
general principles of law unless there is a clear intention to
depart from them and one of those principles is that ignorance
of the law does not excuse failure to comply with a statutory
provision. The only situation where ignorance of the law might
be good cause for delay would be if the Commission itself was
responsible for that ignorance.
Mihm v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [1970]
S.C.R. 348, applied. Varty v. Rimbey (1954) 7 W.W.R.
(N.S.) 256 (Alta. C.A.), agreed with.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
Roland Cousineau for applicant.
Jean Marc Aubry for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Cousineau & Beauchemin, Montreal, for
applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondents.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
LE DAIN J.: This is a section 28 application to
set aside the decision of an umpire under the
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971', dismissing
an appeal by the applicant from the decision of a
board of referees.
The facts on which the parties agreed for pur
poses of the appeal to the umpire are as follows.
The applicant knew that she had a right to claim
unemployment insurance benefits, but she did not
know the procedure for making a claim. She
sought information from an employee in the
Quebec Department of Education, in which she
had been employed. She was advised by this
employee that she must report her termination of
employment to the offices of the Unemployment
Insurance Commission in Ottawa and await a
reply from them, which might take some consider
able time. As a result of her ignorance of the Act
and the Regulations, and the erroneous informa
tion received from the representative of her
employer, there was delay in the applicant's sub
mission of a claim in the manner prescribed by the
Act and the Regulations.
The question that the umpire was called upon to
determine was whether these circumstances could
be considered to be "good cause for delay" within
the meaning of section 20(4) of the Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1971, which provides for relief
from such delay in certain cases as follows:
20. (4) When a claimant makes an initial claim for benefit
on a day later than the day he was first qualified to make the
claim and shows good cause for his delay, the claim may,
subject to prescribed conditions, be regarded as having been
made on a day earlier than the day on which it was actually
made.
' S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
Section 150 of the Regulations makes further
provision for such relief as follows:
150. (1) An initial claim for benefit may be regarded as
having been made on a day prior to the day on which it was
actually made if the claimant proves that
(a) on the prior day he fulfilled, in all respects, the condi
tions of entitlement to benefit and was in a position to furnish
proof thereof; and
(b) throughout the whole period between that prior day and
the day he made the claim he had good cause for the delay in
making that claim.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), no initial claim for benefit
shall be regarded as having been made on a day that is more
than thirteen weeks prior to the day on which it was made.
(3) An initial claim for benefit may be regarded as having
been made on a day that is more than thirteen and not more
than twenty-six weeks prior to the day on which it was made if
the claimant proves that subsequent to the prior day he was
incapable of work by reason of sickness, injury or quarantine.
The umpire held that ignorance or mistake of
law, however induced, unless by representatives on
behalf of the Unemployment Insurance Commis
sion, cannot, as a matter of law, be "good cause
for delay" within the meaning of section 20(4),
and he dismissed the appeal. The applicant con
tends that the umpire erred in law.
The question, as I see it, is whether it is reason
able to conclude in this particular context, given
the nature of the statutory requirement involved,
its role and effect in the legislative scheme, and the
clear intention to provide for relief from delay
where the circumstances appear to justify it, that
Parliament could have contemplated ignorance or
mistake of law as constituting good cause, at least
in some circumstances.
As sections 20(1), 53, 54 and 55 of the Act
indicate, the submission of a claim in accordance
with the requirements of the Act and the Regula
tions is an essential condition of entitlement to
unemployment benefits and determines the date
from which entitlement begins to run. The law
would appear to be designed to encourage the
prompt filing of claims, presumably so that the
Commission may verify the conditions of entitle
ment as soon as possible after the interruption of
earnings. A claim may be antedated if the claim
ant shows good cause for the delay.
What Parliament contemplated by good cause
in section 20(4) of the Act must be determined in
the light of general principles of law. It is pre
sumed that Parliament did not intend to depart
from such principles unless the intention to do so is
clear. (Maxwell, On Interpretation of Statutes,
12th ed., p. 116.) It is a fundamental principle that
ignorance of law does not excuse failure to comply
with a statutory provision. (Mihm v. Minister of
Manpower and Immigration [1970] S.C.R. 348 at
p. 353.) The principle is sometimes criticized as
implying an unreasonable imputation of knowl
edge but it has long been recognized as essential to
the maintenance and operation of the legal order.
Because of its very fundamental character I am
unable to conclude, without more specific indica
tion, that Parliament intended that "good cause"
in section 20(4) should include ignorance of law.
The issue in this case is somewhat analogous to
that which the courts have had to consider under
statutory provisions for relief from failure to give
municipal corporations the notice of accident
required by law, where there is "reasonable
excuse" for the want or insufficiency of notice. It
has been held that mere ignorance of law, at least
where there is no fault imputable to the other
party, is not reasonable excuse. (Varty v. Rimbey
(1953) 7 W.W.R. (N.S.) 681, affirmed by (1954)
12 W.W.R. (N.S.) 256 (Alta. C.A.).) I can see no
good reason for not taking the same view of the
essentially similar expression "good cause" in the
present case.
The admission of ignorance of the law as good
cause for delay would, as the umpire has said,
introduce considerable uncertainty into the
administration of the Act without the possibility of
any clear and reliable criteria to determine when it
should apply in particular cases. I do not under
stand any one to contend that ignorance of the law
should be good cause for delay in any and all
circumstances. If not, then when, in principle,
would it be considered to be justification? I cannot
conceive of any workable criterion short of a duty
of care that would be satisfied only by application
to the Commission itself for information as to the
precise requirements of the law and regulations. In
such a case we would be dealing not so much with
ignorance of law as with mistake induced by
representations on behalf of the Commission. Such
a case might be regarded as good cause for delay
because it would be a cause imputable to the
Commission rather than to the claimant. It is not
necessary, however, for purposes of the present
case to express an opinion on this point.
In the result, I am of the opinion that the
umpire did not err in law, and that the section 28
application should accordingly be dismissed.
* * *
PRATTE J.: I agree that this section 28 applica
tion should be dismissed.
* * *
HYDE D.J.: I agree.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.