A-728-76
Phillis Jonas (Applicant)
v.
G. Therrien and Minister of Manpower and Immi
gration (Respondents)
and
Deputy Attorney General of Canada (Mis -en-
cause)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Le Dain JJ., and
Hyde D.J.—Montreal, March 22, 1977; Ottawa,
April 15, 1977.
Judicial review — Immigration Application to set aside
deportation order — Entry as housekeeper granted for limited
time to expire on fixed date or on date employment visa ceased
to be valid (if earlier) — Employment changed without
authorization — Violations of conditions of employment visa
— Employment visa ceasing to be valid — Whether regula
tions re "limiting of admission of persons" in s. 57(g) of
Immigration Act merely authorize quotas Whether status
of persons can be made conditional on continuing to meet
requirements — Conditions expressly authorized by Regula-
tions—Regulations within authority of s. 57(g)(iii) of Act
Applicant ceasing to be non-immigrant and remaining in
Canada without authorization — Application dismissed —
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2, ss. 18(I)(e)(vi), 57(g)(iii)
Immigration Regulations, Part I, SOR/62-36 (as amended
by 73-20), s. 3C, 3E.
APPLICATION.
COUNSEL:
Julius Grey for applicant.
Suzanne Marcoux-Paquette for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Lazare & Altschuler, Montreal, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondents.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
PRATTE J.: This is a section 28 application to
review and set aside the deportation order made
against the applicant on October 19, 1976.
The applicant is from Tobago. In December
1975, she was authorized to remain and work in
Canada as a non-immigrant. As required by sec
tion 3C of the Immigration Regulations, Part I
[SOR/62-36, as amended], she was then in posses
sion of an employment visa authorizing her to
work as a housekeeper for a Mrs. Griswald in
Montreal. Pursuant to section 3E of the Regula
tions, she was granted entry for a limited time to
expire on the earlier of the following dates:
(a) the 10th day of December 1976, or
(b) the day on which her employment visa
would cease to be valid.
Sometime in the spring of 1976, the applicant
ceased to work for Mrs. Griswald, the employer
named in her employment visa and, without
authorization, took up another job. It is common
ground that by so doing the applicant violated the
conditions of her employment visa which, thereby,
ceased to be valid.
In August 1976, a report was made under sec
tion 18(1)(e)(vi) of the Immigration Act alleging
in substance that the applicant had remained in
Canada after having ceased to be a non-immigrant
since she had remained in Canada without author
ization after having left her job with Mrs. Gris-
wald. An inquiry was held following which the
Special Inquiry Officer, having found that the
allegations of the section 18 report had been estab
lished, ordered the applicant to be deported.
As was indicated at the hearing, in view of
previous decisions of this Court, the only argument
put forward by counsel for the applicant that needs
to be considered is the contention that the appli
cant did not cease to be a non-immigrant when she
stopped working for Mrs. Griswald because the
immigration authorities, who had the power to rule
on her admissibility, could not, according to coun
sel, make her status as a non-immigrant in Canada
subject to the condition that she would continue to
work for the person named in her employment
visa. Such a condition, according to counsel, is an
intolerable restraint on the personal freedom of a
non-immigrant.
Whether or not the imposition of such a condi
tion is considered as limiting unduly the personal
freedom of a non-immigrant, the fact is that it is
expressly authorized by the Regulations. Conse
quently, the validity of that condition depends on
the validity of the Regulations.
The authority of the Governor in Council to
make regulations under the Immigration Act is
derived from section 57 which reads in part as
follows:
57. The Governor in Council may make regulations for
carrying into effect the purposes and provisions of this Act and,
without restricting the generality of the foregoing, may make
regulations respecting
(g) the prohibiting or limiting of admission of persons by
reason of
(iii) unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic,
social, industrial, educational, labour, health or other con
ditions or requirements existing, temporarily or otherwise,
in Canada or in the area or country from or through which
such persons come to Canada.....
In essence, the regulations on employment visas
restrict the admission of the non-immigrants
intending to work in Canada, to those who will
engage in work that no Canadian is able and
willing to execute. Those regulations appear to me
to be within the authority conferred by section
57(g)(iii) since, as I understand them, they limit
the admission of non-immigrants by reason of the
unsuitability for admission, having regard to the
economic conditions existing in Canada, of those
who, if admitted, would take jobs away from
Canadians.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the
words "limiting of admission of persons" in section
57(g) merely authorize the fixing of quotas. I do
not see why the meaning of the word "limiting"
should be so restricted. He also argued that the
authority to limit "the admission of persons"
under section 57(g) did not include the power to
make the status of persons, after admission, condi
tional on those persons continuing to meet certain
requirements. I do not agree with that contention,
which, it may be noted, does not find any support
in the French version of section 57(g). The author
ity to impose limitations on the admission of per
sons to Canada includes, in my view, the power to
subject the admission to the conditions that are
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the limita
tions that are imposed. Such conditions are un
necessary if the limitation on admission is made by
fixing a "quota" or by reference to a fact existing
at the time of the admission; but the absence of
conditions of that type would render meaningless
limitations imposed by reference to the activities
that the persons seeking admission will engage in
while in Canada.
For these reasons, I would dismiss the
application.
* * *
LE DAIN J.: I agree.
* * *
HYDE D.J.: I agree.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.